Many philosophers believe that the traditional problem of our knowledge of the external world was dissolved by Wittgestein and others. They argue that it was not really a problem - just a linguistic `confusion' that did not actually require a solution. Bruce Aune argues that they are wrong. He casts doubt on the generally accepted reasons for putting the problem aside and proposes an entirely new approach. By considering the history of the problem from Descartes to Kant, Aune shows that analogous arguments create difficulties for the contemporary philosophical consensus. He makes it clear that the problem remains acute, particualarly for our understanding of scientific evidence. The solution he proposes draws upon contemporary philosophy of science and probability theory.

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein.

In his writings, Hume talks of our 'gilding and staining' natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to 'spread itself' on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of 'projection' in connection with his philosophy: Hume is held to have taught that causal power and self are projections, that God is a projection of our fear, and that value is a projection of sentiment. By considering what it is about Hume's writing that occasions this metaphor, P. J. E. Kail spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds 'projective' in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds 'realist'. In addition to offering some highly original readings of Hume's central ideas, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.

This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. The distinguished contributors address a variety of issues, including truth, realism, anti-realism, relativism, and scepticism, and testify to Wright's seminal work on language, mind, metaphysics, and epistemology.

This is Volume XVII of twenty-two in a series on 20th Century Philosophy. Originally published in 1959, it is a contribution to the History of Modern Philosophy under the heads: first of different Schools of Thought-Sensationalist, Realist, Idealist, Intuitivist; secondly of different Subjects-Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, Theology. This is a collection of papers by George Edward Moore, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Fellow of Trinity College in the University of Cambridge.

The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions in philosophy: what can we know? The radical sceptic's answer is 'not very much' if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (permanent) deception. This book shows that the radical sceptical problem is an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation.

The volume is full of thought-provoking insight which will prove a stimulus both to further study and to scholarly disagreement.

ÒDescartes' attempt to ground the possibility of human knowledge in the existence of God was judged to be a complete failure by his contemporaries, and this remains the universal opinion of philosophers to this day, despite the fact that three and a half centuries of secular epistemology--which attempts to ground the possibility of knowledge either in the unaided human intellect or in natural processes--has failed to do any better. Further, the leading twentieth-century attempts at theistic epistemology reject both the conception of knowledge and the standards of epistemic evaluation that Descartes takes for granted. ÒIn this book--partly an interpretation of Descartes and partly an attempt to complete his project-- the author attempts to show that a theistic epistemology incorporating Platonic and Aristotelian/Thomist elements can revitalize the Cartesian approach to the solution of the central problems of epistemology, including that most elusive of prizes--the proof of the external world.Ó --From the author's preface

DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy" by Bertrand Russell. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.