Panzer Commander Hermann Balck is an intriguing history of one of the world’s greatest armoured warfare commanders. During World War II, Balck directed panzer troops from the front line and led by example, putting himself in extreme danger when rallying his soldiers to surge forward. He fought battles that were masterpieces of tactical operations, utilising speed, surprise and a remarkable ability to motivate his men to achieve what they considered to be impossible. We follow his exciting journey through the fields of France, the mountains of Greece and the steppes of Russia. In Greece, through flair and innovative leadership, his soldiers overcome every obstacle to defeat determined Australian and New Zealand soldiers defending the narrow mountain passes. This is also the story of a cultured and complex man with a great love of antiquity and classical literature, who nevertheless willingly fought for Hitler’s Third Reich while remaining strangely detached from the horrors around him.

German general Hermann Balck (1897–1982) was considered to be one of World War II's greatest battlefield commanders. His brilliantly fought battles were masterpieces of tactical agility, mobile counterattack, and the technique of Auftragstaktik, or "mission command." However, because he declined to participate in the U.S. Army's military history debriefing program, today he is known only to serious students of the war. Drawing heavily on his meticulously kept wartime journals, Balck discusses his childhood and his career through the First and Second World Wars. His memoir details the command decision-making process as well as operations on the ground during crucial battles, including the Battle of the Marne in World War I and his incredible victories against a larger and better-equipped Soviet army at the Chir River in World War II. Balck also offers observations on Germany's greatest generals, such as Erich Ludendorff and Heinz Guderian, and shares his thoughts on international relations, domestic politics, and Germany's place in history. Available in English for the first time in an expertly edited and annotated edition, this important book provides essential information about the German military during a critical era in modern history.

Did Nazi war criminals deceive the United States military during the Cold War? A new book by a Canberra-based historian tells the story of how America’s most famous and influential military theorist was seduced by the lies of Hitler’s defeated generals. From the author of Panzer Commander Hermann Balck and False Flags comes The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War. Colonel John Boyd, a maverick fighter pilot, revolutionized the American art of war through his ideas on conflict and the human mind. Boyd claimed that victory is won by the side which transitions through 'decision cycles' faster than the enemy and his ideas gained influential converts in the Pentagon who were seeking a new way of waging war after defeat in Vietnam. Although Boyd’s theories became the basis of American military doctrine, he relied upon the fraudulent testimony of former Nazi generals who fabricated historical evidence to disassociate their reputations from their defeat and cover up their willing participation in war crimes. Boyd certainly changed the American art of war, but did he corrupt it in the process? The Blind Strategist separates fact from fantasy and exposes the myths of maneuver warfare through a detailed evidence-based investigation. Discover how maneuver warfare has resulted in catastrophic decisions in this must-read for anybody interested in American military history.

Drawing from post-war reports commissioned by U.S. Army intelligence, World War II historian Steven H. Newton has translated, compiled, and edited the battle accounts of one of Germany's finest panzer commanders and a skilled tactician of tank warfare. Throughout most of the war, Erhard Raus was a highly respected field commander in the German-Soviet war on the eastern front, and after the war he wrote an insightful analysis of German strategy in that campaign.The Raus memoir covers the Russian campaign from the first day of the war to his relief from command at Hitler's order in the spring of 1945. It includes a detailed examination of the 6th Panzer Division's drive to Leningrad, Raus's own experiences in the Soviet winter counteroffensive around Moscow, the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Stalingrad, and the final desperate battles inside Germany at the end of the war. His battlefield experience and keen tactical eye make his memoir especially valuable for scholars, and his narrative is as readable as Heinz Guderian's celebrated Panzer Leader.

A detailed military biography of the most highly decorated Nazi regimental commander in WWII. The most highly decorated German regimental commander of World War II, Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz first won the Iron Cross in the Great War. He was serving with the 1st Panzer Division when the Polish campaign inaugurated World War II. Strachwitz’s exploits as commander of a panzer battalion during the French campaign earned him further decorations before he transferred to the newly formed 16th Panzer Division. There, he participated in the invasion of Yugoslavia and then Operation Barbarossa, where he earned the Knight’s Cross. At Stalingrad, he reached the Volga and fought on the northern rim of Sixth Army’s perimeter. Severely wounded during battle, he was flown out of the Stalingrad pocket and was thus spared the fate of the rest of Sixth Army. Upon recuperation, he was named commander of the Grossdeutschland Division’s panzer regiment and won the Swords to the Knight’s Cross during Manstein’s counteroffensive at Kharkov. Wounded twelve times during the war, and barely surviving a lethal car crash, Strachwitz finally surrendered to the Americans in May 1945. Historian Raymond Bagdonas, though impaired by the disappearance of 16th Panzer Division’s official records at Stalingrad, and the fact that many of the Panzer Graf’s later battlegroups never kept them, has written a vividly detailed account of this combat leader’s life, as well as ferocious armored warfare in World War II.

