This note analyzes the stress experienced (and caused) by open-end mutual funds during the March COVID-19 stress episode, with a focus on global fixed-income funds. In light of increased valuation uncertainty, funds experienced a short period of intense withdrawals while the market liquidity of their holdings deteriorated substantially. To cover redemptions, afflicted funds predominantly shed liquid assets first—for example, cash, cash equivalents, and US Treasury securities. But forced asset sales amplified price pressures in markets and contributed to liquidity falling across fixed-income markets. This drop in market liquidity, as well as the general stress in financial markets, may have led to fund investors becoming even more sensitive to challenging portfolio performance and encouraged further withdrawals. Only after central banks intervened, directly and indirectly supporting asset managers, did liquidity and redemption stress subside. Overall, the March episode validated the financial-stability concerns about liquidity vulnerabilities in the fund industry and calls for further action to address them.

We study three cases in which specialized arbitrageurs lost significant amounts of capital and, as a result, became liquidity demanders rather than providers. The effects on security markets were large and persistent: Prices dropped relative to fundamentals and the rebound took months. While multi-strategy hedge funds who were not capital constrained increased their positions, a large fraction of these funds actually acted as net sellers consistent with the view that information barriers within a firm (not just relative to outside investors) can lead to capital constraints for trading desks with mark-to-market losses. Our findings suggest that real world frictions impede arbitrage capital.

Local currency government bonds (OFZ bonds) are an important fixed-income instrument in Russia’s financial markets. In this paper, based on granular data, we explore the development of the OFZ bond market with a focus on foreign investors. As this fixed-income market has experienced a liberalization of the domestic trading and settlement infrastructure, and weathered several episodes of market stresses since the 2008–09 global financial crisis, the role of foreign investors can be observed along with these events. What we have found is that foreign investors had influenced the market before they became an important player and since then they have contributed to the development of the market while not necessarily destabilizing it in episodes of shocks.

The COVID-19 global health pandemic, which started in late December 2019, forced many countries to adopt unusual measures such as social distancing and strict lockdowns. It changed many of our certainties and practices, including the foundations of the market-led version of capitalism, by bringing social and health considerations back to the forefront of firms' considerations, investors' strategies and governments' priorities. Under the effects of this unprecedented crisis, all sectors of finance and real economy have been seriously affected.Health uncertainties and their increasing consequences for human life and activities require stronger and faster actions to shape pathways towards sustainability and better resilience. The COVID-19 health crisis is a visible part of a greater iceberg: the World Health Organization has tracked, over recent years, a large number of epidemic events around the world, suggesting that many other similar diseases could appear and evolve in the future from epidemic to pandemic in a globalized world.Financial Transformations Beyond the COVID-19 Health Crisis was specifically designed to provide the readers with new results, recent findings and future outlook on the impacts of COVID-19 on financial markets, firm behaviors, and finance and investment strategies. It favors multidimensional perspectives and brings together conceptual, empirical and policy-oriented chapters, using quantitative and qualitative methods alike. This is a timely and comprehensive collection of theoretical, empirical and policy contributions from renowned scholars around the world, and provides the thoughts and insights required to rethink the financial sector in the event of new shocks of the same nature.

This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.

Using panel quantile regressions for 11 advanced and 10 emerging market economies, we show that the conditional distribution of GDP growth depends on financial conditions, with growth-at-risk (GaR)—defined as growth at the lower 5th percentile—more responsive than the median or upper percentiles. In addition, the term structure of GaR features an intertemporal tradeoff: GaR is higher in the short run; but lower in the medium run when initial financial conditions are loose relative to typical levels, and the tradeoff is amplified by a credit boom. This shift in the growth distribution generally is not incorporated when solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with macrofinancial linkages, which suggests downside risks to GDP growth are systematically underestimated.

