Written for both the expert and the novice, this book not only reviews the legal framework for derivative actions but also provides a practical guide to the application of legal principles. Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Besieging the Board reviews each of the legal doctrines relevant to derivative actions, including the demand and standing requirements, potential board responses to demands, the use of special litigation committees, procedural issues in derivative litigation and the business judgment rule's application to derivative litigation. This comprehensive legal study features an up-to-date listing of state derivative action statutes and rules, plus analysis of other significant developments, such as the effect of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on shareholder derivative litigation and recent case law concerning the demand requirement and attorneys' fees. It also delivers a wealth of useful working tools, including an easy to follow flow chart, relevant code sections and model forms.

In-depth analysis of the derivative action in Asia - a critical part of Asian corporate law and governance.

Written by leading scholars and judges in the field, the Research Handbook on Representative Shareholder Litigation is a modern-day survey of the state of shareholder litigation. Its chapters cover securities class actions, merger litigation, derivative suits, and appraisal litigation, as well as other forms of shareholder litigation. Through in-depth analysis of these different forms of litigation, the book explores the agency costs inherent in representative litigation, the challenges of multijurisdictional litigation and disclosure-only settlements, and the rise of institutional investors. It explores how related issues are addressed across the globe, with examinations of shareholder litigation in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Israel, and China. This Research Handbook will be an invaluable resource on this important topic for scholars, practitioners, judges and legislators.

The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of corporate law and the implications of this perspective.

ÔThis book takes us back to the financial crisis and asks: should the directors of the financial institutions that caused the crisis be held responsible to their investors? LoughreyÕs and her contributorsÕ analysis of that question and the suggestions to implement their proposals are insightful and timely. This is a must-read book for those of us who are still trying to determine how to avoid the next financial crisis.Õ Ð Randall Thomas, Vanderbilt Law School, US The financial crisis revealed failings at board level at many financial institutions. But despite calls for bank boards to be held to account, there has been a remarkable paucity of litigation against bank directors for breach of their duties. This book assesses whether the law relating to directorsÕ duties and shareholder litigation has contributed to this, taking into account the changes to both that were introduced by the Companies Act 2006. With contributions from leading academics and practitioners, the book examines the directorÕs duty of care and skill, the s.172 duty, reporting obligations under s.417 of the Companies Act 2006, and shareholder litigation including the derivative action and just and equitable winding up. It concludes that neither the common law nor the statutory duties and derivative action under the Companies Act 2006 function effectively to hold directors to account and analyses why this is so. This detailed book will appeal to academics in company law and corporate governance as well as commercial law practitioners particularly those who specialize in company litigation.

This book examines the role and potential of derivative actions in shareholder protection in public limited companies. Derivative actions have been a focal point of legislators’ agendas on shareholder protection, in the past few decades, throughout Europe and beyond. Nevertheless, there remain jurisdictions, such as Greece, which are still devoid of this remedy. Against this backdrop, this book examines whether and how the derivative action may improve shareholder protection, constituting thus a mechanism that justifies legislative attention. It does so in three parts. First, it analyses the desirable role derivative actions assume in protecting shareholder property, monitoring corporate management and mitigating agency costs, alongside their economic implications, introducing the reader to the contemporary international debate on the topic. Having set the desiderata, the second part proceeds with the comparative analysis of Greek, German and UK law – jurisdictions that have recently reformed their provisions on shareholder protection – examining not only the law on derivative actions and their Greek counterpart remedy but also mechanisms of shareholder protection that do, or could, assume functions similar to those of the derivative action. By critically assessing the merits and failures of the respective UK, German and Greek shareholder protection laws, the book then proceeds to offer (in Part III) a model framework of shareholders’ derivative litigation for jurisdictions considering reform. Written in an accessible format, it will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in this important aspect of company law and corporate governance.

Uniquely in the United States, lawyers litigate large cases on behalf of many claimants who could not afford to sue individually. In these class actions, attorneys act typically as risk-taking entrepreneurs, effectively hiring the client rather than acting as the client’s agent. Lawyer-financed, lawyer-controlled, and lawyer-settled, such entrepreneurial litigation invites lawyers to sometimes act more in their own interest than in the interest of their clients. And because class litigation aggregates many claims, defendants object that its massive scale amounts to legalized extortion. Yet, without such devices as the class action and contingent fees, many meritorious claims would never be asserted. John Coffee examines the dilemmas surrounding entrepreneurial litigation in a variety of specific contexts, including derivative actions, securities class actions, merger litigation, and mass tort litigation. His concise history traces how practices developed since the early days of the Republic, exploded at the end of the twentieth century, and then waned as Supreme Court decisions and legislation sharply curtailed the reach of entrepreneurial litigation. In an evenhanded account, Coffee assesses both the strengths and weaknesses of entrepreneurial litigation and proposes a number of reforms to achieve a fairer balance. His goal is to save the class action, not discard it, and to make private enforcement of law more democratically accountable. Taking a global perspective, he also considers the feasibility of exporting a modified form of entrepreneurial litigation to other countries that are today seeking a mechanism for aggregate representation.

This book anticipates virtually every antitrust issue you can expect to face, including: horizontal and vertical restraints; joint ventures; private treble damage actions; price fixing; and more.