"Reagan and the Economy" is the most comprehensive, authoritative, and up-to-date critique of Reaganomics, the revolutionary economic and political program of the 1980s whose effects are only beginning to be felt. In accessible, non-technical language, Michael J. Boskin describes the Reagan economic program as it was conceived and as it evolved over the first six years of the Reagan presidency, showing its place in the changing world of economic thought. His aim is to dispel the myths about Reaganomics by taking a hard look at the actual data and evaluating the performance of the economy. Many of his findings run counter to conventional wisdom. Boskin's greatest contribution is his analysis of "supply-side" economics, the new school of economic thinking that produced several tax cuts during the Reagan Presidency. He analyzes the effects of these policies in light of the economic conditions and alternatives available at the time, and finds the supply-side tax cuts to be partially successful. These findings form a comprehensive and accurate review of Reaganomics. "Reagan and the Economy" is essential to understanding the political and economic choices the nation will face in the coming years. -- From publisher's description.

This book examines one of the most important economic outcomes in American history—the breakdown of the Keynesian Revolution. Drawing on economic literature, the memoirs of economists and politicians, and the popular press, Eric Crouse examines how economic decline in the 1970s precipitated a political revolution. Keynesian thought flourished through the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, until stagflation devastated American workers and Jimmy Carter’s economic policies faltered, setting the stage for the 1980 presidential campaign. Tracking years of shifting public opinion and colorful debate between free-market and Keynesian economists, this book illuminates a neglected era of American economic history and shows how Ronald Reagan harnessed a vision of small government and personal freedom that transformed the American political landscape.

Mostly papers presented during the Third Annual Sewanee Economics Symposium, Oct. 1-3, 1981; sponsored by the Economics Dept. of the University of the South at Sewanee in cooperation with Sidney Weintraub, visiting appointee to the Kennedy Distinguished Professorship in Economics.

"A report of the Urban Institute's Changing Domestic Priorities Project"--Page ii."URI 34200"--T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references.

Michael Meeropol argues that the ballooning of the federal budget deficit was not a serious problem in the 1980s, nor were the successful recent efforts to get it under control the basis for the prosperous economy of the mid-1990s. In this controversial book, the author provides a close look at what actually happened to the American economy during the years of the "Reagan Revolution" and reveals that the huge deficits had no negative effect on the economy. It was the other policies of the Reagan years--high interest rates to fight inflation, supply-side tax cuts, reductions in regulation, increased advantages for investors and the wealthy, the unraveling of the safety net for the poor--that were unsuccessful in generating more rapid growth and other economic improvements. Meeropol provides compelling evidence of the failure of the U.S. economy between 1990 and 1994 to generate rising incomes for most of the population or improvements in productivity. This caused, first, the electoral repudiation of President Bush in 1992, followed by a repudiation of President Clinton in the 1994 Congressional elections. The Clinton administration made a half-hearted attempt to reverse the Reagan Revolution in economic policy, but ultimately surrendered to the Republican Congressional majority in 1996 when Clinton promised to balance the budget by 2000 and signed the welfare reform bill. The rapid growth of the economy in 1997 caused surprisingly high government revenues, a dramatic fall in the federal budget deficit, and a brief euphoria evident in an almost uncontrollable stock market boom. Finally, Meeropol argues powerfully that the next recession, certain to come before the end of 1999, will turn the predicted path to budget balance and millennial prosperity into a painful joke on the hubris of public policymakers. Accessibly written as a work of recent history and public policy as much as economics, this book is intended for all Americans interested in issues of economic policy, especially the budget deficit and the Clinton versus Congress debates. No specialized training in economics is needed. "A wonderfully accessible discussion of contemporary American economic policy. Meeropol demonstrates that the Reagan-era policies of tax cuts and shredded safety nets, coupled with strident talk of balanced budgets, have been continued and even brought to fruition by the neo-liberal Clinton regime." --Frances Fox Piven, Graduate School, City University of New York Michael Meeropol is Chair and Professor of Economics, Western New England College.

