This book presents the crisis from two different angles: the onlooker's and the player's. The first part is an analysis of the aspirations and constraints that motivated Iraq in the war. The second is a selection of the speeches of its main protagonist, President Saddam Husayn. These speeches are indeed an indispensable source for understanding not just the crisis itself but also the political culture of Iraq and the man at its helm.

Includes 85 translated letters, speeches, messages, interviews from 1955 through January 1991. Presents the Iraqi point of view from Iraqi governmental officials. Represents a sampling of official Iraqi commentary on various aspects of the Gulf Crisis. Includes various UN Security Council resolutions.

The shooting war is over in the Persian Gulf. However, the war of words about it is only now beginning. Elaine Sciolino, who has covered the Middle East during the past decade for ``The New York Times'', fires the opening salvo in an effort to explain and analyze how the war came about. She first warned us about Saddam Hussein in 1985 in an article for The New York Times Magazine. Now she tells us how Saddam came to power; why he invaded Kuwait, what effects the war's outcome will have; and what happens to the region's balance of power with Saddam's army destroyed.

This book presents the Gulf crisis from two different angles: the onlooker's and the player's, an analysis of the motivations in the war, and a selection of the speeches of its main protagonist, President Saddam Husayn.

From a Western perspective, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 largely fulfilled the first President Bush's objective: "In, out, do it, do it right, get gone. That's the message." But in the Arab world, the causes and consequences of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent defeat by a U.S.-led coalition were never so clear-cut. The potent blend of Islam and Arab nationalism that Saddam forged to justify the unjustifiable—his invasion of a Muslim state—gained remarkable support among both Muslims and Arabs and continued to resonate in the Middle East long after the fighting ended. Indeed, as this study argues in passing, it became a significant strand in the tangled web of ideologies and actions that led to the attacks of 9/11. This landmark book offers the first in-depth investigation of how Saddam Hussein used Islam and Arab nationalism to legitimate his invasion of Kuwait in the eyes of fellow Muslims and Arabs, while delegitimating the actions of the U.S.-led coalition and its Arab members. Jerry M. Long addresses three fundamental issues: how extensively and in what specific ways Iraq appealed to Islam during the Kuwait crisis; how elites, Islamists, and the elusive Arab "street," both in and out of the coalition, responded to that appeal and why they responded as they did; and the longer-term effects that resulted from Saddam's strategy.

An examination of the Gulf War conflict looks as the history of strike in the Middle East, the key individuals involved, and the consequences of this event.

The false promise of lost opportunities -- Another fait accompli -- The preventive war temptation meets the preventive war paradox -- Haunted by the preventive war paradox -- The roots of a bitter peace -- The Ruhr war -- Sowing dragons teeth -- No heroes, no goats -- Searching for a silver bullet

The Persian Gulf crisis may well have been the most extensively polled episode in U.S. history as President Bush, his opponents, and even Saddam Hussein appealed to, and tried to influence, public opinion. As well documented as this phenomenon was, it remains largely unexplained. John Mueller provides an account of the complex relationship between American policy and public opinion during the Gulf crisis. Mueller analyzes key issues: the actual shallowness of public support for war; the effect of public opinion on the media (rather than the other way around); the use and misuse of polls by policy makers; the American popular focus on Hussein's ouster as a central purpose of the War; and the War's short-lived impact on voting. Of particular interest is Mueller's conclusion that Bush succeeded in leading the country to war by increasingly convincing the public that it was inevitable, rather than right or wise. Throughout, Mueller, author of War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, an analysis of public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam wars, places this analysis of the Gulf crisis in a broad political and military context, making comparisons to wars in Panama, Vietnam, Korea, and the Falklands, as well as to World War II and even the War of 1812. The book also collects nearly 300 tables charting public opinion through the Gulf crisis, making Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War an essential reference for anyone interested in recent American politics, foreign policy, public opinion, and survey research.

Events in this story of the "Mother of All Battles," as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, video and audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders' eyes. The book is part of an official U.S. Joint Forces Command research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, the author's balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of his unique access to material. The result is a completely unknown but fully documented view from the other side.

In a provocative analysis written during the unfolding drama of 1992, Baudrillard draws on his concepts of simulation and the hyperreal to argue that the Gulf War did not take place but was a carefully scripted media event--a "virtual" war. Patton's introduction argues that Baudrillard, more than any other critic of the Gulf War, correctly identified the stakes involved in the gestation of the New World Order.