In this important and revelatory book, Jonathan Tucker, a leading expert on chemical and biological weapons, chronicles the lethal history of chemical warfare from World War I to the present. At the turn of the twentieth century, the rise of synthetic chemistry made the large-scale use of toxic chemicals on the battlefield both feasible and cheap. Tucker explores the long debate over the military utility and morality of chemical warfare, from the first chlorine gas attack at Ypres in 1915 to Hitler’s reluctance to use nerve agents (he believed, incorrectly, that the U.S. could retaliate in kind) to Saddam Hussein’s gassing of his own people, and concludes with the emergent threat of chemical terrorism. Moving beyond history to the twenty-first century, War of Nerves makes clear that we are at a crossroads that could lead either to the further spread of these weapons or to their ultimate abolition.

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. Despite originally being published in 1984, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.

Recently, World War II veterans have come forward to claim compensation for health effects they say were caused by their participation in chemical warfare experiments. In response, the Veterans Administration asked the Institute of Medicine to study the issue. Based on a literature review and personal testimony from more than 250 affected veterans, this new volume discusses in detail the development and chemistry of mustard agents and Lewisite followed by interesting and informative discussions about these substances and their possible connection to a range of health problems, from cancer to reproductive disorders. The volume also offers an often chilling historical examination of the use of volunteers in chemical warfare experiments by the U.S. militaryâ€"what the then-young soldiers were told prior to the experiments, how they were "encouraged" to remain in the program, and how they were treated afterward. This comprehensive and controversial book will be of importance to policymakers and legislators, military and civilian planners, officials at the Department of Veterans Affairs, military historians, and researchers.

This explosive look into the dawn of chemical warfare during World War I is "a terrifying piece of history that almost no one knows" (Hampton Sides). In 1915, when German forces executed the first successful gas attack of World War I, the world watched in horror as the boundaries of warfare were forever changed. Cries of barbarianism rang throughout Europe, yet Allied nations immediately jumped into the fray, kickstarting an arms race that would redefine a war already steeped in unimaginable horror. Largely forgotten in the confines of history, the development of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service in 1917 left an indelible imprint on World War I. This small yet powerful division, along with the burgeoning Bureau of Mines, assembled research and military unites devoted solely to chemical weaponry, outfitting regiments with hastily made gas-resistant uniforms and recruiting scientists and engineers from around the world into the fight. As the threat of new gases and more destructive chemicals grew stronger, the chemists' secret work in the laboratories transformed into an explosive fusion of steel, science, and gas on the battlefield. Drawing from years of research, Theo Emery brilliantly shows how World War I quickly spiraled into a chemists' war, one led by the companies of young American engineers-turned-soldiers who would soon become known as the "Hellfire Boys." As gas attacks began to mark the heaviest and most devastating battles, these brave and brilliant men were on the front lines, racing against the clock -- and the Germans -- to protect, develop, and unleash the latest weapons of mass destruction.

General employment of toxic munitions in World War I made it necessary for the United States as a belligerent to protect its soldiers against gas attack, and to furnish means for conducting gas warfare. The postwar revulsion against the use of gas in no way guaranteed that it would not be used in another war; and to maintain readiness for gas warfare, Congress therefore authorized the retention of the Chemical Warfare Service as a small but important part of the Army organization. Between world wars, officers of the Chemical Warfare Service anticipated that in another conflict the Service would again be principally concerned with gas warfare, and they concentrated on defense and retaliation against it. The almost equal preparedness of the United States and other nations for gas warfare acted during World War II as the principal deterrent to the uses of gas. That it was not used has obscured the very large and vital effort that preparations for gas warfare required at home and overseas. This effort involved large numbers of American scientists and the American chemical industry as well as the Chemical Warfare Service, and served not only the Army but also the other armed forces of the United States and those of Allied nations. And in World War II the Chemical Warfare Service and its civilian collaborators came up with some new major weapons, notably the 4.2-inch mortar, generators for large-area smoke screening, flame throwers, and incendiary and flame bombs. The Service acquired in addition an entirely new mission, that of preparing the nation against the hazards of biological attack. In fulfilling its responsibilities the Chemical Warfare Service during the war compiled a record of achievement that readers of this subseries both in and out of the Army, will find instructive.

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC 2.5 license. On April 22, 1915, the German military released 150 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium. Carried by a long-awaited wind, the chlorine cloud passed within a few minutes through the British and French trenches, leaving behind at least 1,000 dead and 4,000 injured. This chemical attack, which amounted to the first use of a weapon of mass destruction, marks a turning point in world history. The preparation as well as the execution of the gas attack was orchestrated by Fritz Haber, the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem. During World War I, Haber transformed his research institute into a center for the development of chemical weapons (and of the means of protection against them). Bretislav Friedrich and Martin Wolf (Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society, the successor institution of Haber’s institute) together with Dieter Hoffmann, Jürgen Renn, and Florian Schmaltz (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) organized an international symposium to commemorate the centenary of the infamous chemical attack. The symposium examined crucial facets of chemical warfare from the first research on and deployment of chemical weapons in WWI to the development and use of chemical warfare during the century hence. The focus was on scientific, ethical, legal, and political issues of chemical weapons research and deployment — including the issue of dual use — as well as the ongoing effort to control the possession of chemical weapons and to ultimately achieve their elimination. The volume consists of papers presented at the symposium and supplemented by additional articles that together cover key aspects of chemical warfare from 22 April 1915 until the summer of 2015.

This volume, the second in a series of three devoted to the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in World War II, now the Chemical Corps, covers research, development, procurement, and distribution of chemical warfare materiel. It traces the history of these activities from the World War I period, when the CWS was activated to supervise the offensive and defensive aspects of gas warfare throughout the Army, until the end of World War II. The first volume in the series, "Organizing for War", discusses the development of the CWS organization and mission as well as personnel management and military training. The third volume, entitled "Chemicals in Combat", will deal with the chemical warfare activities in the theaters of operations. In treating research and development, the present volume concentrates on CWS projects that proved of greatest significance to the armed forces during World War II. It attempts to point up the problems that arose in course of research and development and to indicate the solutions which the scientists hit upon. Since research and development in the zone of the interior was closely related to research and development in the theaters of operations, the volume covers activities in both areas. In contrast to research and development, procurement and distribution differed considerably as between the zone of the interior and the theaters of operations; in the theaters these activities were closely associated with the commanders' combat responsibilities. The volume, therefore, confines itself to a review of procurement and distribution in the zone of the interior, leaving narration of theater activities to the volume "Chemicals in combat".