Rectifying International Injustice examines the theory behind claims for reparations and compensation as a result of historic international injustice.

This book aims to help answer two questions that Western philosophy has paid relatively little attention to - what is injustice and what does justice require when injustice occurs? Injustice and Rectification offers a taxonomy of justice, which sets forth an initial framework for a moral theory of justice and focuses on framing a conception of rectificatory justice. The taxonomy is ground for this book's eleven other essays, in which a diverse group of authors brings philosophical analysis to bear on the idea of injustice itself and on some important conceptual and normative issues concerning the rectification of injustice.

Should contemporary citizens provide material redress to right past wrongs? There is a widespread belief that contemporary citizens should take responsibility for rectifying past wrongs. Nahshon Perez challenges this view, questioning attempts to aggregate dead wrongdoers with living people, and examining ideas of intergenerational collective responsibility with great suspicion. He distinguishes sharply between those who are indeed unjustly enriched by past wrongs, and those who are not. Looking at issues such as the distinction between compensation and restitution, counterfactuals and the non-identity problem, Perez concludes that individuals have the right to a clean slate, and that almost all of the pro-intergenerational redress arguments are unconvincing. Key Features *Unique in claiming past wrongs should not be rectified *Analyses pro-intergenerational material redress arguments *Case studies include court cases from Australia, Northern Cyprus, the United States and Austria, and political and social movements from the US, Palestine and Arab countries

Calls for redress of historical wrongs regularly make headlines around the world. People dispute the degree to which justice should be concerned with righting past wrongs, with some arguing that justice should be primarily focused on claims arising from present disadvantage. Proponents and sceptics of restitution, compensation, and other forms of historical redress have engaged with the thesis that historical injustice can be superseded, the idea that changing circumstances following historical injustices can alter what justice later requires. The “supersession thesis,” developed by legal and political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, has been challenged, both conceptually and in terms of its possible application and implications. This is the first book to critically assess how the supersession thesis might be reconstructed, challenged, or applied to empirical cases, with an eye toward larger questions surrounding the temporal orientation of justice. Cases examined include Indigenous peoples, linguistic injustice, and climate change. The edited volume includes contributions by established and junior scholars from philosophy, law, American Indian Studies, and political science, who draw from Indigenous thought, settler colonial theory, liberalism, theories of historical entitlements, and structural injustice theories. It concludes with a reply by Jeremy Waldron. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

This book argues that states have a special obligation to offer asylum as a form of reparation to refugees for whose flight they are responsible. It shows the great relevance of reparative justice, and the importance of the causes of contemporary forced migration, for our understanding of states’ responsibilities to refugees. Part I explains how this view presents an alternative to the dominant humanitarian approach to asylum in political theory and some practice. Part II outlines the conditions under which asylum should act as a form of reparation, arguing that a state owes this form of asylum to refugees where it bears responsibility for the unjustified harms that they experience, and where asylum is the most fitting form of reparation available. Part III explores some of the ethical implications of this reparative approach to asylum for the workings of states’ asylum systems and the international politics of refugee protection.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

Governments today often apologize for past injustices and scholars increasingly debate the issue, with many calling for apologies and reparations. Others suggest that what matters is victims of injustice today, not injustices in the past. Spinner-Halev argues that the problem facing some peoples is not only the injustice of the past, but that they still suffer from injustice today. They experience what he calls enduring injustices, and it is likely that these will persist without action to address them. The history of these injustices matters, not as a way to assign responsibility or because we need to remember more, but in order to understand the nature of the injustice and to help us think of possible ways to overcome it. Suggesting that enduring injustices fall outside the framework of liberal theory, Spinner-Halev spells out the implications of his arguments for conceptions of liberal justice and progress, reparations, apologies, state legitimacy, and post-nationalism.

In this insightful new book, Moncrieffe argues that the traditionally narrow interpretation of accountability obscures relationships, power dynamics, structures, processes and complexities. The relational view, in contrast, seeks to understand the ways in which people perform in their roles as social actors, and how the quality of relationships influences the character of accountability. This book will provide a grounded theoretical background to accountability, using vivid case evidence to emphasize the significance of relational approaches to accountability using empirical data (from Jamaica, Haiti, Ethiopia and Uganda). Ultimately arguing that accountability is much more than a managerial concept; rather, it is deeply social and political. The result is a unique, coherent, perspective that will both explain and 'debunk' this central developmental concept.

This book examines how justice and reconciliation in world politics should be conceived in response to the injustice and alienation of modern colonialism?

Breaking out of the dominance of Anglo-American scholarship, this volume centralises East Asian philosophical traditions to explore cross-cultural perspectives in the field of global justice studies. By bringing together diverse traditions of thinking about justice that contrasts East Asian and Western thinkers' traditions, it avoids the shortcomings of narrow and one-sided conceptualisations of global justice. A range of contributors from East Asia, Europe, and the US who are conversant with both Western and East Asian philosophical traditions provide a rich engagement with contemporary issues relating to global justice. The book opens with a section devoted to the methodological challenges specific to cross-cultural approaches to justice, including the universalism/particularism debate and the conditions of the possibility of cross-cultural comparisons. Part II explores how major East Asian philosophical traditions-including Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism and Buddhism-consider issues related to global justice. The essays in Part III adopt a cross-cultural and/or comparative perspective on justice, enabling the readers to appreciate similarities and differences between the East Asian and Western perspectives on justice, and to appreciate cultural variation. Key applied issues in global justice, such as epistemic injustice, human rights, women's rights, nationalism, religious pluralism, coercion, corruption and post-colonial justice, receive full consideration in the final section of this indispensable reference work for understandings of global justice in East Asia specifically and cross-culturally.