Exploring what we know--and don't know--about how nuclear weapons shape American grand strategy and international relations A 2020 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title The world first confronted the power of nuclear weapons when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The global threat of these weapons deepened in the following decades as more advanced weapons, aggressive strategies, and new nuclear powers emerged. Ever since, countless books, reports, and articles--and even a new field of academic inquiry called "security studies"--have tried to explain the so-called nuclear revolution. Francis J. Gavin argues that scholarly and popular understanding of many key issues about nuclear weapons is incomplete at best and wrong at worst. Among these important, misunderstood issues are: how nuclear deterrence works; whether nuclear coercion is effective; how and why the United States chose its nuclear strategies; why countries develop their own nuclear weapons or choose not to do so; and, most fundamentally, whether nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous. These and similar questions still matter because nuclear danger is returning as a genuine threat. Emerging technologies and shifting great-power rivalries seem to herald a new type of cold war just three decades after the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict that was characterized by periodic prospects of global Armageddon. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy helps policymakers wrestle with the latest challenges. Written in a clear, accessible, and jargon-free manner, the book also offers insights for students, scholars, and others interested in both the history and future of nuclear danger.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

“An excellent contribution to the debate on the future role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in American foreign policy.” ―Contemporary Security Policy This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real-world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them. “Well-researched and carefully argued.” ―Foreign Affairs

For three decades, arms control treaties have provided a legal basis for limiting and reducing long-range nuclear weapons. However, thousands of sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons (TNWs) are not monitored or controlled by any existing treaties or formal agreements, even though they can pose security risks equal to or exceeding those of strategic nuclear weapons. As the world has seen, the rise of international terrorism highlights the potential dangers of tactical nuclear weapons. Because they can be relatively small and portable-particularly but not exclusively in the case of so-cal.

In 1960 there were some 3,500 strategic nuclear weapons in the United States and by the mid-1970s there were more than 10,000. This book, written by a member of the U.S. nuclear weapons force, gives an account of that buildup and the efforts taken to keep the stockpile under control. Jerry Miller highlights the strategies, targeting and attack plans, and arms control measures associated with the bomb. He addresses the role of the military in establishing requirements and the role of the scientists in meeting those requirements and identifies the weapons' strengths and weaknesses and their significance for the future. A final chapter reviews threat scenarios and suggests actions to bring the nuclear force into line.

This book explores China’s approach to the nuclear programs in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. A major power with access to nuclear technology, China has a significant impact on international nuclear weapons proliferation, but its attitude towards the spread of the bomb has been inconsistent. China’s mixed record raises a broader question: why, when and how do states support potential nuclear proliferators? This book develops a framework for analyzing such questions, by putting forth three factors that are likely to determine a state’s policy: (1) the risk of changes in the nuclear status or military doctrines of competitors; (2) the recipient’s status and strategic value; and (3) the extent of pressure from third parties to halt nuclear assistance. It then demonstrates how these factors help explain China’s policies towards Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Overall, the book finds that China has been a selective and strategic supporter of nuclear proliferators. While nuclear proliferation is a security challenge to China in some settings, in others, it wants to help its friends build the bomb. This book will be of much interest to students of international security, nuclear proliferation, Chinese foreign policy and International Relations in general.

As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategic reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the credibility of nuclear war fighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. The Russian Federation is convinced that its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the military rollback. The notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads, as a START 3 regime suggests, is misguided. This ignores the thousands of so called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by both states. The very real threats associated with Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal should impel those with genuine concerns to redirect their efforts toward the lower end of nuclear weapons spectrum. The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporates a regime calling for the elimination of air delivered tactical nuclear weapons that may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions.

We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution. On the basis of recently declassified documents, Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today. In case after case, he finds that we know far less than we think we do about our nuclear history. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers. Gavin's rigorous historical work not only tells us what happened in the past but also offers a powerful tool to explain how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Nuclear Statecraft provides a solid foundation for future policymaking.

Much misinformation has been published by those who support, as well as those who are against, the continued deployment of nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence. This book provides an apolitical description of strategic nuclear weapons, how they are designed, how they work, and how they are assigned to different targets in the event of conflict. As well as a Workshop Manual, this book would be a guide to public understanding expressed in a dispassionate and factual manner for information which many people find hard or impossible to obtain. Nuclear weapons do exist, and they cannot be wished away, and because of that, an entirely fact-based and balanced account is helpful to those who seek to understand this emotively sensitive subject delivered as a seminal reference. This book incorporates a balance of cutaway diagrams, images of hardware and test equipment, facilities and delivery systems, and traces the evolution of nuclear weapons over the past 70 years, with the emphasis on strategic nuclear delivery systems today.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.