A New York Times bestseller! An epic history of the decline of American military leadership—from the bestselling author of Fiasco and Churchill and Orwell. While history has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—it has been less kind to the generals of the wars that followed, such as Koster, Franks, Sanchez, and Petraeus. In The Generals, Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In chronicling the widening gulf between performance and accountability among the top brass of the U.S. military, Ricks tells the stories of great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and generals who failed themselves and their soldiers. In Ricks’s hands, this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails.

Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war. In doing so he demonstrates how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leader's personalities.

Taking a novel approach to the military history of the post–Civil War West, distinguished historian Robert M. Utley examines the careers of seven military leaders who served as major generals for the Union in the Civil War, then as brigadier generals in command of the U.S. Army’s western departments. By examining both periods in their careers, Utley makes a unique contribution in delineating these commanders’ strengths and weaknesses. While some of the book’s subjects—notably Generals George Crook and Nelson A. Miles—are well known, most are no longer widely remembered. Yet their actions were critical in the expansion of federal control in the West. The commanders effected the final subjugation of American Indian tribal groups, exercising direct oversight of troops in the field as they fought the wars that would bring Indians under military and government control. After introducing readers to postwar army doctrine, organization, and administration, Utley takes each general in turn, describing his background, personality, eccentricities, and command style and presenting the rudiments of the campaigns he prosecuted. Crook embodied the ideal field general, personally leading his troops in their operations, though with varying success. Christopher C. Augur and John Pope, in contrast, preferred to command from their desks in department headquarters, an approach that led both of them to victory on the battlefield. And Miles, while perhaps the frontier army’s most detestable officer, was also its most successful in the field. Rounding out the book with an objective comparison of all eight generals’ performance records, Utley offers keen insights into their influence on the U.S. military as an institution and on the development of the American West.

After the Spanish-American War the United States, both by design and by accident, became involved in the Caribbean and the Far East on a scale that would have seemed highly improbable before 1898. As an "emerging" world power, the United States had to grapple with new issues, among them the role of military men and military power in protecting and advancing America's position in the world. Richard D. Challener has examined civil-military relationships in the period 1898-1914 to answer the following questions: To what extent did army and navy officers develop opinions on foreign policy issues? Were the admirals and generals consulted by the civilian officials of government, and did they participate in decision-making? How did the President and State Department use the military services in execution of foreign policy? Were military and diplomatic policy co-ordinated? Does an examination of these relationships help to assess either the interpretations of Kennan and the "realists" or Williams and the "New Left"? And ultimately, how effectively did the United States manage to reconcile force and diplomacy? This book sustains the case for interpreting 1898 and its aftermath as a deliberate search for an "informal" or "insular" empire and shows that American leaders, both civil and military, accepted an interventionist ethic. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

George S. Patton Jr. lived an exciting life in war and peace, but he is best remembered for his World War II battlefield exploits. Patton’s War: An American General’s Combat Leadership: November 1942–July 1944, the first of three volumes, follows the general from the beaches of Morocco to the fields of France, right before the birth of Third Army on the continent. In highly engaging fashion, Kevin Hymel uncovers new facts and challenges long-held beliefs about the mercurial Patton, not only examining his relationships with his superiors and fellow generals and colonels, but also with the soldiers of all ranks whom he led. Using new sources unavailable to previous historians and through extensive research of soldiers’ memoirs and interviews, Hymel adds a new dimension to the telling of Patton’s WWII story.

The sweeping and dramatic story of America's three great five-star generals, who steered America to victory through World War II and shaped the decade that followed, while jockeying against and helping one another as patrons, bosses, friends, and rivals. In the closing days of World War II, America looked up to three five-star generals as its greatest heroes. George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur personified victory, from the Pentagon to Normandy to the Far East. Counterparts and on occasion competitors, they had leapfrogged each other, sometimes stonewalled each other, even supported and protected each other throughout their celebrated careers. In the public mind they stood for glamour, integrity, and competence. But for dramatic twists of circumstance, all three—rather than only one—might have occupied the White House. The story of their interconnected lives opens a fascinating window onto some of the twentieth century's most crucial events, revealing the personalities behind the public images and showing how much of a difference three men can make. Marshall and MacArthur were contemporaries and competitors. Eisenhower was MacArthur's underling, then Marshall's deputy, before becoming MacArthur's counterpart as a supreme commander, Ike in Western Europe, MacArthur in the Pacific. Each of the three five-star generals would go on to extraordinary postwar careers: MacArthur as a virtual viceroy of Japan, overseeing its transition to a new constitutional democracy, and then leading the UN forces in the Korean War; Marshall as secretary of state, author of the Marshall Plan, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize; Eisenhower as president. Fifteen Stars presents the intertwined lives of these three great men against the sweeping background of six unforgettable decades, from two world wars to the Cold War. It is history at its most dramatic yet most personal—a triumph for Stanley Weintraub, our preeminent military historian.

