The Assault Landings on Leyte Island The significance of weather in these operations, as noted in a review of action reports: BY COMMANDER, THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE: 1. The lack of weather restrictions was directly responsible for a large part of the success of the operation. 2. It was recognized that the existence of unreported typhoon weather can outweigh security considerations dictating radio silence. 3. Air operations were not seriously affected by the weather. 4. Weather conditions of wind and temperature distribution favored the efficient use of smoke in the transport area. 5. Ground operations were slowed by unfavorable soil trafficability conditions resulting from precipitation. 6. There was no attempt to use weather for concealment as our intentions had been disclosed when minesweeping operations started. 7. Good weather over the Philippine Islands favored enemy air opposition by facilitating the staging in of aircraft from other locations. BY COMMANDER, SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE: 1. The use of carrier support insures local air superiority as bad weather in the area has the same adverse effect on enemy operations. 2. Weather conditions were excellent for the landing of troops and for protection by friendly aircraft. 3. Close air support was hampered by afternoon shower activity. 4. Enemy aircraft made excellent use of cloud cover for concealment during harassing raids.

With the Leyte Campaign the War in the Pacific entered a decisive stage. The period of limited offensives, bypassing, and island hopping was virtually over. American troops in greater numbers than ever before assembled in the Pacific Theater, supported by naval and air forces of corresponding size, fought and overcame Japanese forces of greater magnitude than any previously met. Though the spotlight is on the front-line fighting, the reader will find in this volume a faithful description of all arms and services performing their missions. The account is not exclusively an infantry story. It covers as well the support of ground fighting on Leyte by large-scale naval operations and by land-based air power under the most adverse conditions. In addition, careful attention to logistical matters, such as the movement of supplies and the evacuation of the wounded, gives the reader a picture of the less spectacular activities of an army in battle.

One of the largest and most complex military efforts ever undertaken, the Leyte Operation was the Allies’ first and most important major combined operation to liberate the Philippine archipelago. The stakes were high: a successful landing at Leyte was critical to a subsequent assault on Luzon and total control of the Philippines. If Japan lost the Philippines, its supply of oil and other strategic raw materials would be cut off and its navy doomed to an inglorious end. In this comprehensive study, one of the world’s leading authorities on the subject addresses all aspects of the two-month-long ground, sea, and air invasion, and presents a complete evaluation of theater-wide command, organization, intelligence, and logistics. Drawing on a wealth of Allied and Japanese primary documents and countless secondary sources, Milan Vego describes and analyzes the operational planning and preparation as well as the execution of actions on both sides. Focusing on the operational versus tactical aspects of the struggle, he critically assesses the major decisions made by the senior commanders. His access to the Allied Magic radio intercepts allows him to shed light on what Allied and Japanese commanders knew and did not know about each other. Unlike other books on the subject, Vego provides the reader with detailed analysis of the operational lessons learned that can be taken away from the engagement. A large number of maps, figures, and tables enhance the text.

When General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia in March 1942, having successfully left the Philippines to organize a new American army, he vowed, "I shall return!" More than two years later he did return, at the head of a large U.S. army to retake the Philippines from the Japanese. The place of his re-invasion was the central Philippine Island of Leyte. Much has been written about the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf that his return provoked, but almost nothing has been written about the three-month long battle to seize Leyte itself. Originally intending to delay the advancing Americans, the Japanese high command decided to make Leyte the "Decisive Battle" for the western Pacific and rushed crack Imperial Army units from Manchuria, Korea, and Japan itself to halt and then overwhelm the Americans on Leyte. As were most battles in the Pacific, it was a long, bloody, and brutal fight. As did the Japanese, the Americans were forced to rush in reinforcements to compensate for the rapid increase in Japanese forces on Leyte. This unique battle also saw a major Japanese counterattackÑnot a banzai charge, but a carefully thought-out counteroffensive designed to push the Americans off the island and capture the elusive General MacArthur. Both American and Japanese battalions spent days surrounded by the enemy, often until relieved or overwhelmed. Under General YamashitaÕs guidance it also saw a rare deployment of Japanese paratroopers in conjunction with the ground assault offensive. Finally there were more naval and air battles, all designed to protect or cover landing operations of friendly forces. Leyte was a three-dimensional battle, fought with the best both sides had to offer, and did indeed decide the fate of the Philippines in World War II.

The landing of American forces on Leyte and the successful conclusion of a campaign which led to the severance of the Japanese mainland from its southern empire.