This book analyses conflict theory through one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation.

"This book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go—and, in fact, must go—hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary—the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University)

This book covers the problems of rational decision-making in conflict situations.

Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.

Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy focuses on the unified presentation of politics as a rational human activity, including the paradox of voting and proportional representation. The publication first offers information on the study of rational politics, political intrigue in the Bible, and candidate strategies. Topics include the factor of timing in presidential primaries, rational positions in a multicandidate race, primacy of issues and their spatial representation, and politics in the story of Esther. The text then elaborates on voting paradoxes and the problems of representation, voting power, and threats and deterrence. Discussions focus on a sequential view of the Cuban missile crisis, use of threat power in Poland, power anomalies in the European Community Council of Ministers, probability of the paradox of voting, empirical examples of the paradox of voting, and problems in achieving proportional representation. The book is a valuable reference for researchers interested in rational politics.

One of the most promising trends in modem political science is the develop ment of a theory of politics as rational action. Focussing on choice as the central topic of study, rational choice theorists set out to specify what alter native an actor should prefer if he has some given knowledge of the conse quences of each alternative and wants to see his preference system as fully realized as possible. But rational choice theory is not confmed to the norma tive sphere of science. It can also be used for explanatory purposes. Then, the alternatives actually chosen are specified and the task is to explain the decisions by fmding out what considerations lay behind them. The starting point for an emerging research program at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, on 'Politics as Rational Action' is to describe the major choices in fifteen different policy areas of Swedish domes tic politics and explain why they were made.

Featuring a substantial new introduction and two new chapters in the Postscript, this new edition makes one of the most significant works on power available in paperback and online for the first time. The author extensively engages with a body of new literature to elucidate and expand upon the original work, using rational choice theory to provide: • An examination of how, due to the collective action problem, groups can be powerless despite not facing any resistance • Timely engagement with feminist accounts of power • An explanation of the relationship of structure and agency and how to measure power comparatively across societies This book’s unique interaction with both classical and contemporary debates makes it an essential resource for anyone teaching or studying power in the disciplines of sociology, philosophy, politics or international relations.

Make workplace conflict resolution a game that EVERYBODY wins! Recent studies show that typical managers devote more than a quarter of their time to resolving coworker disputes. The Big Book of Conflict-Resolution Games offers a wealth of activities and exercises for groups of any size that let you manage your business (instead of managing personalities). Part of the acclaimed, bestselling Big Books series, this guide offers step-by-step directions and customizable tools that empower you to heal rifts arising from ineffective communication, cultural/personality clashes, and other specific problem areas—before they affect your organization's bottom line. Let The Big Book of Conflict-Resolution Games help you to: Build trust Foster morale Improve processes Overcome diversity issues And more Dozens of physical and verbal activities help create a safe environment for teams to explore several common forms of conflict—and their resolution. Inexpensive, easy-to-implement, and proved effective at Fortune 500 corporations and mom-and-pop businesses alike, the exercises in The Big Book of Conflict-Resolution Games delivers everything you need to make your workplace more efficient, effective, and engaged.