"Air Force basic doctrine asserts that the precise application of force can reliably generate desired, discriminate effects at the strategic level of war. A deconstruction of that assertion reveals three necessary assumptions: the ability to clearly define desired discriminate effects at the strategic level of war, the ability to trace the desired discriminate effects back to a triggering action, and the ability to ensure that the actual effects generated by the triggering action are only the discriminate ones being sought. This paper presents evidence that these assumptions suffer from important conceptual weaknesses that are amplified when examined from the perspective of nonlinear and complex systems. Further evidence suggests that technological fixes are not likely to resolve these weaknesses nor produce the strategic efficiencies implied by the doctrinal concept. In fact, such fixes could increase the potential for small errors to combine in unexpected ways to create a system accident, where outcomes diverge in significant and undesirable ways from the intended discriminate strategic effect. This paper cautions against using the term "precision" in ways that imply congruency between technology and war, and recommends that doctrine clearly differentiate technical exactness from strategic correctness. It concludes that effect-based approaches can foreclose adversary option sets with far more reliability than compelling specific, predetermined behaviors, and it emphasizes the need to ensure that adaptation remains a fundamental feature of any effects-based concept."--Abstract.

This second edition of Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower introduces contemporary strategy at the operational level of war. Developed as foundational reading for all US Air Force Academy cadets, this textbook is designed to close the gap between military theory and practice.

The Art of Maneuver shows how true maneuver-warfare theory has been applied in campaigns throughout history. With a genius for apt analogy the author shows how our obsession with fighting and winning set-piece battles causes us to overlook an enemy’s true vulnerabilities. But as low-intensity conflicts promise to become the dominant warfare of the future, the importance of maneuver in attacking an enemy’s critical vulnerability will render attrition approaches to warfighting ever more obsolete. Praise for The Art of Maneuver “Robert Leonhard is one of a number of prominent young military writers, like Daniel Bolger, John Antal, Bruce Gudmundsson, and Harold Raugh, whose work appears regularly in military journals. The Art of Maneuver is his first book, and military readers will appreciate his grasp of military history, forceful analysis, and adventurous writing style. . . .This is an important book which deserves the attention of military professionals. . . . Leonhard deserves credit for a hard-nosed attempt to evaluate U.S. strengths and weaknesses as a basis for further improvements in service doctrine, training, and force development. . . . In the celebratory aftermath of a ‘good war,’ such honest self-appraisal is both healthy and encouraging.”—Parameters “This commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations. . . . This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author’s knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. . . . An important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!”—Marine Corps Gazette “Leonhard . . . has combined military expertise and historical analysis for an entertaining and fresh look at maneuver warfare. . . . In one volume, the author offers trenchant, exciting, and masterful perspective on victory in modern warfare.”—National Defense “Robert Leonhard makes an outstanding contribution to our understanding of maneuver warfare in this book. . . . Our leaders, junior and senior alike, should find this book well worth reading and contemplating.”—ARMOR Magazine “An important contribution to the on-going reassessment of U.S. Army doctrine . . . A must for anyone seriously interested in the future of Army doctrine—and the Army. . . . Further, it is an excellent starting point for young officers to begin their lifelong study of the art of war.”—ARMY Magazine

Rapid progress in information and communications technologies is dramatically enhancing the strategic role of information, positioning effective exploitation of these technology advances as a critical success factor in military affairs. These technology advances are drivers and enablers for the "nervous system" of the militaryâ€"its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systemsâ€"to more effectively use the "muscle" side of the military. Authored by a committee of experts drawn equally from the military and commercial sectors, Realizing the Potential of C4I identifies three major areas as fundamental challenges to the full Department of Defense (DOD) exploitation of C4I technologyâ€"information systems security, interoperability, and various aspects of DOD process and culture. The book details principles by which to assess DOD efforts in these areas over the long term and provides specific, more immediately actionable recommendations. Although DOD is the focus of this book, the principles and issues presented are also relevant to interoperability, architecture, and security challenges faced by government as a whole and by large, complex public and private enterprises across the economy.

Several nations are engaging in development and production of directed energy weapons. Recent scientific advances now enable the production of lethal lasers and high-powered microwaves. The current growth and development in this emerging area strongly suggests that directed energy weapons of lethal power will reach the battlefield before 2010. Since proliferation of lower power laser weapons has already happened, it is likely that proliferation of high power or high energy weapons will occur as well. This paper expands on this development and posits potential impacts on a plausible future battlefield, developed in part from the Alternate Futures of AF 2025, where all comers deploy lethal directed energy technologies. From these impacts, which span doctrine, organization, force structure, and systems design, this paper recommends changes to better posture the United States for this potential future.

During the Cold War the United States developed the Trident class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to replace the aging fleet of forty-one Poseidon ballistic missile submarines. Each of the eighteen Trident class submarines built to carry the mantle of strategic nuclear deterrence was extremely large and quiet with tubes for twenty-four ballistic missiles. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States conducted a review of its nuclear posture, which determined that only fourteen of these submarines were necessary to meet the needs of U.S. national security. Since these submarines are due for nuclear core refueling and overhaul and thus are no longer required to support U.S. nuclear policy, these submarines will be deactivated or refueled and converted to other purposes. These submarines are only halfway through their design life of forty-two years, and once refueled could be used for other missions. Furthermore, their large size makes these ships a prime candidate for conversion to a large variety of missions that require space, stealth, and endurance, This excess capability has convinced the U.S. Navy that it should develop a concept for converting the first four Trident class ballistic missile submarines into guided missile submarines (SSGN). This program would equip these submarines both for cruise missile operations and as special operations force insertion platforms. Each submarine could carry more than 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and up to sixty-six special operations personnel with dual Dry Deck Shelter or two Advanced SEAL Delivery System mini-submarines for SEAL deployment.

Hyperspectral Imagery, or HSI, is a sophisticated, versatile intelligence gathering technology that could potentially enable the US military to make significant strides towards improving the preparation for and execution of its missions. Many of the difficulties in bringing the promise of HSI to fruition have very little to do with the technology itself. As will be discussed shortly, HSI technology has been successfully demonstrated in a variety of diverse applications. In point of fact, it is the versatility of HSI that may be hindering its implementation into the mainstream of the U.S. military's intelligence gathering capability. The objective of this paper is threefold. The first goal is to introduce the reader to both the technology itself and the myriad potential applications of Hyperspectral Imagery. The second goal is to realistically examine the challenges that HSI must overcome, specifically in the areas of how HSI fits into the world of joint vision, intelligence doctrine, and the intelligence cycle. Finally, the paper will provide a series of recommendations some focused on organizational issues and others on acquisition issues that will address the majority of the challenges faced by the intelligence community as they endeavor to incorporate an HSI capability into the U.S. intelligence community.