Probability theory

Authoritative account of the development of Boole's ideas in logic and probability theory ranges from The Mathematical Analysis of Logic to the end of his career. The Laws of Thought formed the most systematic statement of Boole's theories; this volume contains incomplete studies intended for a follow-up volume. 1952 edition.

As a survey of many technical results in probability theory and probability logic, this monograph by two widely respected scholars offers a valuable compendium of the principal aspects of the formal study of probability. Hugues Leblanc and Peter Roeper explore probability functions appropriate for propositional, quantificational, intuitionistic, and infinitary logic and investigate the connections among probability functions, semantics, and logical consequence. They offer a systematic justification of constraints for various types of probability functions, in particular, an exhaustive account of probability functions adequate for first-order quantificational logic. The relationship between absolute and relative probability functions is fully explored and the book offers a complete account of the representation of relative functions by absolute ones. The volume is designed to review familiar results, to place these results within a broad context, and to extend the discussions in new and interesting ways. Authoritative, articulate, and accessible, it will interest mathematicians and philosophers at both professional and post-graduate levels.

An introductory 2001 textbook on probability and induction written by a foremost philosopher of science.

Since the publication of the first edition in 1976, there has been a notable increase of interest in the development of logic. This is evidenced by the several conferences on the history of logic, by a journal devoted to the subject, and by an accumulation of new results. This increased activity and the new results - the chief one being that Boole's work in probability is best viewed as a probability logic - were influential circumstances conducive to a new edition.Chapter 1, presenting Boole's ideas on a mathematical treatment of logic, from their emergence in his early 1847 work on through to his immediate successors, has been considerably enlarged. Chapter 2 includes additional discussion of the ``uninterpretable'' notion, both semantically and syntactically. Chapter 3 now includes a revival of Boole's abandoned propositional logic and, also, a discussion of his hitherto unnoticed brush with ancient formal logic. Chapter 5 has an improved explanation of why Boole's probability method works. Chapter 6, Applications and Probability Logic, is a new addition. Changes from the first edition have brought about a three-fold increase in the bibliography.

Shows both the shortcomings and benefits of each technique, and even demonstrates useful combinations of the two.

The present study is an extension of the topic introduced in Dr. Hailperin's Sentential Probability Logic, where the usual true-false semantics for logic is replaced with one based more on probability, and where values ranging from 0 to 1 are subject to probability axioms. Moreover, as the word "sentential" in the title of that work indicates, the language there under consideration was limited to sentences constructed from atomic (not inner logical components) sentences, by use of sentential connectives ("no," "and," "or," etc.) but not including quantifiers ("for all," "there is"). An initial introduction presents an overview of the book. In chapter one, Halperin presents a summary of results from his earlier book, some of which extends into this work. It also contains a novel treatment of the problem of combining evidence: how does one combine two items of interest for a conclusion-each of which separately impart a probability for the conclusion-so as to have a probability for the conclusion basedon taking both of the two items of interest as evidence? Chapter two enlarges the Probability Logic from the first chapter in two respects: the language now includes quantifiers ("for all," and "there is") whose variables range over atomic sentences, notentities as with standard quantifier logic. (Hence its designation: ontological neutral logic.) A set of axioms for this logic is presented. A new sentential notion-the suppositional-in essence due to Thomas Bayes, is adjoined to this logic that later becomes the basis for creating a conditional probability logic. Chapter three opens with a set of four postulates for probability on ontologically neutral quantifier language. Many properties are derived and a fundamental theorem is proved, namely, for anyprobability model (assignment of probability values to all atomic sentences of the language) there will be a unique extension of the probability values to all closed sentences of the language. The chapter concludes by showing the Borel's early denumerableprobability concept (1909) can be justified by its being, in essence, close to Hailperin's probability result applied to denumerable language. The final chapter introduces the notion of conditional-probability to a language having quantifiers of the kind

Paradoxes provide a vehicle for exposing misinterpretations and misapplications of accepted principles. This book discusses seven paradoxes surrounding probability theory. Some remain the focus of controversy; others have allegedly been solved, however the accepted solutions are demonstrably incorrect. Each paradox is shown to rest on one or more fallacies. Instead of the esoteric, idiosyncratic, and untested methods that have been brought to bear on these problems, the book invokes uncontroversial probability principles, acceptable both to frequentists and subjectivists. The philosophical disputation inspired by these paradoxes is shown to be misguided and unnecessary; for instance, startling claims concerning human destiny and the nature of reality are directly related to fallacious reasoning in a betting paradox, and a problem analyzed in philosophy journals is resolved by means of a computer program.​

This book is meant to be a primer, that is an introduction, to probability logic, a subject that appears to be in its infancy. Probability logic is a subject envisioned by Hans Reichenbach and largely created by Adams. It treats conditionals as bearers of conditional probabilities and discusses an appropriate sense of validity for arguments such conditionals, as well as ordinary statements as premises. This is a clear well written text on the subject of probability logic, suitable for advanced undergraduates or graduates, but also of interest to professional philosophers. There are well thought out exercises, and a number of advanced topics treated in appendices, while some are brought up in exercises and some are alluded to only in footnotes. By this means it is hoped that the reader will at least be made aware of most of the important ramifications of the subject and its tie-ins with current research, and will have some indications concerning recent and relevant literature.