My field artillery unit was mobilized to perform a non-standard military police mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. The unit was part of the largest National Guard mobilization from our state since the Vietnam era. The challenges of deploying a field artillery unit as an ad hoc MP company were many. The challenges were overcome through the strength of our NCO Corps. As I write this paper, I am preparing for a deployment, a non-standard mission with my current unit. As I compare the two mobilizations, it is apparent that the process for mobilizing, training and preparing our soldiers has improved since the first rotation, but issues concerning the selection of units for non-standard mission still exist five years later.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.50 is a new manual for the Military Police Corps in conducting police intelligence operations (PIO). It describes the doctrine relating to: * The fundamentals of PIO; * The legal documents and considerations affiliated with PIO; * The PIO process; * The relationship of PIO to the Army's intelligence process; * The introduction of police and prison structures, organized crime, legal systems, investigations, crime conducive conditions, and enforcement mechanisms and gaps (POLICE)-a tool to assess the criminal dimension and its influence on effects-based operations (EBO); * PIO in urban operations (UO) and on installations; and * The establishment of PIO networks and associated forums and fusion cells to affect gathering police information and criminal intelligence (CRIMINT).

After war, police forces are often unable or unwilling to put pressure on suspected war criminals, organized crime groups, and other spoilers of sustainable peace. This book sheds light on the role of international military forces in post-conflict law enforcement. Drawing on numerous interviews, it shows that EU and NATO military forces have not systematically fought serious crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. International actors need to better balance their own interests as well as the requirement to separate military and police functions with the urgent need to protect individuals in war-torn countries. The policy recommendations in the book are aimed at contributing to more effective, efficient, and legitimate peace operations in the Balkans and beyond.

The 2004 revelations of detainee maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad, Iraq have led to an exhaustive overhaul of Army doctrine and training with respect to this topic. The Army has identified disconnects in its individual, leader, and collective training programs, and has also identified the absence of a deliberate, focused doctrinal crosswalk between the two principal branches concerned with detainees, Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Police (MP). These problems and their consequences are real and immediate. The perceptions of just treatment held by citizens of our nation and, to a great extent the world at large, have been and are being shaped by the actions of the US Army, both in the commission of detainee maltreatment but also, and more importantly, in the way the Army addresses its institutional shortcomings. This study examines the relationship over time between doctrine in two branches of the Army Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). Specifically, it analyzes the MP detention field manual series and the MI interrogation field manual series to evaluate their GPW content. It also further examines the relationship of military police and military intelligence to each other in the enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) and detainee operations environment, as expressed in their doctrinal manuals. Finally, the study looks at the Army's experience in detainee operations through the prism of six conflicts or contingency operations: the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), Operation DESERT STORM (Iraq, 1991), and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

This publication outlines the planning process as it relates to a Special Forces (SF) operational detachment-alpha (ODA) conducting deliberate planning for special operations. Planning is an essential task common to all aspects of SF operations. More content available at: doguedebordeauxsurvival.com