Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962.

Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962.

In this work Crowell proposes that the distinguishing feature of 20th-century philosophy is not so much its emphasis on language as its concern with meaning. He argues that transcendental phenomenology is indispensible to the philosophical explanation of the space of meaning.

A collection of research by leading international scholars on Beckett and phenomenology - both comparing and contrasting his work with key figures in phenomenology and analysing phenomenological themes and their dramatization in Beckett's work.

From the Preface to the Revised Edition: Since its publication in 2007, Transcendental Phenomenological Psychology has been sold on every continent (except Antarctica), and is in the collections of research libraries in North America, Europe, and Asia. Even so, its presentation to the academic community rightly provoked many comments, corrections, suggestions, and criticisms. Such input, while mostly welcome, provided the impetus to publish a revised edition. A phenomenological explanation of human consciousness has long been sought in regions of psychology since the discipline was first carved out of philosophical concepts and theories about the human condition. In its earliest years, Western psychology was faced with two possible directions for this explanation: an empirical naturalistic approach along with physics and biology, or a non-empirical eidetic approach along with logic and mathematics. Edmund Husserl took up the latter. His phenomenological tradition of inquiry successfully spanned nearly forty years until suddenly stopped and largely suppressed during the Second World War. This book recovers Husserl's revolutionary approach toward the human sciences, just as it was developed, and just as it is presented for further study. Here, the author systematically gathers what Husserl calls the "leading clues" in the phenomenological method proper for a psychology of affective inner experience, and then for the first time applies Husserl's own methodology for introducing a phenomenological psychology in the transcendental register of human consciousness. Unlike contemporary phenomenological psychology in the existential register, transcendental phenomenological psychology is presented as an eidetic non-empirical "act psychology" in Husserl's mature genetic phenomenology. This novel approach takes in the full range of solipsistic and transcendental subjectivity in Husserl's theories of human consciousness, and follows Husserl's lead in presenting phenomenological psychology as an "applied geometry" of intentional experience within a step-wise theory of inquiry. This book is unique in human science today, not only in its presentation of the development and applications of Husserl's key concepts for the discipline of psychology, but also for introducing a psychology that could be intuitively grasped as self-evidently valid wherever one's interest might lie.

It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel's contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel's thinking by a priori categorial relationships.

This book is a scholarly monograph on Sigmund Freud's understanding of the basics of psychotherapy theory and practice from the perspective of phenomenology. Two leading phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, are chosen to make an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of Freud's interpretation of talking and relating with others. Heidegger is then compared to Husserl to produce a position that keeps a focus on intentionality yet accepts the understanding offered by hermeneutics. This work is relevant to psychotherapists, philosophers and philosophically-interested human scientists who value qualitative approaches to meaning.

The transcendental turn of Husserl's phenomenology has challenged philosophers and scholars from the beginning. This volume inquires into the profound meaning of this turn by contrasting its Kantian and its phenomenological versions. Examining controversies surrounding subjectivity, idealism, aesthetics, logic, the foundation of sciences, and practical philosophy, the chapters provide a helpful guide for facing current debates.

Transcendence and Phenomenology presents a definitive collection of essays discussing the much debated turn to theology in philosophy, most evident in phenomenology. Arguably the most pressing debate at the interface of philosophy and theology, this collection of essays makes a significant intervention in the on-going argument, gathering together some of the finest phenomenologist s writing today; Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Jean-Louis Chretien and Michel Henry. It also presents major criticisms of phenomenology in relation to theology, especially from John Milbank. This volume will provide a framework for those new to the debate. Contributors to this volume: JEAN-LUC MARION, MICHEL HENRY, RICHARD KEARNEY, JEFF BLOECHL, RUDI VISKER, JEAN-YVES LACOSTE, LASZLO TENGELYI, JOHN MILBANK, JEAN GREISCH, RUUD WELTEN, MAURO CARBONE. Dr Conor Cunningham is Co Director of the Centre for Theology and Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. Dr Peter Candler is Assistant Professor of Theology at Baylor University in Texas.