Following is an address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the Time Magazine Conference on SDI Strategic Defense initiative, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1986. The primary security objective of the United States is to reduce the risk of war while preserving our liberty and democratic political system. Over the past 25 years, the United States has pursued this objective through two related means. We have sought to deter war by maintaining a force structure adequate to convince potential adversaries that the risks and costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible gains. Simultaneously, we have sought to limit the nature and extent of the threat to the United States and to stabilize the strategic relationship with our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, through arms control agreements. The United States is now engaged in research to find out if new technologies could provide a more stable basis to deter war in the future by a shift to a greater reliance on strategic defenses. Arms control could also play an important role in designing a more stable strategic regime in the future. Tonight, I propose to examine the relationship among SDI, arms control, and stability. I hope to show that our SDI research and arms control policies, as currently defined, provide a cohesive and firm basis for enhancing strategic stability in the future and ultimately for reducing the risk of war.

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With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.