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The Pacific War changed abruptly in November 1943 when Admiral Chester Nimitz unleashed a relentless 18-month, 4,000-mile offensive across the Central Pacific, spearheaded by fast carrier task forces and U.S. Marine and Army assault troops. The sudden American proclivity for amphibious frontal assaults against fortified islands astonished Japanese commanders, who called them “storm landings” because they differed so sharply from the limited landings of 1942-43. This is the story of seven epic assaults from the sea against murderous enemy fire—Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Each risky battle enhanced the U.S. capability to concentrate overwhelming naval force against a distant island and literally kick down the front door. While the assault forces learned priceless operational lessons from each landing, so did the Japanese. The ultimate U.S. victory in the seven “storm landings” came at the total cost of 100,000 killed and wounded. The survivors faced the prospect of even bloodier future beachheads against mainland Japan. Award-winning historian Joseph Alexander relates this extraordinary story with an easy narrative style bolstered by years of analyzing U.S. and Japanese battle accounts, personal interviews with veterans, and his own amphibious warfare experience. Abounding with human-interest stories of colorful “web-footed amphibians,” his book vividly portrays the sheer drama of these naval battles whose magnitude and ferocity may never again be seen in this world.

[Includes 4 tables, 3 charts, 27 maps and 90 illustrations] Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls deals with amphibious warfare as waged by American forces against the Japanese-held atolls of the Central Pacific during World War II... The atoll operations described in this volume were amphibious from beginning to end. They were not simple seaborne hit-and-run raids of the Dieppe type. The objective was to secure the atolls as steppingstones to the next advance. The islands were relatively small, permitting continual naval and air support of the ground operations. Some outstanding examples of the co-ordination of fire support by artillery, naval gunfire, and air are found in this book. The advantages of simple plans and the disadvantages of the more complicated will stand out for the careful reader. The story of the capture of these atolls of Micronesia offers some of the best examples of combined operations that are available in the annals of modern war. Ground, sea, and air components were always present, and the effectiveness with which they were combined and co-ordinated accounts in large measure for the rapid success enjoyed in these instances by American arms. From the point of view of strategy, the significance of this volume lies in the fact that it tells the story of the beginnings of the drive across the Central Pacific toward the Japanese homeland. This concept of defeating Japan by pushing directly westward from Hawaii through the island bases of the mid-Pacific was traditional in American strategic thinking, but had never been put to test and was seriously challenged in some quarters. As is shown here, the test was first made in the campaigns against the Gilberts and Marshalls, the outcome was successful, and the experience gained was of inestimable value in planning for the subsequent conduct of the war in the Pacific.