As a domestic policy advisor to Ronald Reagan, Bruce Bartlett was one of the originators of Reaganomics, the supply-side economic theory that conservatives have clung to for decades. In The New American Economy, Bartlett goes back to the economic roots that made Impostor a bestseller and abandons the conservative dogma in favor of a policy strongly based on what's worked in the past. Marshalling compelling history and economics, he explains how economic theories that may be perfectly valid at one moment in time under one set of circumstances tend to lose validity over time because they are misapplied under different circumstances. Bartlett makes a compelling, historically-based case for large tax increases, once anathema to him and his economic allies. In The New American Economy, Bartlett seeks to clarify a compelling and way forward for the American economy.

An innovative approach to measuring inequality providing the first full integration of distributional and macro level data for the US.

The fascinating, suppressed history of how JFK pioneered supply-side economics. John F. Kennedy was the first president since the 1920s to slash tax rates across-the-board, becoming one of the earliest supply-siders. Sadly, today’s Democrats have ignored JFK’s tax-cut legacy and have opted instead for an anti-growth, tax-hiking redistribution program, undermining America’s economy. One person who followed JFK’s tax-cut growth model was Ronald Reagan. This is the never-before-told story of the link between JFK and Ronald Reagan. This is the secret history of American prosperity. JFK realized that high taxes that punished success and fanned class warfare harmed the economy. In the 1950s, when high tax rates prevailed, America endured recessions every two or three years and the ranks of the unemployed swelled. Only in the 1960s did an uninterrupted boom at a high rate of growth (averaging 5 percent per year) drive a tremendous increase in jobs for the long term. The difference was Kennedy’s economic policy, particularly his push for sweeping tax-rate cuts. Kennedy was so successful in the ’60s that he directly inspired Ronald Reagan’s tax cut revolution in the 1980s, which rejuvenated the economy and gave us another boom that lasted for two decades. Lawrence Kudlow and Brian Domitrovic reveal the secret history of American prosperity by exploring the little-known battles within the Kennedy administration. They show why JFK rejected the advice of his Keynesian advisors, turning instead to the ideas proposed by the non-Keynesians on his team of rivals. We meet a fascinating cast of characters, especially Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, a Republican. Dillon’s opponents, such as liberal economists Paul Samuelson, James Tobin, and Walter Heller, fought to maintain the high tax rates—including an astonishing 91% top rate—that were smothering the economy. In a wrenching struggle for the mind of the president, Dillon convinced JFK of the long-term dangers of nosebleed income-tax rates, big spending, and loose money. Ultimately, JFK chose Dillon’s tax cuts and sound-dollar policies and rejected Samuelson and Heller. In response to Kennedy’s revolutionary tax cut, the economy soared. But as the 1960s wore on, the departed president’s priorities were undone by the government-expanding and tax-hiking mistakes of Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter. The resulting recessions and the “stagflation” of the 1970s took the nation off its natural course of growth and prosperity-- until JFK’s true heirs returned to the White House in the Reagan era. Kudlow and Domitrovic make a convincing case that the solutions needed to solve the long economic stagnation of the early twenty-first century are once again the free-market principles of limited government, low tax rates, and a strong dollar. We simply need to embrace the bipartisan wisdom of two great presidents, unleash prosperity, and recover the greatness of America.

The eight years of the Reagan administration have left an indelible imprint on U.S. economic policy. Although the term Reaganomics is employed by both the general public and academic economists, there is still no consensus as to what the overall impact of Reaganomics has been for the country. This work, a wide-ranging collection of essays and commentaries, analyzes the empirical evidence that comprises the Reagan economic legacy. By detailing that legacy's successes, such as low unemployment and economic growth, and its negative effects, including unprecedented deficits and regulatory chaos, the editors provide some tentative conclusions as to whether the Reagan years produced an economic miracle or paved the way for economic disaster. The volume concentrates on the first level of economic impacts, covering the issues of supply-side economics, the regulatory environment, monetary policy, and foreign trade. Under each topic, groups of essays and commentaries present alternative interpretations of the Reagan legacy. Tax policy and business fixed investment, the effects of supply-side policies on labor supply, tax reform and deregulation are addressed in the supply-side section; interest rates and monetary policy objectives and realizations comprise the monetary policy section; and trade policy, trade deficit, and exchange rates are discussed in the international trade section. A final essay offers an alternate view of the Reagan legacy that attempts to synthesize the divergent theories. This work will be an important new resource for courses in economics and political science, as well as a worthy addition to college, university, and public libraries.