This Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them.

"Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) was the most widely used, and abused, acronym in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s. Subsequently, "transformation" has superceded it as the preferred term of art. For the better part of two decades, American defense professionals have been excited by the prospect of effecting a revolutionary change in the conduct and character of warfare. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray provides a critical audit of the great RMA debate and of some actual RMA behavior. He argues that the contexts of warfare are crucially important. Indeed so vital are the contexts that only a military transformation that allows for flexibility and adaptability will meet future strategic demands. Dr. Gray warns against a transformation that is highly potent only in a narrow range of strategic cases. In addition, he advises that the historical record demonstrates clearly that every revolutionary change in warfare eventually is more or less neutralized by antidotes of one kind or another (political, strategic, operational, tactical, and technological). He warns that the military effectiveness of a process of revolutionary change in a "way of war" can only be judged by the test of battle, and possibly not even then, if the terms of combat are very heavily weighted in favor of the United States. On balance, the concept of revolutionary change is found to be quite useful, provided it is employed and applied with some reservations and in a manner that allows for flexibility and adaptability. Above all else, the monograph insists, the contexts of warfare, especially the political, determine how effective a transforming military establishment will be.

The author provides a critical audit of the great RMA debate and of some actual RMA behavior and warns against a transformation that is highly potent only in a narrow range of strategic cases. He warns that the military effectiveness of a process of revolutionary change in a "way of war" can only be judged by the test of battle, and possibly not even then, if the terms of combat are very heavily weighted in favor of the United States. On balance, the concept of revolutionary change is found to be quite useful, provided it is employed and applied with some reservations and in a manner that allows for flexibility and adaptability. The contexts of warfare, especially the political, determine how effective a transforming military establishment will be.

This study will provide a badly-needed survey and synopsis of the scholarly literature on strategic culture and ways of war.

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book. Sample Book Insights: #1 Military strategy is the practice of reducing an opponent’s physical capacity and willingness to fight, and continuing to do so until one’s aim is achieved. It takes place in wartime as well as peacetime, and may involve using force, directly or indirectly, as a threat. #2 The practice of military strategy has always been about finding ways to weaken an adversary’s material capacity and willingness to fight with respect to one’s aims. Grand strategy is the concern of the head of state, and it is often but not always separate from the business of the general. #3 Grand strategists and military commanders attempt to out-position their rivals by building alliances and coalitions, or by securing treaties and agreements that increase or preserve their power relative to their rivals. #4 Military strategy is the equivalent of national military strategy in contemporary defense literature. It describes how a state will use its military power in pursuit of its policy goals.

"This book explores military operations, including indirect support to other interagency actors and functions in dense urban terrain and megacities. Dense urban terrain describes urban areas with high population densities that, in the developing world, often outstrip the capacity of local governance systems to exert formal control. The term megacity describes a city with a population of 10 million or more. These environments define patterns of human settlement. In 1950, only 30 percent of the world's population lived in cities compared to more than 55 percent in 2018. Much of this growth is concentrated in large, urban centers that connect a global flow of goods and ideas. By 2030, there will be more than 40 of these megacities"--

"The call to war is often met by young soldiers who lack an understanding of what they are about to encounter. These young soldiers must be trained, prepared, and then led in battle by those with experience and understanding--the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. In an effort to preserve the history of the US Army Noncommissioned Officer and to provide future noncommissioned officers with an understanding of the actions necessary to prepare soldiers and to lead them in war, the US Army Sergeants Major Academy undertook a program to gather and publish the stories of NCOs who had served in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the papers received were from students of the US Army Sergeants Major Course who had already deployed to either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom. This work highlights a few of those stories. A wide range of topics have been chosen to allow the reader to understand the preparations, training, and actions needed for NCOs to accomplish their missions ... Many of the selected stories were shortened and edited for clarity; however, every attempt was made to remain true to the author's original intent"--Forward.

This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF’s rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the ‘operational level of war’ and on the body of military activity known as ‘the operational art’, rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels. This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.