This thesis studies the urban history of Mumbai from the perspective of popular Hindi films. The change of the name from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995 is symbolic of the transition of the colonial city from a centre of industrial capitalism to a neoliberal city, characterised by finance capital. It also signals the massive changes in the social and the political spheres of the city. Thomas Blom Hansen's Violence in Urban India starts its narrative of the city with a conversation that the author had on a suburban train, few weeks before the official rechristening. He asked an elderly gentleman about his reaction to the proposed change of the city's name from Bombay to Mumbai. While poring over an article in the English daily, Times of India, regarding the change of name of the city, the gentleman promptly answered: "its proper name is Bombay."

The 2010s were a decade of transformation and conflict in the Middle East, bookended by the Arab Uprisings and the coronavirus pandemic. Throughout this time, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar--the three Arab states with the most ambitious regional policies--declared stability to be their main objective. Yet, rather than being a common denominator, this seemingly shared goal in fact obscured differences between their often-competing agendas. These three Gulf monarchies all agreed that the Middle East had descended into unprecedented and dangerous instability following the Arab Uprisings. But their assessments diverged on what characterized and drove the unrest. This led each country to formulate different--and at times contradictory--views of how politics should be organized in and between states in the region, and what role external powers should play to build a stable new order. With no universally accepted definition of stability, this book develops an original analytical framework linking this concept to that of order, and provides a useful lens through which to understand foreign policy in the Gulf. While governments often frame their relations with other states by evoking a joint commitment to stability, Tobias Borck shows that this does not, in itself, imply strategic alignment.

The 2010s were a decade of transformation and conflict in the Middle East, bookended by the Arab Uprisings and the coronavirus pandemic. Throughout this time, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar—the three Arab states with the most ambitious regional policies—declared stability to be their main objective. Yet, rather than being a common denominator, this seemingly shared goal in fact obscured differences between their often-competing agendas. These three Gulf monarchies all agreed that the Middle East had descended into unprecedented and dangerous instability following the Arab Uprisings. But their assessments diverged on what characterised and drove the unrest. This led each country to formulate different—and at times contradictory—views of how politics should be organised in and between states in the region, and what role external powers should play to build a stable new order. With no universally accepted definition of stability, this book develops an original analytical framework linking this concept to that of order, and provides a useful lens through which to understand foreign policy in the Gulf. While governments often frame their relations with other states by evoking a joint commitment to stability, Tobias Borck shows that this does not, in itself, imply strategic alignment.

The 2010s were a decade of transformation and conflict in the Middle East, bookended by the Arab Uprisings and the coronavirus pandemic. Throughout this time, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar--the three Arab states with the most ambitious regional policies--declared stability to be their main objective. Yet, rather than being a common denominator, this seemingly shared goal in fact obscured differences between their often-competing agendas. These three Gulf monarchies all agreed that the Middle East had descended into unprecedented and dangerous instability following the Arab Uprisings. But their assessments diverged on what characterized and drove the unrest. This led each country to formulate different--and at times contradictory--views of how politics should be organized in and between states in the region, and what role external powers should play to build a stable new order. With no universally accepted definition of stability, this book develops an original analytical framework linking this concept to that of order, and provides a useful lens through which to understand foreign policy in the Gulf. While governments often frame their relations with other states by evoking a joint commitment to stability, Tobias Borck shows that this does not, in itself, imply strategic alignment.

The research background of this book focuses on the historical evolution and strategic development of the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) foreign policy from its formation to the present day. The research methodology proposed in this book includes a historical analysis of the UAE's foreign policy, examining key events and strategies that have shaped its current principles and goals. The task involves understanding the UAE's foreign policy evolution and its performance in maintaining regional stability, fostering economic growth, and enhancing diplomatic relations. The performance supports their goals by demonstrating the UAE's proactive and adaptive approach to international relations. Methods • Historical analysis of the formation of the UAE and its early diplomatic engagements; • Examination of the influence of Pan-Arabism and the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); • Analysis of the UAE's role in regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War; • Evaluation of the impact of the Arab Spring on UAE foreign policy; • Assessment of the shift towards economic diversification and trade-based foreign policy. Conclusion: • The significance of this piece of work lies in its comprehensive overview of the UAE's foreign policy evolution, highlighting the country's strategic adaptability and commitment to stability and economic growth. • Innovation point: The study provides a detailed historical context and analysis of the UAE's foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of economic diversification and cultural diplomacy. • Performance: The UAE's proactive engagement in regional and global affairs demonstrates its effectiveness in achieving its foreign policy goals. • Workload: The book covers a broad range of historical events and policy shifts, providing a thorough understanding of the UAE's foreign policy development.

