Until 1943 there was little effective resistance to the German occupation of The Netherlands. Though numerous small opposition groups had formed immediately after the German invasion in 1940, there was no concerted movement or over-arching organization. Gradually, though, as the Germans introduced harsher measures against certain groups, opposition grew, particularly in the urban areas. These met with very limited success due to poor security which was to plague the Dutch resistance movement in general. As is made clear in this official account, individuals were often members of more than one resistance group at the same time. This inevitably meant that when one cell was compromised others quickly met the same fate. Nevertheless, in 1941 the Netherlands, or N, Section of the Special Operations Executive under Major Seymour Bingham started sending trained agents to The Netherlands. These operatives were dropped by parachute or infiltrated into the country from France or Belgium. Unfortunately, poor discipline continued to hamper the resistance movement. Preparation was poor, security was lax, and codewords were forgotten or ignored. As a result, fifty-four of N Section’s agents were captured by the Germans; fifty of these were subsequently executed. Despite its egregious failings, SOE’s N Section, could count on some successes. Its agents were able to coordinate the various groups and help maintain communications with the UK. They also undertook valuable weapons training and gave instruction on demolition techniques. The people the agents assisted in active resistance were usually ordinary Dutch citizens, often working in respectable jobs under the very noses of the Germans, their only precaution being the adoption of a false name while operating undercover. The SOE agents themselves had to adopt the cover occupations of those professions which would not be subjected to conscription, such as teachers, medical personnel, or police. Usually, they would take the identity of brave individuals who had volunteered to have their information duplicated. In addition, the agents would be thoroughly briefed on their adopted personas so that they could provide convincing accounts of their movements if stopped and interrogated. This official account of the development and activities of SOE’s Dutch Section was written by a Staff Officer prior to SOE being disbanded in 1946. It was based on information, reports and documents provided by those involved in the campaign. It details how SOE agents were recruited and trained in the UK and gives information on safe houses, contact addresses, secret telephone exchanges, training premises and methods of communications in The Netherlands and externally to London. In essence, it provides all the apparatus and procedures used in the establishment of the underground movement which sought to obstruct and oppose the Germans at every turn.

William Mackenzie’s in-house history of the Special Operations Executive made no secret of the disaster in Holland, long notorious in the secret world as well as in the news media, but entered into few details. The full story is now set out, from SOE’s surviving archives, by a leading expert on the subject, whose ground-breaking SOE in France first appeared 35 years ago. This book tells a series of harrowing stories of confusion, ineptitude, blundering, and courage, placing the minute details in their proper contexts of strategy and history. It also provides the first authoritative account of precisely what happened in a classic case of counter-espionage.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) combine economic activities resulting from their position on the market with non-economic functions determined by the state owner. In many of the world’s major economies, SOEs play an important role, and in some, such as China, India, Russia and Brazil, they are outright dominant. At the same time, the existence of SOEs is largely ignored by economic theory and the current figures on SOEs on a global scale available in the literature are questionable in terms of their methodological validity and thus they do not allow for a proper cross-country analysis. This book fills this research gap. It focuses on the scope and importance of SOEs in a broad group of the largest economies, primarily on a variety of quantitative estimates. It contains the results of an extensive and unique empirical study of 37 of the world’s largest economies over the period from 2009 to 2018. The findings showed that the average share of SOEs – measured by operating revenues and total assets – in the group of the largest 100 enterprises (Top 100) of a given country is nearly 30%, while in the Top 20 group it is even slightly higher. The authors present an econometric analysis showing the relationship between the scope of SOEs and the various economic and non-economic characteristics of the studied set of countries. The book also contains an in-depth discussion of selected key issues, such as the functions of SOEs in various types of economies, the role of SOEs in capital markets and the phenomenon of SOEs with foreign capital. This work is addressed to both academic economists, dealing with macroeconomics and economic policy, as well as researchers and analysts from various international organizations and think-tanks.

This book tells, for the first time, the story of their recuitment and training and their courageous actions alongside the Dutch Resistance.

Originally published: London: Leo Cooper, 1993.