The spread of COVID-19, containment measures, and general uncertainty led to a sharp reduction in activity in the first half of 2020. Europe was hit particularly hard—the economic contraction in 2020 is estimated to have been among the largest in the world—with potentially severe repercussions on its nonfinancial corporations. A wave of corporate bankruptcies would generate mass unemployment, and a loss of productive capacity and firm-specific human capital. With many SMEs in Europe relying primarily on the banking sector for external finance, stress in the corporate sector could easily translate into pressures in the banking system (Aiyar et al., forthcoming).

From the creator of the popular website Ask a Manager and New York’s work-advice columnist comes a witty, practical guide to 200 difficult professional conversations—featuring all-new advice! There’s a reason Alison Green has been called “the Dear Abby of the work world.” Ten years as a workplace-advice columnist have taught her that people avoid awkward conversations in the office because they simply don’t know what to say. Thankfully, Green does—and in this incredibly helpful book, she tackles the tough discussions you may need to have during your career. You’ll learn what to say when • coworkers push their work on you—then take credit for it • you accidentally trash-talk someone in an email then hit “reply all” • you’re being micromanaged—or not being managed at all • you catch a colleague in a lie • your boss seems unhappy with your work • your cubemate’s loud speakerphone is making you homicidal • you got drunk at the holiday party Praise for Ask a Manager “A must-read for anyone who works . . . [Alison Green’s] advice boils down to the idea that you should be professional (even when others are not) and that communicating in a straightforward manner with candor and kindness will get you far, no matter where you work.”—Booklist (starred review) “The author’s friendly, warm, no-nonsense writing is a pleasure to read, and her advice can be widely applied to relationships in all areas of readers’ lives. Ideal for anyone new to the job market or new to management, or anyone hoping to improve their work experience.”—Library Journal (starred review) “I am a huge fan of Alison Green’s Ask a Manager column. This book is even better. It teaches us how to deal with many of the most vexing big and little problems in our workplaces—and to do so with grace, confidence, and a sense of humor.”—Robert Sutton, Stanford professor and author of The No Asshole Rule and The Asshole Survival Guide “Ask a Manager is the ultimate playbook for navigating the traditional workforce in a diplomatic but firm way.”—Erin Lowry, author of Broke Millennial: Stop Scraping By and Get Your Financial Life Together

Abstract: We quantify the macroeconomic effects of COVID-19 for a small open economy by calibrating a SIR-multi-sector-macro model to Turkey. Sectoral supply shocks are based on the proximity requirements in each sector and the ability to work from home. Physical proximity determines the supply shock through its effect on infection rates. Sectoral demand shocks incorporate domestic and foreign demand, both of which adjust with infection rates. We calibrate demand shocks during COVID-19 using real-time credit card purchase data. Our results show that the optimal policy, which yields the lowest economic cost and saves the maximum number of lives, can be achieved under a full lockdown of 39 days. Economic costs are much larger for an open economy as the shocks are amplified through the international production network. A decline in foreign demand leads to losses in domestic sectors through international input-output linkages, accounting for a third of the total output loss. In addition, the reduction in capital flows deprives the network from its trade financing needs, where sectors with larger external finance needs experience larger losses. The policy options are limited given sparse fiscal resources to fight the pandemic domestically, while serving the external debt. We present historical evidence from 2001 crisis of Turkey, when fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies were employed altogether to deal with a triple crisis of balance of payments, banking, and sovereign debt

This paper examines the drivers of liquidity shortages in the Mexican government bond market. We use unique transaction- and quote level data with information on end-investors to construct an index of bond market liquidity. We find that liquidity remained stable in recent years, although temporary shortages arose amid domestic and global market stress. The analysis suggests that the largest liquidity squeezes have tended to be driven by foreign investors, whose sell-offs were especially pronounced in less liquid market segments. While domestic banks often absorbed part of the shock, other domestic investors--with the notable inclusion of domestic pension and mutual funds--appeared to take a more opportunistic stance depending on the nature of the shock.