A German commander’s “very readable and thought-provoking” study of Operation Barbarossa (Military Review). This book unveils a wealth of experiences and analysis about Operation Barbarossa, perhaps the most important military campaign of the twentieth century, from a perspective rarely encountered. Hermann Hoth led Germany’s 3rd Panzer Group in Army Group Center—in tandem with Guderian’s 2nd Group—during the invasion of the Soviet Union, and together, these two daring panzer commanders achieved a series of astounding victories, encircling entire Russian armies at Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma, all the way up to the very gates of Moscow. This work begins with Hoth discussing the use of nuclear weapons in future conflicts. This cool-headed postwar reflection, from one of Nazi Germany’s top panzer commanders, is rare enough. But then Hoth dives into his exact command decisions during Barbarossa—still the largest continental offensive ever undertaken—to reveal new insights into how Germany could, and in his view should, have succeeded in the campaign. Hoth critically analyses the origin, development, and objective of the plan against Russia, and presents the situations confronted, the decisions taken, and the mistakes made by the army’s leadership, as the new form of mobile warfare startled not only the Soviets on the receiving end but the German leadership itself, which failed to provide support infrastructure for their panzer arm’s breakthroughs. Hoth sheds light on the decisive and ever-escalating struggle between Hitler and his military advisers on the question of whether, after the Dnieper and the Dvina had been reached, to adhere to the original idea of capturing Moscow. Hitler’s momentous decision to divert forces to Kiev and the south only came in late August 1941. He then finally considers in detail whether the Germans, after obliterating the remaining Russian armies facing Army Group Center in Operation Typhoon, could still hope for the occupation of the Russian capital that fall. Hoth concludes his study with several lessons for the offensive use of armored formations in the future. His firsthand analysis, here published for the first time in English, will be vital reading for every student of World War II.

This book is the first detailed and comprehensive account of the Kharkov counteroffensive, the operations of the SS divisions and the supporting actions of Armeeabteilung Fretter-Pico and 1. Panzerarmee, and is supported by over 210 photographs and maps. By the end of January of 1943, Hitler's armies had been dealt a series of defeats by the Russians, beginning with the disaster at Stalingrad. Successive Soviet offensives had destroyed the German 6. Armee and annihilated the armies of Germany's Axis allies, Italy, Rumania and Hungary. Germany teetered on the brink of defeat in World War II because the Soviet advance threatened to drive to the Dnepr River and encircle the remaining Germans armies in southern Russia. Stalin and the Russian high command believed that the war could be won with just one more great effort. Accordingly, they planned and launched two offensives, designated Operations "Star" and "Gallop." The focal points of the two offensives included the recapture of Kharkov, the industrial heart of the Ukraine and the destruction of Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 4. Panzerarmee and 2. Armee. Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein entered the picture in late 1942 when he was appointed commander of Heeresgruppe Don. Beginning in February he engineered a remarkable operation that changed the course of the war in Russia. Manstein's counteroffensive destroyed or severely damaged four Russian armies and regained much of the territory lost in January. The troops that played the most important role in the offensive were three divisions of the Waffen-SS. "Leibstandarte," "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" were combined for the first time into a corps, which was commanded by SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Paul Hausser, the senior commander of the Waffen-SS. "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" participated in the defense of Kharkov, along with the elite Army division "Grossdeutschland" supported by three weak infantry divisions. This handful of divisions was attacked by four Soviet armies, but under command of Armeeabteilung Lanz, was able to hold the city for two weeks. On 14 February, 1943 the SS-Panzerkorps and the rest of Armeeabteilung Lanz withdrew from Kharkov under disputed circumstances that involved Hausser and his violation of a direct order from Hitler. Almost exactly a month later, the Germans had recaptured Kharkov and destroyed or crippled the four Soviet armies that had driven them out of the city in February. The divisions that played the key role in Manstein's counteroffensive were the three divisions of the Waffen-SS. While "Leibstandarte" defended the supply base of the SS-Panzerkorps from the entire Soviet 3rd Tank Army, "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" conducted a complex series of operations that began with a 100 kilometer thrust to the south which saved the Dnepr bridges, thus securing supply lines for the armies of Heeresgruppe Don/Sud. Subsequent operations by the SS divisions drove the Russians away from the rail net south of Kharkov and wrested Kharkov from the Russians once again. During the recapture of the city, there was controversy regarding Hausser's command decisions. Hausser has been accused of disregarding his instructions from superior officers and throwing his divisions into costly combat in the city for reasons of personal and SS prestige, in order to regain Hitler's favor. This study has found that the records of the SS-Panzerkorps and 4. Panzerarmee provide a different explanation for Hausser's actions.

For the US Army to succeed in the 21st Century, Soldiers of all ranks must understand and use Mission Command. Mission Command empowers leaders at all levels, allowing them to synchronize all warfighting functions and information systems to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against a range of adversaries. This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role. Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander's intent and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations. Others recount how field grade officers built cohesive teams that relied on mutual trust to achieve key operational objectives. Each historical account is complemented by an annotated explanation of how the six Mission Command principles shaped the action. For this reason, the collection is ideal for leader development in the Army school system as well as for unit and individual professional development. Mission Command places great responsibility on our Soldiers.