The International Court of Justice at The Hague is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1923–1946), which was the first real permanent court of justice at the international level. This 2005 book analyses the groundbreaking contribution of the Permanent Court to international law, both in terms of judicial technique and the development of legal principle. The book draws on archival material left by judges and other persons involved in the work of the Permanent Court, giving fascinating insights into many of its most important decisions and the individuals who made them (Huber, Anzilotti, Moore, Hammerskjöld and others). At the same time it examines international legal argument in the Permanent Court, basing its approach on a developed model of international legal argument that stresses the intimate relationships between international and national lawyers and between international and national law.

'Legacies of the Permanent Court of International Justice' assesses the continuing relevance of the first 'world court' and shows how, for better or worse, it has shaped our thinking about binding legal dispute resolution.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and epitomizes the very notion of international judicial institution. Yet, it decides inter-State disputes only with the parties’ consent. This makes it more similar to international arbitral tribunals than other international courts. However, the permanent nature of the Court, the predetermination of procedural rules by the Statute and the Rules of Court, the public character of proceedings, the opportunity for third States to intervene in a case under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute and the Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations mark a structural difference between the ICJ and non-institutionalized international arbitral tribunals. This book analyses if and to what extent these features have influenced the approach of the ICJ (and of the PCIJ before it) to its own judicial function and have led it to depart from the principles established in international arbitration.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and plays a central role in both the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the development of international law. This comprehensive Commentary on the Statute of the International Court of Justice, now in its second edition, analyses in detail not only the Statute of the Court itself but also the related provisions of the United Nations Charter as well as the relevant provisions of the Court's Rules of Procedure. Five years after the first edition was published, the second edition of the Commentary embraces current events before the International Court of Justice as well as before other courts and tribunals relevant for the interpretation and application of its Statute. The Commentary provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of all legal questions and issues the Court has had to address in the past and will have to address in the future. It illuminates the central issues of procedure and substance that the Court and counsel appearing before it face in their day-to-day work. In addition to commentary covering all of the articles of the Statute of the ICJ, plus the relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the book includes three scene-setting chapters: Historical Introduction, General Principles of Procedural Law, and Discontinuation and Withdrawal. The second edition of the Commentary adds two important and instructive chapters on Counter-Claims and Evidentiary Issues. The combination of expert editors and commentators, and their assessment of new developments in the important work of the ICJ, make this a landmark publication in the field of international law.

Litigation at the International Court of Justice provides a systematic guide to questions of procedure arising when States come before the International Court of Justice to take part in contentious litigation. Quintana's approach is primarily empirical and emphasis is put on examples derived from actual practice. This book is mainly intended to help practitioners and advisors to governments engaged in actual cases and deliberately avoids theoretical discussions, favoring a pragmatic stance that is focused not so much on what authors have to say on any given topic concerning procedure, but rather on presenting, directly “from the Court’s mouth,” as it were, what ICJ judges actually have done and said over the last ninety years concerning such questions.

International courts and tribunals are key actors in international law, both because of their primary dispute resolution function and for their role in developing international law in a more general sense. Their growing number and complexity makes a detailed study of their practice particularly relevant. The Rules, Practice, and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals examines existing international dispute resolution institutions, including those of general jurisdiction (ICJ, PCA), specialised jurisdiction (ITLOS, ICSID, WTO), as well as human rights courts, international criminal courts and tribunals, courts of regional integration agreements, claims commissions and tribunals, and administrative tribunals of international organizations. Uniquely, it assesses both procedural rules and essential case-law, making it relevant for both academics and practitioners in international law.

The International Court of Justice, principal judicial organ of the United Nations, plays an important and unique role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. As a third-party mechanism, it is a highly technical and well-structured institution. Through its continuous and consistent jurisprudence, it provides legal certainty, stability and predictability to the interpretation and application of international law. This special course intends to introduce some general concepts that underlie international adjudication and the basic rules and principles governing the competence and jurisdiction of the Court. Notwithstanding its prominence, the Court does not have a general and unconditional competence in dispute resolution. Its jurisdiction is based on the consent of the States, both in general terms as well as in each specific case, which reflects the attributes of the State system. Jurisdiction is a substantive matter. The Court’s decision on the question of jurisdiction is no less important than on the merits.

The book appraises the international judicial process and will be of value to anyone interested in this subject.

An in-depth analysis of the remedies of international law used by the International Court of Justice to resolve inter-state disputes.