This report analyzes the objectives, instruments, and achievements of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. It focuses on the mechanisms used by the Soviet Union to pursue its objectives in Europe, including diplomacy, military power, arms control, the West European Communist parties, ties with the non-Communist left, propaganda, and trade. The author concludes that the Soviet Union has achieved mixed results in its policy toward Western Europe. While it has succeeded in helping to consolidate postwar gains, Soviet policy has not yet made a dramatic breakthrough toward its stated objective of fostering a system of 'collective security' in Europe. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that failure to achieve these maximal goals has led the Soviets to rethink their objectives of lower their expectations. (Author).

This book, first published in 1984, carefully examine the political debate surrounding nuclear weapons and superpower polices in Cold War Western Europe. It seeks to analyse a distinctly European view in Soviet policy, as opposed to a superpower view. It examines Soviet domestic and foreign policy, economic and military practice, with the aim of understanding and countering the Soviet threat to Western Europe.

This report presents the multiple issues raised at an international conference on "The Future of Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," held in Ebenhausen, West Germany, October 26-28, 1984, under the auspices of The RAND Corporation, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales. The ten papers presented at the conference consider the internal Soviet dimension (both political and economic) and its possible consequences for the future of Soviet policy toward Western Europe; the nature of present Soviet strategy toward Western Europe, both in general and with respect to West Germany in particular; the East European factor and its possible effects on European detente; Soviet behavior in the world arena and its possible consequences for Europe; and finally, overall prospects for Soviet policy, both in the near term and in the late 1980s.

Examines the political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and European nations such as France, West Germany, and Italy.

Over 2,400 total pages ... Russian outrage following the September 2004 hostage disaster at North Ossetia’s Beslan Middle School No.1 was reflected in many ways throughout the country. The 52-hour debacle resulted in the death of some 344 civilians, including more than 170 children, in addition to unprecedented losses of elite Russian security forces and the dispatch of most Chechen/allied hostage-takers themselves. It quickly became clear, as well, that Russian authorities had been less than candid about the number of hostages held and the extent to which they were prepared to deal with the situation. Amid grief, calls for retaliation, and demands for reform, one of the more telling reactions in terms of hardening public perspectives appeared in a national poll taken several days after the event. Some 54% of citizens polled specifically judged the Russian security forces and the police to be corrupt and thus complicit in the failure to deal adequately with terrorism, while 44% thought that no lessons for the future would be learned from the tragedy. This pessimism was the consequence not just of the Beslan terrorism, but the accumulation of years of often spectacular failures by Russian special operations forces (SOF, in the apt US military acronym). A series of Russian SOF counterterrorism mishaps, misjudgments, and failures in the 1990s and continuing to the present have made the Kremlin’s special operations establishment in 2005 appear much like Russia’s old Mir space station—wired together, unpredictable, and subject to sudden, startling failures. But Russia continued to maintain and expand a large, variegated special operations establishment which had borne the brunt of combat actions in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other trouble spots, and was expected to serve as the nation’s principal shield against terrorism in all its forms. Known since Soviet days for tough personnel, personal bravery, demanding training, and a certain rough or brutal competence that not infrequently violated international human rights norms, it was supposed that Russian special operations forces—steeped in their world of “threats to the state” and associated with once-dreaded military and national intelligence services—could make valuable contributions to countering terrorism. The now widely perceived link between “corrupt” special forces on the one hand, and counterterrorism failures on the other, reflected the further erosion of Russia’s national security infrastructure in the eyes of both Russian citizens and international observers. There have been other, more ambiguous, but equally unsettling dimensions of Russian SOF activity as well, that have strong internal and external political aspects. These constitute the continuing assertions from Russian media, the judicial system, and other Federal agencies and officials that past and current members of the SOF establishment have organized to pursue interests other than those publicly declared by the state or allowed under law. This includes especially the alleged intent to punish by assassination those individuals and groups that they believe have betrayed Russia. The murky nature of these alleged activities has formed a backdrop to other problems in the special units.

This book, first published in 1990, examines the nature and causes of the changes to Soviet national security policy under Gorbachev. Changes in leadership and institutional arrangements, economic policy, ideology and military involvement all fostered new patterns of cooperation and competition. Authors look at the historical, economic and cultural contexts of change and proceed to a discussion of change agents, such as modernization, technology and domestic politics. Specific components of foreign and military policy, such as arms control and relations with Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact and the Third World, are also examined.

This report examines the ways in which Soviet control of Eastern Europe has both contributed to and detracted from the Soviet Union's pursuit of foreign policy goals in Western Europe. In successive sections, it (1) reviews the highlights of past USSR-East European-West European interactions and outlines general characteristics of the triangular relationship; (2) examines the impact of the Polish crisis; and (3) traces the East European foreign policy activity related to NATO's 1983 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces and analyzes the emergence of a group of East European states--East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania--whose policies differed from those of the Soviets. The author suggests that, while Eastern Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet relations with Western Europe, Western Europe also acts as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. (Author).

Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.