First published in 1995. When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the continental and analytic traditions in philosophy? Answers to both questions are found in this extraordinary account of the debate surrounding psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. The trajectory of twentieth century philosophy has been largely determined by this anti-naturalist view which holds that empirical research is in principle different from philosophical inquiry, and can never make significant contributions to the latter's central issues. Martin Kusch explores the origins of psychologism through the work of two major figures in the history of twentieth century philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. His sociological and historical reconstruction shows how the power struggle between the experimental psychologists and pure philosophers influenced the thought of these two philosophers, shaping their agendas and determining the success of their arguments for a sharp separation of logic from psychology. A move that was crucial in the creation of the distinct discipline of psychology and was responsible for the anti-naturalism found in both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions in philosophy. Students and lecturers in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, cognitive science and history will find this study invaluable for understanding a key moment in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.

This book presents a remarkable diversity of contemporary opinions on the prospects of addressing philosophical topics from a psychological perspective. It considers the history and philosophical merits of psychologism, and looks systematically at psychologism in phenomenology, cognitive science, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophical semantics, and artificial intelligence.

Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.

This book presents an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant’s philosophy together with those of the British empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant’s psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant’s philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. It also relates Kant’s psychologism to Wittgenstein’s later conception of language. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant’s philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.

This book shows us how rather than abandoning psychology once he liberated phenomenology from the psychologism of the philosophy of arithmetic, Edmund Husserl remained concerned with the ways in which phenomenology held important implications for a radical reform of psychology throughout his intellectual career. The author fleshes out what such a radical reform actually entails, and proposes that it can only be accomplished by following the trail of the transcendental reduction described in Husserl’s later works. In order to appreciate the need for the transcendental even for psychology, the book tracks Husserl’s thinking on the nature of this relationship between phenomenology as a philosophy and psychology as a positive science as it evolved over time. The text covers Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as “descriptive psychology” in the Logical Investigations, rejecting the hybrid form of “phenomenological psychology” described in the lectures by that name, and ends with his proposal for a “fundamental refashioning” of psychology by situating it within the transcendental framework of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The Author argues for a re-grounding of psychology by virtue of a “return to positivity” after having performed the reduction to transcendental intersubjectivity. What results is a phenomenological approach to a transcendentally-grounded psychology which, while having returned to the life-world, no longer remains transcendentally naïve. A phenomenologically-grounded psychology thus empowers researchers, clinicians, and clients alike to engage in social actions that move the world closer to achieving social justice for all. This text appeals to students and researchers working in phenomenology and psychology.

A new translation of Heidegger's early work "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic'', originally published in 1913 under the German title "Die lehre vom urteil im psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik ". This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for Existentialist terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. The document explores the nature of judgment, its relation to perception, and the psychological underpinnings of logical thought. Heidegger argues for the need to make a clear distinction between psychological and transcendental methods in logic, arguing for an independent and intrinsic understanding of logic beyond psychological interpretations.

The essays which are collected in this book were written at various intervals during the last seven years. The essay "Heidegger and Dewey," which is the last one to be printed in the book, was actually the first one I wrote. It was written as a seminar paper for John D. Goheen's course on Dewey in the Spring of 1968 at Stanford University where I was a second-year graduate student. The paper went unchanged into my thesis "Four Studies in Phenomenology and Pragmatism," which I eventually submitted in 1971, and it is here reprinted with no alteration except for the title. A first version of the two essays on Sartre was written in the Spring of 1969 during my first year of teaching at Princeton University. Even tually I decided to break the essay into two parts. A shortened version of "Sartre and the Cartesian Ego" was read at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 1973.

Bringing together established researchers and emerging scholars alike to discuss new readings of Husserl and to reignite the much needed discussion of what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about, this volume sets out to critically re-evaluate (and challenge) the predominant interpretations of Husserl’s philosophy, and to adapt phenomenology to the specific philosophical challenges and context of the 21st century. “What is phenomenology?”, Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks at the beginning of his Phenomenology of Perception – and he continues: “It may seem strange that this question still has to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. It is, however, far from being resolved.” Even today, more than half a century after Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus, the answer is in many ways still up for grasp. While it may seem obvious that the main subject of phenomenological inquiry is, in fact, the subject, it is anything but self evident what this precisely implies: Considering the immense variety of different themes and methodological self-revisions found in Husserl’s philosophy – from its Brentanian beginnings to its transcendental re-interpretation and, last but not least, to its ‘crypto-deconstruction’ in the revisions of his early manuscripts and in his later work –, one cannot but acknowledge the fact that ‘the’ subject of phenomenology marks an irreducible plurality of possible subjects. Paying tribute to this irreducible plurality the volume sets out to develop interpretative takes on the phenomenological tradition which transcend both its naive celebration and its brute rejection, to re-articulate the positions of other philosophers within the framework of Husserl’s thought, and to engage in an investigative dialogue between traditionally opposed camps within phenomenology and beyond.