Although likely a small percentage of all people screened, the thousands of persons misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List can experience additional questioning, delays, and other effects. Most misidentifications occur because of similarities to names on the Terrorist Watch List; agencies are attempting to reduce the incidence of misidentifications or otherwise facilitate individuals through the screening process. The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-screening Agencies are addressing concerns related to Watch List Screening, and an Interagency Agreement is being developed to further ensure an effective means for seeking redress.

Why does a country with religious liberty enmeshed in its legal and social structures produce such overt prejudice and discrimination against Muslims? Sahar Aziz’s groundbreaking book demonstrates how race and religion intersect to create what she calls the Racial Muslim. Comparing discrimination against immigrant Muslims with the prejudicial treatment of Jews, Catholics, Mormons, and African American Muslims during the twentieth century, Aziz explores the gap between America’s aspiration for and fulfillment of religious freedom. With America’s demographics rapidly changing from a majority white Protestant nation to a multiracial, multireligious society, this book is an in dispensable read for understanding how our past continues to shape our present—to the detriment of our nation’s future.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.

All U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect or "mine" personal data-such as phone records or Web sites visited-should be required to evaluate the programs' effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy. A framework is offered that agencies can use to evaluate such information-based programs, both classified and unclassified. The book urges Congress to re-examine existing privacy law to assess how privacy can be protected in current and future programs and recommends that any individuals harmed by violations of privacy be given a meaningful form of redress. Two specific technologies are examined: data mining and behavioral surveillance. Regarding data mining, the book concludes that although these methods have been useful in the private sector for spotting consumer fraud, they are less helpful for counterterrorism because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity. Regarding behavioral surveillance in a counterterrorist context, the book concludes that although research and development on certain aspects of this topic are warranted, there is no scientific consensus on whether these techniques are ready for operational use at all in counterterrorism.

This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.

Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from possessing firearms or explosives under current federal law. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the FBI is notified when a firearm or explosives background check involves an individual on the terrorist watchlist. This statement addresses: (1) how many checks have resulted in matches with the terrorist watchlist; (2) how the FBI uses information from these checks for counterterrorism purposes; and (3) pending legislation that would give the Attorney General authority to deny certain checks. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.