Translated from the Russian. Edited and with a foreword by Serge L. Levitsky. A systematic and authoritative analysis of current Soviet legislation related to the organization and the mechanism of foreign economic relations under perestroika. Of particular interest to prospective partners in joint v

For this study, a group of Russian authors were commissioned to describe and assess the arms trade policies and practices of Russia under new domestic and international conditions. The contributors, drawn from the government, industry, and academic communities, offer a wide range of reports on the political, military, economic, and industrial implications of Russian arms transfers, as well as specific case studies of key bilateral arms transfer relationships.

Russia is a huge storehouse of natural resources, including oil, gas, and other energy sources, which she can trade with the rest of the world for advanced technology and wheat. In this book, leading experts evaluate the Soviet potential in major energy and industrial raw materials, giving special attention to implications for the world economy to the end of the twentieth century. The authors examine the mineral and forest resources that the Soviet Union has developed and may yet develop to provide exports during the 1980s. They discuss the regional dimension of these resources, especially in Siberia and the Soviet Far East; individual mineral raw materials, such as petroleum, natural gas, timber, iron ore, manganese, and gold; and finally the role of raw materials in Soviet foreign trade. The authors, representing the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, are primarily geographers, but they include economists, political scientists, and a geologist. Their work is based on primary sources (for most of these reports, current information is no longer being released to researchers) and on interviews with Soviet officials.

This book considers the effectiveness of food supply, or the withholding of it, or the threat of withholding it, in winning allies or punishing recalcitrant nations. Paarlberg also debates whether the "weapon of food" has ever been used as an instrument of foreign policy in a consistent manner. He examines past and present grain policies in India, the Soviet Union and the United States, and concludes that this "weapon" has been used very infrequently and that, when used, it has failed. The constraint to the use or success of the food weapon as an instrument of foreign policy is domestic food and farm policy. The author examines and evaluates the instances when food power has been used--such as Jimmy Carter's grain embargo to Afghanistan in the wake of Soviet occupation of that country--but the major finding is that such episodes are rare. ISBN 0-8014-1772-4 (alk. paper): $29.95; ISBN 0-8014-9345-5 (pbk.): $12.95.

Was the Soviet Union a superpower? Red Globalization is a significant rereading of the Cold War as an economic struggle shaped by the global economy. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony challenges the idea that the Soviet Union represented a parallel socio-economic construct to the liberal world economy. Instead he shows that the USSR, a middle-income country more often than not at the mercy of global economic forces, tracked the same path as other countries in the world, moving from 1930s autarky to the globalizing processes of the postwar period. In examining the constraints and opportunities afforded the Soviets in their engagement of the capitalist world, he questions the very foundations of the Cold War narrative as a contest between superpowers in a bipolar world. Far from an economic force in the world, the Soviets managed only to become dependent providers of energy to the rich world, and second-best partners to the global South.

Leading scholars in the field analyse the Soviet economy sector by sector to make available, in textbook form, the results of the latest research on Soviet industrialisation.

The enigma of Soviet society is nowhere more strikingly manifested than in its economic relations with the outside world. Western business people, even those with representative offices in Moscow, often describe their negotiations with the Soviets as a veritable black-box affair. Offers for purchase and sale are funneled into the bureaucracy, usually via the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where they are digested for very long periods of time. When a response emerges, little is usually known about the level at which decisions were made, and even less is known about the criteria that were employed to make them. In the abstract, at least, foreign trade decision making in the Western market economies is a rather simple exercise. An American consumer will purchase a Toyota rather than a comparable Chrysler if its price, expressed in dollars at the market exchange rate, is lower. The influences of governmental tariffs, quantitative restrictions, foreign exchange controls, "buy American" policies, and the like, are usually of only secondary importance. In contrast, the Soviet consumer, whether an individual or an industrial enterprise, does not generally have the authority to order the importation of goods or services. That authority is concentrated at the top of Soviet society and administered through a labyrinthine system of overlapping bureaucratic agencies. Furthermore, those Soviet agencies cannot respond to price signals in the same way as the American consumer can, because Soviet domestic prices and exchange rates are themselves set rather arbitrarily by governmental agencies.

This collection of studies investigates the political economy of international relations between the Soviet bloc (the "East") and the developing world (the "South"), focusing on the 1970s and 1980s. The works examine East-South relations from the standpoints of international trade patterns, financial transfers, and military relations.