In 1942, with a black-market chicken tucked under his arm by his mother, Leo Marks left his father's famous bookshop, 84 Charing Cross Road, and went off to fight the war. He was twenty-two. Soon recognized as a cryptographer of genius, he became head of communications at the Special Operations Executive (SOE), where he revolutionized the codemaking techniques of the Allies and trained some of the most famous agents dropped into occupied Europe. As a top codemaker, Marks had a unique perspective on one of the most fascinating and, until now, little-known aspects of the Second World War. This stunning memoir, often funny, always gripping and acutely sensitive to the human cost of each operation, provides a unique inside picture of the extraordinary SOE organization at work and reveals for the first time many unknown truths about the conduct of the war. SOE was created in July 1940 with a mandate from Winston Churchill to "set Europe ablaze." Its main function was to infiltrate agents into enemy-occupied territory to perform acts of sabotage and form secret armies in preparation for D-Day. Marks's ingenious codemaking innovation was to devise and implement a system of random numeric codes printed on silk. Camouflaged as handkerchiefs, underwear, or coat linings, these codes could be destroyed message by message, and therefore could not possibly be remembered by the agents, even under torture. Between Silk and Cyanide chronicles Marks's obsessive quest to improve the security of agents' codes and how this crusade led to his involvement in some of the war's most dramatic and secret operations. Among the astonishing revelations is his account of the code war between SOE and the Germans in Holland. He also reveals for the first time how SOE fooled the Germans into thinking that a secret army was operating in the Fatherland itself, and how and why he broke the code that General de Gaulle insisted be available only to the Free French. By the end of this incredible tale, truly one of the last great World War II memoirs, it is clear why General Eisenhower credited the SOE, particularly its communications department, with shortening the war by three months. From the difficulties of safeguarding the messages that led to the destruction of the atomic weapons plant at Rjukan in Norway to the surveillance of Hitler's long-range missile base at Peenemünde to the true extent of Nazi infiltration of Allied agents, Between Silk and Cyanide sheds light on one of the least-known but most dramatic aspects of the war. Writing with the narrative flair and vivid characterization of his famous screenplays, Marks gives free rein to his keen sense of the absurd and wry wit without ever losing touch with the very human side of the story. His close relationship with "the White Rabbit" and Violette Szabo -- two of the greatest British agents of the war -- and his accounts of the many others he dealt with result in a thrilling and poignant memoir that celebrates individual courage and endeavor, without losing sight of the human cost and horror of war.

This book presents the stories of individuals, who were - and still are - affected by violence and stigmatisation in the name of suppressing communism in Indonesia during the late 1960s.

SOE and The Resistance describes the extraordinary contribution to the allied war effort made by the Special Operations Executive, from its formation in 1940 to the end of the war. Within a broadly chronological framework, the book illustrates how resistance was stimulated among the subjugated populations of Europe and the Far East, leading to the sabotage of industry and communications critical to the Axis cause. Ranging from France, through Scandinavia, the Low Countries , North Africa, the Balkans and the Far East, the story unfolds through the lives of the heroic men and women who served with the SOE in enemy-held territory, as recorded in their obituaries in The Times.

Resistance is universal, but why does it occur, and fail or succeed? Resistance is often regarded in traditional management books as a problem to be overcome because it is seen as short-sighted or self-interested. Grint suggests, however, that resistance is not necessarily right or wrong. From resistance to the Roman Empire, to slavery, to the Nazis, to racism, to the state and capital, to patriarchy, and to imperialism, this book ranges across time and place to explain the success or failure of resistance. While many contemporary approaches focus on leadership as the explanatory variable, A Cartography of Resistance expands the approach to include management and command of resistance movements - and of their opponents. Many of the case studies explore the failures, as well as the successes, of resistance and the book suggests that even the failures reveal a fundamental truth about the human condition: just because the situation looks bleak for those suffering from oppression does not mean they surrendered meekly. Rather many seemed to adopt the same attitude that led Sisyphus to keep rolling the boulder up the hill: they were determined not to let their situation define or defeat them.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization’s activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.