Established in June 2014, New-Med is a research network of Mediterranean experts and policy analysts with a special interest in the complex social, political, cultural and security-related dynamics that are unfolding in the Mediterranean region. The network is developed by IAI, in cooperation with the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, the Compagnia di San Paolo of Turin, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States. At the core of the New-Med activities stands the need to rethink the role of multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations, to make them better equipped to respond to fast-changing local and global conditions and to address the pressing demands coming from Mediterranean societies all around the basin. This volume examines the goals and prospects of the OSCE’s growing engagement in the Mediterranean region and, more specifically, with the OSCE’s six Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia). The volume’s four chapters focus on the OSCE’s potential role in international efforts to stabilize Libya, a country which has been ravaged by a prolonged and destructive civil war, becoming the epicenter of conflict dynamics with far-reaching implications for both neighbouring countries and Europe. Each chapter addresses a particular theme, or level of analysis, tied to the current conflict in Libya. Beginning with an introductory chapter outlining the OSCE’s growing engagements in the Mediterranean region and Libya’s abortive requests to joint the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership, subsequent chapters delve into the minute details of the major internal and external obstacles to peace-building and stabilization in Libya, addressing the role of regional, European and international actors involved in the country. A final chapter delivers a Russian viewpoint of these themes and traces Moscow’s evolving policy and interests in Libya while addressing the broader role of the OSCE in the Mediterranean.

This edition of Global Trends revolves around a core argument about how the changing nature of power is increasing stress both within countries and between countries, and bearing on vexing transnational issues. The main section lays out the key trends, explores their implications, and offers up three scenarios to help readers imagine how different choices and developments could play out in very different ways over the next several decades. Two annexes lay out more detail. The first lays out five-year forecasts for each region of the world. The second provides more context on the key global trends in train.

Whether democracy promotion should play a role in US foreign policy continues to be a subject of considerable debate, perhaps nowhere more than with regard to the Arab World. But looking beyond the "whether," what explains why, where, and how the United States promotes democracy? What caused the shift from the Obama administration's support of the Arab Spring protests in 2011 to its retreat from democracy promotion only two years later? What explains the Trump administration's focus on relationships with autocrats?In the context of these questions, Mieczyslaw Boduszynski explores the tensions between interests and ideals in US foreign policy and the possibilities and limits of US democracy promotion in a region where Washington has often supported autocracy over freedom.

Since 2011 the Libyan crisis has moved from being a domestic dispute to assuming increasing importance at the international level. Today it represents a crucial issue affecting global security. The intervention of external actors in the Libyan crisis was mainly driven by a desire to direct the transition towards outcomes that would best meet their own political and economic interests. Accordingly, each external player tried to support one specific faction, favoring either the Parliament in Tobruk, upheld by Khalifa Haftar, or the Presidential Council headed by Fayez al-Serraj in Tripoli, the latter being legitimized by the UN as well as by local militias in both Misrata and Tripoli. This report analyzes the troublesome re-building of Libya with a focus on the specific role played by international actors (neighboring and Gulf countries, European nations, Russia and the US) which make it more of an international rather than a domestic issue.

Less than twenty-four months after the hope-filled Arab uprising, the popular movement had morphed into a dystopia of resurgent dictators, failed states, and civil wars. Egypt's epochal transition to democracy ended in a violent military coup. Yemen and Libya collapsed into civil war, while Bahrain erupted in smothering sectarian repression. Syria proved the greatest victim of all, ripped apart by internationally fueled insurgencies and an externally supported, bloody-minded regime. Amidst the chaos, a virulently militant group declared an Islamic State, seizing vast territories and inspiring terrorism across the globe. What happened? The New Arab Wars is a profound illumination of the causes of this nightmare. It details the costs of the poor choices made by regional actors, delivers a scathing analysis of Western misreadings of the conflict, and condemns international interference that has stoked the violence. Informed by commentators and analysts from the Arab world, Marc Lynch's narrative of a vital region's collapse is both wildly dramatic and likely to prove definitive. Most important, he shows that the region's upheavals have only just begun -- and that the hopes of Arab regimes and Western policy makers to retreat to old habits of authoritarian stability are doomed to fail.