November issue includes abridged index to yearly volume.

This book is dedicated to the study of structure and transport of deep and bottom waters above and through underwater channels of the Atlantic Ocean. The study is based on recent observations, analysis of historical data, and literature reviews. This approach allows us to understand how water transport and water mass prop- ties have changed over the last years and decades. The focus of our study is on the propagation of bottom waters in the Atlantic Ocean based on new field data at key points. At the end of the 1920s, the first integral study of water masses and bottom topography of the Central and South Atlantic was carried out from the German - search vessel Meteor. This German Atlantic Expedition was one of the first cruises equipped with the newly developed echo sounder (fathometer): an obligatory p- requisite for the investigation of bottom morphology in the deep sea on an - erational base. The results of the expedition were published by Wüst, Defant, and colleagues in the multivolume METEOR publication series starting with the cruise report by the ship’s commander (Spiess 1928, 1932). Historically, this series of p- lications, intermittently interrupted by World War II, was the basis for many years of research into the development of modern concepts about Atlantic water masses and their circulation schemes.

Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."