Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

Defense against nuclear attack—so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal—has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question.

This volume consists of major books written in the English language on NATO as well as an extensive listing of journal articles that deal with various aspects of the Alliance. All the major debates that have taken place over the last forty years are discussed.

A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed. In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile defence. Drawing widely on the theoretical literature in international relations and strategic studies, it identifies the key groups that have competed over America's nuclear policy post-1945 and examines how the concept of missile defence went through a process of gestation and intellectual contestation, leading to its eventual legitimization in the late 1990s. Steff sheds light on the individuals, groups, institutions and processes that led to the decision by the Bush administration to deploy a national missile defence shield. Additionally, Steff systematically examines the impact deployment had on the calculations of Russia and China. In the process he explains that their reactions under the Bush administration have continued into the Obama era, revealing that a new great power security dilemma has broken out. This, Steff shows, has led to a decline in great power relations as a consequence.

Defence against ballistic missiles has been a subject of UK political policy and technical investigation since World War II - this book analyses that long history.

This book is devoted to one of the central issues in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations—ballistic missile defense. Drawing on more than 2,000 primary sources, interviews with Russian and NATO officials, and a variety of Russian and Western publications, this book offers an unparalleled, in-depth analysis of the reasons behind Russia’s policy towards the construction of a U.S ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides a critical assessment of the decision-making mechanisms that shape Russia’s position on ballistic missile defense, as well as Russia’s strategic relations with the United States and Russia’s interaction with European and non-European powers. Lilly argues that contrary to Moscow’s official claims during the Putin era, Russian objections to the construction of ballistic missile defense in Europe have not been wholly dictated by security concerns. To Russia, missile defense is not purely an issue in and of itself, but rather a symbol and instrument of broader political considerations. At the international level, the factors that have shaped Russia’s response include Moscow’s perception of the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the Kremlin’s capacity to project influence and power abroad, and NATO’s behavior in the post-Soviet space. Domestically, the issue of missile defense has been a facilitating instrument for strengthening Putin’s regime and justifying military modernization. Taken together, these instrumental considerations and their fluctuating intensity in different periods prompt the Russian leadership to pursue contradictory policy approaches simultaneously. On the one hand, the Kremlin seeks U.S. cooperation, while on the other hand, it threatens retaliation and reinforces Russian offensive capabilities. The result is Moscow’s incoherence, inconsistency, and double-speak over the issue of missile defense.

Throughout the Cold War, people worldwide feared that the U.S. and Soviet governments could not prevent a nuclear showdown. Citizens from both East-bloc and Western countries, among them prominent scientists and physicians, formed networks to promote ideas and policies that would lessen this danger. Two of their organizations—the Pugwash movement and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—won Nobel Peace Prizes. Still, many observers believe that their influence was negligible and that the Reagan administration deserves sole credit for ending the Cold War. The first book to explore the impact these activists had on the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, Unarmed Forces demonstrates the importance of their efforts on behalf of arms control and disarmament.Matthew Evangelista examines the work of transnational peace movements throughout the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev eras and into the first years of Boris Yeltsin's leadership. Drawing on extensive research in Russian archives and on interviews with Russian and Western activists and policymakers, he investigates the sources of Soviet policy on nuclear testing, strategic defense, and conventional forces. Evangelista concludes that transnational actors at times played a crucial role in influencing Soviet policy—specifically in encouraging moderate as opposed to hard-line responses—for they supplied both information and ideas to that closed society. Evangelista's findings challenge widely accepted views about the peaceful resolution of the Cold War. By revealing the connection between a state's domestic structure and its susceptibility to the influence of transnational groups, Unarmed Forces will also stimulate thinking about the broader issue of how government policy is shaped.

Drawing on their daily involvement with defense issues and their interactions with the military and political elements of the national security community, civilian and military defense analysts in the U.S. Army War Colleger Strategic Studies Institute offer a lucid analysis of the complex mosaic of strategic and European defense issues. Their contributions are probing, balanced, and provocative, designed for students of foreign and defense affairs, as well as for policymakers. In the first section of the book, the offensive and defensive aspects of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union are examined. Going beyond sterile, static weapons counts, the authors address the relationship between the overall disposition of military forces and deterrence and are attentive to possible future developments, including the impact of new technologies and changing Sino-Soviet relations that are likely to affect the U.S.-USSR relationship. The second section of the book focuses on crucial East-West defense issues within Europe: the balance of conventional and theater nuclear forces, prospects for European arms control, the impact of chemical weapons on deterrence and defense, and the fashioning of an effective nonnuclear NATO defense. The book concludes with a chapter that illuminates U.S.-West European historical and cultural divergences, explaining in a new way the political strains that frequently plague the alliance.

Examines the ways in which views of technology have been used in debates over ballistic missile defence.