This new book analyzes how the Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the years from 1949 to 1964. Focusing on how Soviet leaders actually perceived China’s role in Vietnam relative to the Soviet role, it shows how these perceptions influenced the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. It also explains how and when Moscow’s enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end – or, in other words, from what point was Beijing’s involvement in Vietnam perceived as a liability rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers. This book is an excellent resource for all students with an interest in Soviet-Vietnamese relations and of strategic studies and international relations in general.

This book charts the development of the First Vietnam War – the war between the Vietnamese Communists (the Viet Minh) and the French colonial power – considering especially how relations between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists had a profound impact on the course of the war. It shows how the Chinese provided finance, training and weapons to the Viet Minh, but how differences about strategy emerged, particularly when China became involved in the Korean War and the subsequent peace negotiations, when the need to placate the United States and to prevent US military involvement in Southeast Asia became a key concern for the Chinese. The book shows how the Viet Minh strategy of all-out war in the north and limited guerrilla warfare in the south developed from this situation, and how the war then unfolded.

This book charts the development of the First Vietnam War – the war between the Vietnamese Communists (the Viet Minh) and the French colonial power – considering especially how relations between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists had a profound impact on the course of the war. It shows how the Chinese provided finance, training and weapons to the Viet Minh, but how differences about strategy emerged, particularly when China became involved in the Korean War and the subsequent peace negotiations, when the need to placate the United States and to prevent US military involvement in Southeast Asia became a key concern for the Chinese. The book shows how the Viet Minh strategy of all-out war in the north and limited guerrilla warfare in the south developed from this situation, and how the war then unfolded.

This collection examines changes in China’s international role over the past century. Tracing the links between domestic and external expectations in the PRC’s role conception and preferred engagement patterns in world politics, the work provides a systematic account of changes in China’s role and the mechanisms of role taking. Individual chapters address the impact of China’s history and identity on its bilateral role taking patterns with the United States, Japan, Africa, the Europe Union, and Socialist States as well as China’s role in international institutions, the G-20, and East Asia’s Financial Order. Each of the empirical chapters is written to a common template exploring the role of historical self-identification, altercasting and domestic role contestation in shaping the PRC’s role. The volume provides an analytically coherent framework evaluating whether cooperation or conflict in China’s international engagement is likely to increase, and if so, the extent to which this will follow from incompatible domestic demands and external expectations. By combining a theoretical framework with strong comparative case studies, this volume contributes to the ongoing debate on China’s rise and integration into the international society and provides sound conclusions about the prospects for a transition of China’s purpose in world politics.

This is the first full-length book on the concept of “People’s Diplomacy,” promoted by the president of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, at the peak of the Vietnam War from 1965-1972. It holds great appeal for historians, international relations scholars, diplomats, and the general reader interested in Vietnam. A form of informal diplomacy, people’s diplomacy was carried out by ordinary Vietnamese including writers, cartoonists, workers, women, students, filmmakers, medical doctors, academics, and sportspersons. They created an awareness of the American bombardment of innocent Vietnamese civilians, and made profound connections with the anti-war movements abroad. People’s diplomacy made it difficult for the United States to prolong the war because the North Vietnamese, together with the peace movements abroad, exerted popular pressure on the American presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to end the conflict. It was much more effective than the formal North Vietnamese diplomacy in gaining the support of Westerners who were averse to communism. It damaged the reputation of the United States by casting North Vietnam as a victim of American imperialism.

This new edition masterfully explains the origins and outcome of America's war in Vietnam by focusing on its local dimensions.

"Using new and largely inaccessible Vietnamese sources as well as French, British, Canadian and American archives, Pierre Asselin sheds valuable light on Hanoi's path to war. Step by step the narrative makes Hanoi's revolutionary strategy from the end of the French Indochina War to the start of the Anti-American Resistance Struggle for Reunification and National Salvation (the Vietnam War) transparent. The book reveals how North Vietnamese leaders moved from a cautious policy emphasizing nonviolent political and diplomatic struggle to a far riskier pursuit of military victory"--

The surprise Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 shocked the international community. The two communist nations had seemed firm political and cultural allies, but the twenty-nine-day border war imposed heavy casualties, ruined urban and agricultural infrastructure, leveled three Vietnamese cities, and catalyzed a decadelong conflict. In this groundbreaking book, Xiaoming Zhang traces the roots of the conflict to the historic relationship between the peoples of China and Vietnam, the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's desire to modernize his country. Deng's perceptions of the Soviet Union, combined with his plans for economic and military reform, shaped China's strategic vision. Drawing on newly declassified Chinese documents and memoirs by senior military and civilian figures, Zhang takes readers into the heart of Beijing's decision-making process and illustrates the war's importance for understanding the modern Chinese military, as well as China's role in the Asian-Pacific world today.

This book examines competition and collaboration among Western powers, the socialist bloc, and the Third World for control over humanitarian aid programs during the Cold War. Young-sun Hong's analysis reevaluates the established parameters of German history. On the one hand, global humanitarian efforts functioned as an arena for a three-way political power struggle. On the other, they gave rise to transnational spaces that allowed for multidimensional social and cultural encounters. Hong paints an unexpected view of the global humanitarian regime: Algerian insurgents flown to East Germany for medical care, barefoot Chinese doctors in Tanzania, and West and East German doctors working together in the Congo. She also provides a rich analysis of the experiences of African trainees and Asian nurses in the two Germanys. This book brings an urgently needed historical perspective to contemporary debates on global governance, which largely concern humanitarianism, global health, south-north relationships, and global migration.

This book examines the NATO reports on the Soviet bloc's political and economic system, from 1951 to the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the beginning of detente. As part of the wider history of Cold War Alliances, the detailed assessments of the NATO experts regarding the non-military aspects of Soviet power are a crucial indicator of Western/allied perceptions of the adversary. Their study allows us to widen the discussion on the Western alliance, the accuracy of its information or perceptions, and the nature of the Cold War. Hatzivassiliou argues that the Cold War was not only a strategic dilemma (although it certainly was that, as well), but also the latest stage of the crisis of legitimization which had been raging since the dawn of modernity. NATO/Western analysis is examined in this context. At the same time, the book discusses the relative influence of the major NATO members – US and British influence was strong while French, West German and Italian influence was also significant – in the drafting of the reports, and thus in shaping the alliance’s perceptions during the Cold War. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, Cold War Studies, international history, foreign policy and IR in general.