This impressive compilation offers a nearly complete listing of sound recordings made by American minority artists prior to mid-1942. Organized by national group or language, the seven-volume set cites primary and secondary titles, composers, participating artists, instrumentation, date and place of recording, master and release numbers, and reissues in all formats. Because of its clear arrangements and indexes, it will be a unique and valuable tool for music and ethnic historians, folklorists, and others.

Despite publicity given to the successes of British and American codebreakers during the Second World War, the study of signals intelligence is still complicated by governmental secrecy over even the most elderly peacetime sigint. This book, first published in 1986, lifts the veil on some of these historical secrets. Christopher Andrew and Keith Neilson cast new light on how Tsarist codebreakers penetrated British code and cypher systems. John Chapman’s study of German military codebreaking represents a major advance in our understanding of cryptanalysis during the Weimar Republic. The history of the Government Code and Cypher School – forerunner of today’s GCHQ – by its operational head, the late A.G. Denniston, provides both a general assessment of the achievements of British cryptanalysis between the wars and a tantalising glimpse of what historians may one day find in GCHQ’s forbidden archives. The distinguished cryptanalyst of Bletchley Park, the late Gordon Welchman, describes in detail how the Ultra programme defeated the German Enigma machine, while another Bletchley Park cryptographer, Christopher Morris, reminds us in his account of the valuable work on hand cyphers that wartime sigint consisted of much more than Ultra. Roger Austin’s study of surveillance under the Vichy regime shows the continuing importance of older and simpler methods of message interception such as letter-opening. Taken together, the articles establish sigint as an essential field of study for both the modern historian and the political scientist.

Examines questions raised by the performance of the military institutions of France, Germany, Russia, the US, Great Britain, Japan and Italy between 1914 and 1945.

A detailed German perspective on D-Day, featuring accounts by German commanders on preparations, strategy, and the brutal fighting during the Allied invasion of Normandy. “The planned landing operation in France of the Allies was on so large a scale – and of such decisive importance – that the preparations for it could certainly not be kept secret…Everyone realized that, sooner or later, the invasion would have to become a reality.” – Generalmajor Rudolf, Freiherr von Gersdorff. In June 1944 Allied troops were massing along the shores of southern England in readiness for the invasion of Hitler's Fortress Europe. Facing them, from the Pas de Calais to Brittany, were German troops, dug in, waiting and preparing for the inevitable confrontation. This compilation of in-depth accounts by German commanders presents D-Day, and the events leading up to it, from the point of view of the officers entrusted with preventing the Allied landings. The accounts David Isby has selected, all written soon after the war's close for American military intelligence, cover preparations for the invasion and chart the development of German strategy as invasion looms. They then turn to the ordeal of D-Day itself including reactions to the first reports of troop landings and a blow-by-blow account of the fighting. Fighting the Invasion paints a superb picture of D-Day from the German perspective, bringing home the entire experience from the initial waiting to the bitter fighting on the beaches and running battles in Norman villages.

This double volumes LNCS 11229-11230 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Confederated International Conferences: Cooperative Information Systems, CoopIS 2018, Ontologies, Databases, and Applications of Semantics, ODBASE 2018, and Cloud and Trusted Computing, C&TC, held as part of OTM 2018 in October 2018 in Valletta, Malta. The 64 full papers presented together with 22 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 173 submissions. The OTM program every year covers data and Web semantics, distributed objects, Web services, databases, informationsystems, enterprise workflow and collaboration, ubiquity, interoperability, mobility, grid and high-performance computing.

Challenging previous accounts, Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged. Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic defeat. Megargee exposes the structure, processes, and personalities that governed the Third Reich's military decision making and shows how Germany's presumed battlefield superiority was undermined by poor strategic and operational planning at the highest levels. His study tracks the evolution of German military leadership under the Nazis from 1933 to 1945 and expands our understanding of the balance of power within the high command, the role of personalities in its organizational development, and the influence of German military intellectuals on its structure and function. He also shows how the organization of the high command was plagued by ambition, stubbornness, political intrigue, and overworked staff officers. And his "a week in the life" chapter puts the high command under a magnifying glass to reveal its inner workings during the fierce fighting on the Russian Front in December 1941. Megargee also offers new insights into the high command crises of 1938 and shows how German general staff made fatal mistakes in their planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Their arrogant dismissal of the Soviet military's ability to defend its homeland and virtual disregard for the extensive intelligence and sound logistics that undergird successful large-scale military campaigns ultimately came back to haunt them. In the final assessment, observes Megargee, the generals' strategic ideas were no better than Hitler's and often worse. Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder, and the rest were as guilty of self-deception as their Fuhrer, believing that innate German superiority and strength of will were enough to overcome nearly any obstacle. Inside Hitler's High Command exposes these surprising flaws and illuminates the process of strategy and decision making in the Third Reich.

First Published in 1983. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"Authoritative and convincing."—New York Times Book Review The classic reference on the theory and practice of war The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics, and its political and social functions over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays that became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book while four others have been extensively revised. The rest—twenty-two essays—are new. The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations—the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts—the First and Second World Wars—or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together, the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

Hitler's decision to declare war on the United States has baffled generations of historians. In this revisionist new history of those fateful months, Klaus H. Schmider seeks to uncover the chain of events which would incite the German leader to declare war on the United States in December 1941. He provides new insights not just on the problems afflicting German strategy, foreign policy and war production but, crucially, how they were perceived at the time at the top levels of the Third Reich. Schmider sees the declaration of war on the United States not as an admission of defeat or a gesture of solidarity with Japan, but as an opportunistic gamble by the German leader. This move may have appeared an excellent bet at the time, but would ultimately doom the Third Reich.