During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.

The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.

Captain Glenn F. Howell kept a detailed account of his activities in China for 62 years. His journals now make up 202 leather-bound volumes--one of the largest sources in existence, perhaps the largest, of servicemen's observations of service in China during that country's struggle to oust one power and come to grips with a new one between World War I and II. This work presents Howell's diary from June 6, 1920, to September 23, 1921, during which time he commanded the naval gunboat USS Palos on the Yangtze River. First comes a biography of Howell, an overview of Chinese history from 1800 to 1920, and a history of the United States military involvement in China during those years. Howell's time as commander of the USS Palos is divided into three sections. Preceding each, the editor comments on the nature of the upcoming diary entries. Howell covers a range of topics, including the Chinese people, various important locales (e.g., the Three Gorges), making official visits, (his first as a captain), officer-enlisted man relations, opium, the steam navy, people who influenced him (S. Cornell Plant and Captain Joseph Miclo, skipper of the Meitan), missionaries and other foreigners in China (including U.S. military retirees), and "trackers" (China's human beasts of burden.)

The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. This historical study examines three cases in which the U.S. Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century, In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s. The Army thought it learned: The need for U.S. advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt U.S. organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. These lessons are still important and relevant today. This is a print on demand report.

A fascinating encyclopedic survey of the Spanish-Cuban/American War, the Philippine War, and the small wars between 1899 and the end of the occupation of Haiti in 1934. The name changes themselves are instructive. The usage of "Spanish-American War" ignores the fact that the war in Cuba had been la