The purpose of this treatise is to give a brief account of Soviet foreign policy from the moment of the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 to the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, in June, 1941.

This book discerns Soviet leaders' views of the United States and sees them in relation to foreign policy statements and actions. Hermann first examines the subtle problem of analyzing perceptions and interpreting motives from the words and deeds of national leaders. He then turns to cases, measuring the dominant U.S. hypotheses about the USSR against Soviet behavior in Central Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, as well as Soviet participation in the arms race. Finally, he weighs his conclusions against a thematic study of speeches and publications by members of the Politburo.

The conduct of the foreign relations of the Russian state in its several contexts—Kiev Rus, Muscovy, Russian Empire, Provisional Government, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Russian Federation—were unique in its common currents from the beginning to the present. Geography was certainly a key factor, located in the center of the world's largest land mass and surrounded by often hostile forces. “All of the Russias” had to confront the problems of open frontiers and the conduct of relations with a number of adjacent states of different ethnicity, and with many that were more distant. No other nation states had to face such complex and divergent circumstances over their histories. Most other Great Powers were neighbors of similar states in culture and historical background, whereas Russia had to deal with Asian, as well as European countries. The Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy covers the history through a chronology, an introductory essay, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 700 cross-referenced entries on important individuals, events, and other aspects of the foreign policy of this important country. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Russian foreign policy.

This study concentrates on the military roots of Soviet policy. It concentrates on how planning for the contingency of a world war shapes and distorts Soviet policy while producing a military posture and structure of forces that appear to the West as being far in excess of any legitimate defense needs. The focus is on the military-technical aspects of doctrine, which is the responsibility of the military to implement. The study does not dwell on the decisions that the Soviet political leaders would face in the course of a war except to note how the hierarchy of objectives would influence those decisions.

Since the sudden collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe in 1989, scholars have tried to explain why the Soviet Union stood by and watched as its empire crumbled. The recent release of extensive archival documentation in Moscow and the appearance of an increasing number of Soviet political memoirs now offer a greater perspective on this historic process and permit a much deeper look into its causes. The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy is a comprehensive study detailing the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe between 1968 and 1989, focusing especially on the pivotal Solidarity uprisings in Poland. Based heavily on firsthand testimony and fresh archival findings, it constitutes a fundamental reassessment of Soviet foreign policy during this period. Perhaps most important, it offers a surprising account of how Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the late Brezhnev era defined the parameters of Mikhail Gorbachev's later position of laissez-faire toward Eastern Europe--a position that ultimately led to the downfall of socialist governments all over Europe.

Gorbachev’s Gamble offers a new and more convincing answer to this question by providing the missing link between the internal and external aspects of Gorbachev’s perestroika. Andrei Grachev shows that the radical transformation of Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev years was an integral part of an ambitious project of internal democratic reform and of the historic opening of Soviet society to the outside world. Grachev explains the motives and the intentions of the initiators of this project and describes their hopes and their illusions. He recounts the story of the internal debates and struggles in the Kremlin and behind-the-scene decisions that led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and eventually the demise of the Soviet Union itself. The book is based on exclusive interviews with the leaders of the Soviet Union including Gorbachev, personal notes and diaries of their assistants and advisers and transcripts of the discussions inside the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee. Together they constitute a multi-voice political confession of a whole generation of decision-makers of the Soviet Union that enables us better to understand the origin and the breathtaking trajectory of the events that led to the end of the Cold War and the unprecedented transformation of world politics in the closing decades of the 20th century.

This collection of studies investigates the political economy of international relations between the Soviet bloc (the "East") and the developing world (the "South"), focusing on the 1970s and 1980s. The works examine East-South relations from the standpoints of international trade patterns, financial transfers, and military relations.

Introduction: the guns of August -- Contours of Russian foreign policy -- Bulldogs fighting under the rug: the making of Russian foreign policy -- Resetting expectations: Russia and the United States -- Europe: between integration and confrontation -- Rising China and Russia's Asian vector -- Playing with home field advantage? Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors -- Conclusion: dealing with Russia's foreign policy reawakening.