"The authors of this report seek to understand how network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities are a source of combat power for the Army's Stryker brigade and to determine the extent to which the tenets of NCO are realized by the unit. Using a broad range of measures of effectiveness, the authors compared the performance of a Stryker brigade with that of a nondigitized light infantry brigade in certification exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and found that the Stryker brigade's superior networking capabilities, superior shared situational awareness, speed of command, and ability to control the speed of command vastly improved the brigade's performance in these exercises. Using NCO measures of effectiveness, this analysis sheds light on the NCO capabilities that made the Stryker brigade a more agile and effective combat force. The authors conclude by discussing the potential implications of future NCO capabilities for future Army forces."--BOOK JACKET.

Provides answers to some of the fundamental questions regarding network-centric warfare (NCW) as an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. Describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow our forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. Provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD).

As the world enters a new millennium, the U.S. military simultaneously enters a new era in warfare -- an era in which warfare is affected by a changing strategic environment and rapid technological change. The United States and its multinational partners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. Simultaneously, it is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization. These changes, as well as the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. This document describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow U.S. forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. In sum, the report provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD). A brief description of NCW, including its origins, its central role in force transformation, its tenets and principles, and an implementation strategy, are provided in Chapter 1. An examination of NCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationship to the four domains of Information Age warfare, the growing evidence of its benefits, and the warfighting advantages it can provide are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on network-centric operations (NCO), including the relationship of NCO to the overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the NCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct of NCO case studies. An overview of Joint and Service plans and initiatives to develop and implement network-centric capabilities and the growing investment in these capabilities by our allies and multinational partners are provided in Chapter 4.

Link 16 enables network-centric operations (NCO) in ways that voice-only communications cannot. How does this increase in effectiveness translate into success in battle? More than 12,000 sorties were flown in the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Operations Special Project, where Link 16 and voice-only communications were evaluated. Using NCO metrics, the authors gauged improvements provided by Link 16. The almost threefold increase in effectiveness shows the merits of the Link 16 and NCO concepts. The authors conclude that further studies should examine more complex missions and increase understanding of NCO concepts.

Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.

A report by the Dept. of Defense¿s Command and Control Research Program. Contents: (1) Complexity in Natural and Economic Systems; (2) Concepts for Warfare from Complexity Theory; (3) Evidence for Complex Emergent Behavior in Historical Data; (4) Mathematical Modeling of Complexity, Knowledge, and Conflict; (5) An Extended Example of the Dynamics of Local Collaboration and Clustering, and Some Final Thoughts. Appendix: Optimal Control with a Unique Control Solution. Tables and figures.

A selective review of modern decision science and implications for decision-support systems. The study suggests ways to synthesize lessons from research on heuristics and biases with those from "naturalistic research." It also discusses modern tools, such as increasingly realistic simulations, multiresolution modeling, and exploratory analysis, which can assist decisionmakers in choosing strategies that are flexible, adaptive, and robust.

Since its emergence in 1998, the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become a central driver behind America’s military ‘transformation’ and seems to offer the possibility of true integration between multinational military formations. Even though NCW, or variations on its themes, has been adopted by most armed services, it is a concept in operational and doctrinal development. It is shaping not only how militaries operate, but, just as importantly, what they are operating with, and potentially altering the strategic landscape. This paper examines how the current military dominance of the US over every other state means that only it has the capacity to sustain military activity on a global scale and that other states participating in US-led coalitions must be prepared to work in an ‘interoperable’ fashion. It explores the application of computer networks to military operations in conjunction with the need to secure a network’s information and to assure that it accurately represents situational reality. Drawing on an examination of how networks affected naval operations in the Persian Gulf during 2002 and 2003 as conducted by America’s Australian and Canadian coalition partners, the paper warns that in seeking allies with the requisite technological capabilities, but also those that it can trust with its information resources, the US may be heading towards a very secure digital trap.