Even the most ancient elements of traditional theism may reveal unexpected facets when viewed from an unfamiliar angle. This book explores some recently opened avenues in logic and philosophical analysis which lead to new perspectives on arguments both in defence and criticism of time-honouredreligious beliefs. Topics covered include: the nature of divine attributes; the implications of divine benevolence and of divine justice; arguments in support of theism and atheism; and religion and morality.

This book proves there is nothing new under the sun regarding many of our modern religious beliefs. This includes Christianity, and how many of its beliefs could be far older than what we have suspected. It gives a complete run-down of the stellar, lunar, and solar evolution of our religious systems and contains new, long-awaited, exhaustive research on the gods and our beliefs.

Jesus is the end of all religion. All the sacrifices of priests and people are rendered null and void by Jesus' one-time-for-all-time sacrifice for all people, everywhere, past, present, and future tense. Jesus' death and resurrection save us from our own religiosity.

A renowned scholar calls for a change of direction for the study of Jesus in the 21st century.

Is evil evidence against the existence of God? A collection of essays by philosophers, theologians, and other scholars. Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this issue by eminent philosophers and theologians, and places them in dialogue with eleven original essays reflecting new thinking by these and other scholars. The volume focuses on two versions of the argument. The first affirms that there is no reason for God to permit either certain specific horrors or the variety and profusion of undeserved suffering. The second asserts that pleasure and pain, given their biological role, are better explained by hypotheses other than theism. Contributors include William P. Alston, Paul Draper, Richard M. Gale, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Bruce Russell, Eleonore Stump, Richard G. Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen John Wykstra.

Natural theology is the project of articulating, defending and CntlClzmg arguments for the existence and nature of God without the aid of special revelation. Philosophical theology, which employs the rational methods of natural theology, is not restricted to premises that are discernible through observation and reason; it may rightly employ premises that are knowable through special revelation. While the project of natural theology may be construed as an attempt to demonstrate God's existence, one cannot ignore the importance of using reason or experience to understand, determine or assess attributes. One will want to know at the conclusion of a proof in natural God's theology if one has proved the existence of God and not merely the prim urn mobilum, source of moral obligation or a committee of finite designers; while God may be the prime mover and designer of the cosmos, none of these attributes alone is sufficient for making a claim to divinity. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish sharply the project of natural theology from philosophi cal theology. The project of classical natural theology has been the attempt to prove God's existence and nature with arguments that employ premises that all rational creatures are obliged to accept.

Must we be free to truly love? Evil is a problem for all Christians. When responding to objections that both evil and God can exist, many resort to a "free will defense," where God is not the creator of evil but of human freedom, by which evil is possible. This response is so pervasive that it is just as often assumed as it is defended. But is this answer biblically and philosophically defensible? In God Reforms Hearts, Thaddeus J. Williams offers a friendly challenge to the central claim of the free will defense—that love is possible only with true (or libertarian) free will. Williams argues that much thinking on free will fails to carve out the necessary distinction between an autonomous will and an unforced will. Scripture presents a God who desires relationship and places moral requirements on his often--rebellious creatures, but does absolute free will follow? Moreover, God's work of transforming the human heart is more thorough than libertarian freedom allows. With clarity, precision, and charity, Williams judges the merits and shortcomings of the relational free will defense while offering a philosophically and biblically robust alternative that draws from theologians of the past to point a way forward.

The non-technical, basic yet familiar features of time are investigated, e.g. two novel, detailed arguments defending the common view that 'time rolls relentlessly' are advanced; a number of hitherto neglected fundamental differences between spatio-temporal location and every other physical property are discussed; the unresolved problem, why the past is so much better known than the future is tackled. For those who wish to delve deeper, 25% of the book consists of problems to ponder and their possible solutions.

Of all the issues in the philosophy of religion, the problem of reconciling belief in God with evil in the world arguably commands more attention than any other. For over two decades, Michael L. Peterson’s The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings has been the most widely recognized and used anthology on the subject. Peterson's expanded and updated second edition retains the key features of the original and presents the main positions and strategies in the latest philosophical literature on the subject. It will remain the most complete introduction to the subject as well as a resource for advanced study. Peterson organizes his selection of classical and contemporary sources into four parts: important statements addressing the problem of evil from great literature and classical philosophy; debates based on the logical, evidential, and existential versions of the problem; major attempts to square God's justice with the presence of evil, such as Augustinian, Irenaean, process, openness, and felix culpa theodicies; and debates on the problem of evil covering such concepts as a best possible world, natural evil and natural laws, gratuitous evil, the skeptical theist defense, and the bearing of biological evolution on the problem. The second edition includes classical excerpts from the book of Job, Voltaire, Dostoevsky, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, and Hume, and twenty-five essays that have shaped the contemporary discussion, by J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, William Rowe, Marilyn Adams, John Hick, William Hasker, Paul Draper, Michael Bergmann, Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen, and numerous others. Whether a professional philosopher, student, or interested layperson, the reader will be able to work through a number of issues related to how evil in the world affects belief in God.

If the physical constants, initial conditions, or laws of nature in our universe had been even slightly different, then the evolution of life would have been impossible. This observation has led many philosophers and scientists to ask the natural next question: why is our universe so "fine-tuned" for life? The debates around this question are wide-ranging, multi-disciplinary, complicated, technical, and (at times) heated. This study is a comprehensive investigation of these debates and the many metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by cosmological fine-tuning. Waller’s study reaches two significant and controversial conclusions. First, he concludes that the criticisms directed at the "multiverse hypothesis" by theists and at the "theistic hypothesis" by naturalists are largely unsuccessful. Neither of these options can plausibly be excluded. Choosing between them seems to turn on primitive (and so hard to justify) metaphysical intuitions. Second, in order to break the philosophical deadlock, Waller moves the debate from the level of universes to the level of possible worlds. Arguing that possible worlds are also "fine-tuned" in an important and interesting sense, Waller concludes that the only plausible explanation for the fine-tuning of the actual world is to posit the existence of some kind of "God-like-thing."