Oil stands alone among primary commodities in its potential for sending economic shock waves across the world. The value of oil production is one and a half times the world's total production of food grains; demand is unresponsive to price in the short run; and the world's oil resources are heavily concentrated in the Middle East, where political disturbances have been chronic and oil supply is subject to sudden interruption. Together, these factors have made oil a virtual rogue elephant in the world economy since 1973. This book discusses the oil shocks of 1973-74, 1979-80, and the "minishock" of 1990-91, and examines the possibility of oil shocks over the next twenty years. The authors assess the world market outlook on the basis of underlying trends on world oil supply and demand. They take into account prospects for investment in oil production in the Persian Gulf states, the former Soviet republics, and Latin America; environmental factors and policies; and political uncertainties in the Middle East.

“A valuable addition to the new wave of critical studies on the history of oil and energy policy”—and a bracing corrective to longstanding myths (James M. Gustafson, Diplomatic History). Conventional wisdom tells us that the US military presence in the Persian Gulf is what guarantees American access to oil; that the “special” relationship with Saudi Arabia is necessary to stabilize an otherwise volatile market; and that these assumptions in turn provide Washington enormous leverage over Europe and Asia. But the conventional wisdom is wrong. Robert Vitalis debunks the myths of “oilcraft”, a line of magical thinking closer to witchcraft than statecraft. Oil is a commodity like any other: bought, sold, and subject to market forces. Vitalis exposes the suspect fears of oil scarcity and investigates the geopolitical impact of these false beliefs. In particular, Vitalis shows how we can reconsider the question of the US-Saudi special relationship, which confuses and traps many into unnecessarily accepting what they imagine is a devil’s bargain. Freeing ourselves from the spell of oilcraft won’t be easy, but the benefits make it essential.

In 2007, the United States imported 58 percent of the oil it consumed. This book critically evaluates commonly suggested links between these imports and U.S. national security and assesses the economic, political, and military costs and benefits of potential policies to alleviate imported oil?related challenges to U.S. national security.

Monique Taylor analyses the policy rationale and institutional underpinnings of China's state-led or neomercantilist oil strategy, and its development, set against the wider context of economic transformation as the country transitions from a centrally planned to market economy.

The importance of oil for national military-industrial complexes appeared more clearly than ever in the Cold War. This volume argues that the confidential acquisition of geoscientific knowledge was paramount for states, not only to provide for their own energy needs, but also to buttress national economic and geostrategic interests and protect energy security. By investigating the postwar rebuilding and expansion of French and Italian oil industries from the second half of the 1940s to the early 1960s, this book shows how successive administrations in those countries devised strategies of oil exploration and transport, aiming at achieving a higher degree of energy autonomy and setting up powerful oil agencies that could implement those strategies. However, both within and outside their national territories, these two European countries had to confront the new Cold War balances and the interests of the two superpowers.

The importance of oil for national military-industrial complexes appeared more clearly than ever in the Cold War. This volume argues that the confidential acquisition of geoscientific knowledge was paramount for states, not only to provide for their own energy needs, but also to buttress national economic and geostrategic interests and protect energy security. By investigating the postwar rebuilding and expansion of French and Italian oil industries from the second half of the 1940s to the early 1960s, this book shows how successive administrations in those countries devised strategies of oil exploration and transport, aiming at achieving a higher degree of energy autonomy and setting up powerful oil agencies that could implement those strategies. However, both within and outside their national territories, these two European countries had to confront the new Cold War balances and the interests of the two superpowers.