This book integrates findings from across domains in performance psychology to focus on core research on what influences peak and non-peak performance. The book explores basic and applied research identifying cognition-action interactions, perception-cognition interactions, emotion-cognition interactions, and perception-action interactions. The book explores performance in sports, music, and the arts both for individuals and teams/groups, looking at the influence of cognition, perception, personality, motivation and drive, attention, stress, coaching, and age. This comprehensive work includes contributions from the US, UK, Canada, Germany, and Australia. - Integrates research findings found across domains in performance psychology - Includes research from sports, music, the arts, and other applied settings - Identifies conflicts between cognition, action, perception, and emotion - Explores influences on both individual and group/team performance - Investigates what impacts peak performance and error production

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noë. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noë argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought—that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience. To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In Action in Perception, Noë investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. Noë then argues that perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of color. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.

Numerous spatial biases influence navigation, interactions, and preferences in our environment. This volume considers their influences on perception and memory.

Joan Vickers presents evidence on gaze control within visual perception and action in sport as well as the science underlying decision training.

We effortlessly recognize all sorts of events--from simple events like people walking to complex events like leaves blowing in the wind. We can also remember and describe these events, and in general, react appropriately to them, for example, in avoiding an approaching object. Our phenomenal ease interacting with events belies the complexity of the underlying processes we use to deal with them. Driven by an interest in these complex processes, research on event perception has been growing rapidly. Events are the basis of all experience, so understanding how humans perceive, represent, and act on them will have a significant impact on many areas of psychology. Unfortunately, much of the research on event perception--in visual perception, motor control, linguistics, and computer science--has progressed without much interaction. This volume is the first to bring together computational, neurological, and psychological research on how humans detect, classify, remember, and act on events. The book will provide professional and student researchers with a comprehensive collection of the latest research in these diverse fields.

This volume is the outcome of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Time, Action and Cognition. which was held in Saint-Malo, France, in October 1991. The theme - time in action and cognition of time - was sparked by growing awareness in informal meetings between mostly French-speaking time psychologists of the need to bring together time specialists in the areas of development, motor behavior, attention, memory and representations. The workshop was designed to be a forum where different theoretical points of view and a variety of empirical approaches could be presented and discussed. Time psychologists tended to draw conclusions restricted to their specific fields of interest. From our own experience, we felt that addressing a common issue - possible relationships between time in action and representations of time - could lead to a more comprehensive approach. We are endebted to NATO for allowing us to bring this idea to fruition. We take this opportunity as well to express our thanks to Cognisciences ( Cognisud section) -- an active interdisciplinary research organization - for its financial backing and the CNRS for its scientific support.

One of the key questions in cognitive psychology is how people represent knowledge about concepts such as football or love. Some researchers have proposed that concepts are represented in human memory by the sensorimotor systems that underlie interaction with the outside world. These theories represent developments in cognitive science to view cognition no longer in terms of abstract information processing, but in terms of perception and action. In other words, cognition is grounded in embodied experiences. Studies show that sensory perception and motor actions support understanding of words and object concepts. Moreover, even understanding of abstract and emotion concepts can be shown to rely on more concrete, embodied experiences. Finally, language itself can be shown to be grounded in sensorimotor processes. This book brings together theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from several key researchers in this field to support this framework.

Even as simple a task as quenching thirst with a glass of water involves a sequence of perceptions and actions woven together by expectations and experience. What are the myriad links between perception and action, and what does cognition have to do with them? Intuitively we think that perception precedes action, but we also know that action moulds perception. The reciprocal links between perception and action are now accepted almost universally. The discovery of mirror neurons that encode observed actions has further emphasized the coupling of perception and action. The real aim of this research topic is to go beyond identifying the evidence for perception-action coupling, and study the cognitive entities and processes that influence the perception-action link. For example, the internal representations of perceived and produced events are created and modified through experience. Yet the perception action link is considered relatively automatic. To what extent is the perception-action link affected by representations and their manipulations by cognitive processes? Does selective attention modify the perception action coupling? How, and to what extent, does the context provide sources of cognitive control? The developmental trajectory of the perception-action link and the influence of cognition at various stages of development could be another line of important evidence. The responses to these and other such questions contribute to our understanding of this research area with significant implications for perception-action coupling.

What mediates between sensory input and motor output? What makes it possible to act on what you perceive? Bence Nanay argues that pragmatic representations provide the perceptual guidance for performing actions. They play a key role in our mental lives, and help explain why the majority of our mental processes are very similar to those of animals.

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.