China’s reaction to the United States’ new maritime strategy will significantly impact its success, according to three Naval War College professors. Based on the premise that preventing wars is as important as winning wars, this new U.S. strategy, they explain, embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the United States can best pursue its interests in cooperation with other nations. The authors contend that despite recent turbulence in U.S.-China military relations, substantial shared interests could enable extensive U.S.-China maritime security cooperation, as they attempt to reach an understanding of “competitive coexistence.” But for professionals to structure cooperation, they warn, Washington and Beijing must create sufficient political and institutional space.

Lo Jung-pang argues that during each of the three periods when imperial China embarked on maritime enterprises (the Qin and Han dynasties, the Sui and early Tang dynasties, and Song, Yuan, and early Ming dynasties), coastal states took the initiative at a time when China was divided, maritime trade and exploration subsequently peaked when China was strong and unified, and declined as Chinese power weakened. At such times, China's people became absorbed by internal affairs, and state policy focused on threats from the north and the west. These cycles of maritime activity, each lasting roughly five hundred years, corresponded with cycles of cohesion and division, strength and weakness, prosperity and impoverishment, expansion and contraction. In the early 21st century, a strong and outward looking China is again building up its navy and seeking maritime dominance, with important implications for trade, diplomacy and naval affairs. Events will not necessarily follow the same course as in the past, but Lo Jung-pang's analysis suggests useful questions for the study of events as they unfold and decades to come.

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a "great maritime power" and secondly, that the PLA "become a world-class armed force by 2050." He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the "world class" goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's "sea lane anxiety" and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a "near seas"-focused navy to one that has global reach; a "blue water navy." He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to "blue water" status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's "first responders" in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines "world class" but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a "world-class navy" might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

This book analyses China’s maritime strategy for the 21st century, integrating strategic planning, policy thinking and strategic prediction. This book explains the construction and application of China's military, political, economic and diplomatic means for building maritime power, and predicts the future of China's maritime power by 2049, as well as development trends in global maritime politics. It explores both the strengths and the limitations of President Xi’s ‘Maritime Dream’ and provides a candid assessment of the likely future balance at sea between China and the United States. This volume explains and discusses China’s claims and intentions in the East and South China Seas and makes some recommendations for China's future policy that will lessen the chance of conflict with the United States and its closer neighbors. This book will be of much interest to students of maritime strategy, naval studies, Chinese politics and International Relations in general.

This book is a valuable work of reference for the study of sea power, especially in China. It analyzes the challenges and problems facing China’s sea power and offers a complete set of solutions known as ‘sea exploitation.’ In this context, it discusses five aspects of China’s sea power: 1) It revises the notion of sea power and proposes a cost-benefit analysis framework for it. It holds that sea power is undergoing major changes, that multivariate completion and peaceful competition have become mainstream, that negative and zero-sum games have become positive sum games, and that the pursuit of control over the sea has gradually developed into efforts to establish dominance in a partnership. 2) By analyzing the increase in the benefits of China’s sea power, the rise in the nation’s ability-to-pay principle and the growth in the public expectation of China’s capability of providing global public goods, it points out that the rise of China’s sea power is an unavoidable trend. 3) It explores the challenges and problems facing China’s sea power, arguing that China is currently in a situation where it is daunted by large countries, troubled by small countries and its neighbors are expanding their armaments, which have combined to increase the cost of improving China’s sea power. Meanwhile, factors such as strategy vacuum, poor oceanic management and polices tending to restrict ocean development have substantially undermined the benefits of China’s sea power. 4) It summarizes features of China’s sea power and stresses that dilemmas of non-sovereign sea power expansion and sovereign sea power expansion, traumatic pressure and transcendental ideals, escalated conflict and peaceful appeal, etc. require China to articulate its stance on sea power on the one hand and possess the wisdom to resolve sea power problems peacefully on the other. 5) It proposes that China should draw on the experience of the Western Han Dynasty of ancient China, which adopted a land exploitation strategy and introduced a sea exploitation strategy, offering a unique way to implement sea exploitation strategies in China based on domestic and foreign practices.

This monograph examines China's approach to using sea power to defend and advance its maritime claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This approach, which Chinese strategists sometimes called "echelon defense," involves the use of non-military instruments of sea power--especially maritime law enforcement forces--to vie with other states for control over disputed maritime space. These non-military forces operate on the first line (or echelon) of China's expanding frontier. Behind them, on the second line, China employs naval forces to deter foreign leaders from using force, thereby compelling them to compete on China's own terms. The echelon defense approach allows China to gradually achieve its objectives without risking a conflict or giving other great powers such as the United States sufficient grounds to intervene. Since 2006, when this approach was pioneered, it has enabled China to expand its influence and control in maritime East Asia. But it has also harmed China's relations with its neighbors and other great powers. Discover more products: Other products produced by the United States Navy, Naval War College (USNWC) can be found here:https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/naval-war-college-nwc Maritime resources collection here:https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/maritime-transportation-shipping Resources relating to China can be found here:https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/china

This book examines the evolution of China’s maritime security strategy, and questions what has made China shift from a constrained to a more assertive strategy. Historically, China has not been an active player in maritime security, but in recent years Beijing has begun to pursue policies and measures to safeguard its maritime rights and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This growing influence in the region has become a concern for other countries about what kind of sea power China is developing. This book seeks to address this concern by providing an overview of the development of China’s maritime security strategy from the era of Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping. It suggests that while the involvement of maritime actors and the development of naval capability have provided the depth to the strategy, the national strategic guidelines from each generation of Chinese leadership have determined the overall direction of the maritime security strategy. After 40 years of development, China has established a set of priorities for its maritime agenda: territorial integrity is at the top, followed by development, and then regional and international maritime cooperation. These findings help us to understand China’s multidimensional maritime power as being both assertive and cooperative. This book will be of much interest to students of naval strategy, maritime security, Chinese politics and International Relations.

This challenging new book argues that the People's Republic of China is pursuing a long-term strategy to extend its national power by sea.

This book examines the strategic choices that American and Chinese decisionmakers face regarding sea power in the Western Pacific, shaped by geography, history, technology, and politics. In particular, the author explores the potential for cooperation on maritime security in the Western Pacific, and how the United States might pursue such cooperation as part of a broader strategy to advance its interests in the region.

The expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in many ways a logical and even forgone conclusion. China is the world's second-largest economy; its heavy dependence on trade inevitably makes the seas of growing importance to national well-being. Yet as China's maritime ambitions continue to expand, the U.S. is faced with a challenging task: recognizing Chinese interests without acceding to Chinese demands. How America meets this challenge will determine the future of the Asia-Pacific region and whether America's maritime dominance will continue through the next century.