This book critically examines the evolving global trend of judicial activism with particular reference to Bangladesh. It constructs judicial activism as a golden-mean adjudicative technology, standing between excessive judicial assertion and unacceptable judicial passivity that may leave injustices un-redressed. It argues that judicial balancing between over-activism and meek administration of justice should essentially be predicated upon domestic conditions, and the needs and fundamental public values of the judges’ respective society. Providing cross-jurisdictional empirical evidence, the study demonstrates that judicial activism, steered towards improving justice and grounded in one’s societal specificities, can be exercised in a morally and legally legitimate form and without rupturing the balance of powers among the state organs. This study has sought to displace the myth of judicial activism as constitutional transgression by “unelected” judges, arguing that judicial activism is quite different from excessivism. It is argued and shown that a particular judge or judiciary turns out to be activist when other public functionaries avoid or breach their constitutional responsibilities and thus generate injustice and inequality. The study treats judicial activism as the conscientious exposition of constitutional norms and enforcement of public duties of those in positions of power. The study assesses whether Bangladeshi judges have been striking the correct balance between over-activism and injudicious passivity. Broadly, the present book reveals judicial under-activism in Bangladesh and offers insights into causes for this. It is argued that the existing milieu of socio-political injustices and over-balance of constitutional powers in Bangladesh calls for increased judicial intervention and guidance, of course in a balanced and pragmatic manner, which is critical for good governance and social justice. “Writing about judicial activism easily gets shackled by fussy and pedestrian debates about what judges may or may not do as unelected agents of governance. The book . . . goes much beyond such reductionist pedestrianisation of law, for it courageously lifts the debate into the skies of global legal realism. The analysis perceptively addresses bottlenecks of justice, identifying shackles and mental blocks in our own minds against activising concerns for justice for the common citizen.” —Prof Werner Menski (Foreword)

Constitutional scholar Kermit Roosevelt uses plain language and compelling examples to explain how the Constitution can be both a constant and an organic document, and takes a balanced look at controversial decisions through a compelling new lens of constitutional interpretation.

In this book the author argues that judicial activism in respect of the protection of human rights and dignity and the right to due process is an essential element of the democratic rule of law in a constitutional democracy as opposed to being ‘judicial overreach’. Selected recent case law is explored from the US and Canadian Supreme Courts as well as the European Court of Human Rights illustrating that these Courts have, at times, engaged in judicial activism in the service of providing equal protection of the law and due process to the powerless but have, on other occasions, employed legalistic but insupportable strategies to sidestep that obligation.The book will be of interest to those with a deep concern regarding the factors that influence judicial decision-making and the judiciary's role through judgments in promoting and preserving the underpinnings of democracy. This includes legal researchers, the judiciary, practicing counsel and legal academics and law students as well as those in the area of democracy studies, in addition to scholars in the fields of sociology and philosophy of law.

When conservatives took control of the federal judiciary in the 1980s, it was widely assumed that they would reverse the landmark rights-protecting precedents set by the Warren Court and replace them with a broad commitment to judicial restraint. Instead, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist has reaffirmed most of those liberal decisions while creating its own brand of conservative judicial activism. Ranging from 1937 to the present, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History traces the legal and political forces that have shaped the modern Court. Thomas M. Keck argues that the tensions within modern conservatism have produced a court that exercises its own power quite actively, on behalf of both liberal and conservative ends. Despite the long-standing conservative commitment to restraint, the justices of the Rehnquist Court have stepped in to settle divisive political conflicts over abortion, affirmative action, gay rights, presidential elections, and much more. Keck focuses in particular on the role of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, whose deciding votes have shaped this uncharacteristically activist Court.

'Measuring Judicial Activism' supplies empirical analysis to the widely discussed concept of judicial activism at the United States Supreme Court. The book seeks to move beyond more subjective debates by conceptualizing activism in non-ideological terms.

This book uses empirical analysis to show that courts refrain from using the proportionality test as a means of judicial activism.

This collection examines topical issues related to the impact of courts on constitutional politics during extreme conditions. The book explores the impact of activist courts on democracy, separation of powers and rule of law in times of emergency constitutionalism. It starts with a theoretical explanation of the concept, features and main manifestations of judicial activism and its impact in shaping the relationship between constitutional, international and supranational law. It then focuses on judicial activism in extreme conditions, for example, in times of emergencies and pandemics, or in the context of democratic backsliding, authoritarian constitutionalism and illiberal constitutionalism. Thus, the book may be considered as a contribution to the debates on judicial activism, including the discussion of the impact of courts on certainty, proportionality and balancing of rights, as well as on revolutionary courts challenging authoritarian context and generally over the role of courts in the context of illiberalism and democratic backsliding. The volume thus offers an explanation of the concept of judicial activism, its impact on both the legal system and the political order and the role of courts in shaping the structures of the legal order. These issues are explored in theoretical and comparative constitutional perspectives. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of courts, constitutional law and constitutional politics.

This volume offers different perspectives on judicial practice in the European and American contexts, both arguably characterized in the last decades by the emergence of novel normative and even policy arguments by judges. The central question deserving the attention of the contributors concerns the degree in which judicial exercises in practical reasoning may amount to forms of judicial usurpation of the legislative function by courts. Since different views as to the nature and scope of legal reasoning lead to different degrees of tolerance regarding what should be admissible to courts, that same nature and scope is thoroughly debated. The main disciplinary approach is that of general jurisprudence, but the contributions take stock of other disciplines in which judicial activism has been addressed, namely positive theories of judicial behavior. Accordingly, the book also explores the development of interdisciplinary dialogue about the theme.

In this revised and updated edition of a classic text, one of America's leading constitutional theorists presents a brief but well-balanced history of judicial review and summarizes the arguments both for and against judicial activism within the context of American democracy. Christopher Wolfe demonstrates how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights" with fateful political consequences and he challenges popular opinions held by many contemporary legal scholars. This is important reading for anyone interested in the role of the judiciary within American politics. Praise for the first edition of Judicial Activism: "This is a splendid contribution to the literature, integrating for the first time between two covers an extensive debate, honestly and dispassionately presented, on the role of courts in American policy. --Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University

Brown v. Board of Education (1954) -- Mapp v. Ohio (1961) -- Engel v. Vitale (1962) -- Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) -- New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) -- Reynolds v. Sims (1964) -- Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) -- Miranda v. Arizona (1966) -- Loving v. Virginia (1967) -- Katz v. United States (1967) -- Shapiro v. Thompson (1968) -- Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).