What made Ulysses S. Grant tick? Perhaps the greatest general of the Civil War, Grant won impressive victories and established a brilliant military career. His single-minded approach to command was coupled with the ability to adapt to the kind of military campaign the moment required. In this exciting new book, Michael B. Ballard provides a crisp account of Grant's strategic and tactical concepts in the period from the outset of the Civil War to the battle of Chattanooga--a period in which U. S. Grant rose from a semi-disgraceful obscurity to the position of overall commander of all Union armies. The author carefully sifts through diaries and letters of Grant and his inner circle to try to get inside Grant's mind and reveal why those early years of the war were formative in producing the Civil War's greatest general.

When the Revolutionary War began, Congress established a national army and appointed George Washington its commander in chief. Congress then took it upon itself to choose numerous subordinate generals to lead the army’s various departments, divisions, and brigades. How this worked out in the end is well known. Less familiar, however, is how well Congress’s choices worked out along the way. Although historians have examined many of Washington’s subordinates, Washington’s Revolutionary War Generals is the first book to look at these men in a collective, integrated manner. A thoroughgoing study of the Revolutionary War careers of the Continental Army’s generals—their experience, performance, and relationships with Washington and the Continental Congress—this book provides an overview of the politics of command, both within and outside the army, and a unique perspective on how it affected Washington’s prosecution of the war. It is impossible to understand the outcome of the War for Independence without first examining America’s military leadership, author Stephen R. Taaffe contends. His description of Washington’s generals—who they were, how they received their commissions, and how they performed—goes a long way toward explaining how these American officers, who were short on experience and military genius, prevailed over their professional British counterparts. Following these men through the war’s most important battles and campaigns as well as its biggest controversies, such as the Conway Cabal and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Taaffe weaves a narrative in the grand tradition of military history. Against this backdrop, his depiction of the complexities and particulars of character and politics of military command provides a new understanding of George Washington, the War for Independence, and the U.S. military’s earliest beginnings. A unique combination of biography and institutional history shot through with political analysis, this book is a thoughtful, deeply researched, and an eminently readable contribution to the literature of the Revolution.

The First Comprehensive Historical Investigation into the Conway Cabal, the Attempt to Remove George Washington from Command In the spring of 1778, General George Washington wrote to his friend Landon Carter about a rumored "disposition in the Northern Officers to see me superceded in my Command." This was as candid a statement as the general ever made about the so-called "Conway Cabal" of patriot officers and politicians critical of his leadership. Most early historians of the Revolution took the threat to Washington seriously, but by the mid-twentieth century interpretations had reversed, with the plot--if one existed--posing no real danger to the commander-in-chief. Yet, as historian Mark Edward Lender reveals in his compelling Cabal! The Plot Against General Washington, clues found in original new research provide a more comprehensive understanding of the personalities and political maneuverings of those involved in the Cabal, and the real nature of the challenge to Washington. Rather than the "classic Cabal" of Generals Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, and Thomas Conway in a plot to remove Washington quickly, the threat to Washington's command was a gradual administrative attempt by the Board of War and political allies to take over the war effort. Reorganized in late 1777 under the leadership of Mifflin, with Gates assuming the board presidency in January 1778, the Board of War sought authority to determine military policy and strategic goals, all training, organizational, personnel, and logistical functions, and even the assignment of theater commanders. Had they succeeded, Washington's title of commander-in-chief would have been utterly hollow. The Cabal tested Washington as few other things did during the war and perhaps tempered him into the man we remember today. Washington adroitly navigated the challenges to his leadership, meeting and defeating every attempt to curtail his authority. His response revealed a leadership style that saw him safely through the war, and gave him overwhelming support from his countrymen to become their first president.

Civil War general William Tecumseh Sherman earned a place in history as “the first modern general,” yet behind his reputation as a fierce warrior was a sympathetic man of complex character. A century and a half after the Civil War, Sherman remains one of its most controversial figures—the soldier who brought the fight not only to the Confederate Army, but to Confederate civilians as well. Yet Eisenhower, a West Point graduate and a retired brigadier general (Army Reserves), finds in Sherman a man of startling contrasts, not at all defined by the implications of “total war.” His scruffy, disheveled appearance belied an unconventional and unyielding intellect. Intensely loyal to superior officers, especially Ulysses S. Grant, he was also a stalwart individualist. Dubbed “no soldier” during his years at West Point, Sherman later rose to the rank of General of the Army, and he had great affection for the people of the South despite his commitment to the Union cause. In this remarkable reassessment of Sherman’s life and career, Eisenhower takes readers from Sherman’s Ohio origins and his fledgling first stint in the Army to his years as a businessman in California and his hurried return to uniform at the outbreak of the war. From Bull Run through Sherman’s epic March to the Sea, Eisenhower offers up a fascinating narrative of a military genius whose influence helped preserve the Union.