The second edition of a bestseller, Safety Differently: Human Factors for a New Era is a complete update of Ten Questions About Human Error: A New View of Human Factors and System Safety. Today, the unrelenting pace of technology change and growth of complexity calls for a different kind of safety thinking. Automation and new technologies have resu

This book is a set of new skills written for the managers that drive safety in their workplace. This is Human Performance theory made simple. If you are starting a new program, revamping an old program, or simply interested in understanding more about safety performance, this guide will be extremely helpful.

This title was first published in 2002: This field guide assesses two views of human error - the old view, in which human error becomes the cause of an incident or accident, or the new view, in which human error is merely a symptom of deeper trouble within the system. The two parts of this guide concentrate on each view, leading towards an appreciation of the new view, in which human error is the starting point of an investigation, rather than its conclusion. The second part of this guide focuses on the circumstances which unfold around people, which causes their assessments and actions to change accordingly. It shows how to "reverse engineer" human error, which, like any other componant, needs to be put back together in a mishap investigation.

Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.

Human error is cited over and over as a cause of incidents and accidents. The result is a widespread perception of a 'human error problem', and solutions are thought to lie in changing the people or their role in the system. For example, we should reduce the human role with more automation, or regiment human behavior by stricter monitoring, rules or procedures. But in practice, things have proved not to be this simple. The label 'human error' is prejudicial and hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or malfunctions. This book takes you behind the human error label. Divided into five parts, it begins by summarising the most significant research results. Part 2 explores how systems thinking has radically changed our understanding of how accidents occur. Part 3 explains the role of cognitive system factors - bringing knowledge to bear, changing mindset as situations and priorities change, and managing goal conflicts - in operating safely at the sharp end of systems. Part 4 studies how the clumsy use of computer technology can increase the potential for erroneous actions and assessments in many different fields of practice. And Part 5 tells how the hindsight bias always enters into attributions of error, so that what we label human error actually is the result of a social and psychological judgment process by stakeholders in the system in question to focus on only a facet of a set of interacting contributors. If you think you have a human error problem, recognize that the label itself is no explanation and no guide to countermeasures. The potential for constructive change, for progress on safety, lies behind the human error label.

Marine accidents can occur at any time and everywhere in the world, resulting in loss of life, property, environment and reputation of the companies involved. Preventing accidents and establishing a safer world without accidents is an important agenda for the maritime industry. Since the enforcement of the International Safety Management Code in 1998, companies have taken various kinds of measures to prevent accidents. Unfortunately, measures have been undertaken in a disorganized manner, and have not been effective. Experts of risk management, the safety management system, and accident models have each undertaken accident preventive measures within the scope of their specific fields, but have not looked beyond the realm of their own fields. This book discusses systematic accident prevention by integrating multi-disciplinary expertise based on academic research, the quality management system which has already proved its effectiveness in other fields, and findings of the author’s research. In systematic accident prevention, the weaknesses of a system within which accidents and incidents have occurred are viewed by combining scientific accident investigation data based on the International Maritime Organization model and the accident model. The nature of every type of marine accident, such as collisions, groundings, occupational casualties, etc., are derived by combining the accident model and statistical data. System weaknesses are rectified by the risk reduction method of risk management, and the rectified performance is incorporated in improvement in the system by the PDCA cycle, which is the core of the Safety Management System. We can see the weakness in the system and reduce the number of accidents and incidents while utilizing limited resources optimally to prevent accidents and incidents.

This innovative book aims to bring the science of safety into a simple and practical approach to investigating workplace incidents, using the ideas of some of the great safety science thinkers of our time. This book serves as an easy-to-follow, real-world reference for supervisors, managers and safety practitioners across many industries.

This book covers all aspects of aircraft accident investigation including inflight fires, electrical circuitry, and composite structure failure. The authors explain basic investigation techniques and procedures required by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). There are also chapters on accident analysis, investigation management, and report writing. The appendices include the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators.

Review of previous edition: "Trevor Kletz's book makes an invaluable contribution to the systematic, professional and scientific approach to accident investigation". The Chemical Engineer Fully revised and updated, the third edition of Learning from Accidents provides more information on accident investigation, including coverage of accidents involving liquefied gases, building collapse and other incidents that have occurred because faults were invisible (e.g. underground pipelines). By analysing accidents that have occurred Trevor Kletz shows how we can learn and thus be better able to prevent accidents happening again. Looking at a wide range of incidents, covering the process industries, nuclear industry and transportation, he analyses each accident in a practical and non-theoretical fashion and summarises each with a chain of events showing the prevention and mitigation which could have occurred at every stage. At all times Learning from Accidents, 3rd Edition emphasises cause and prevention rather than human interest or cleaning up the mess. Anyone involved in accident investigation and reporting of whatever sort and all those who work in industry, whether in design, operations or loss prevention will find this book full of invaluable guidance and advice.