First published in 1968 and 1976, the two volumes of this work still constitute the only authoritative study of the broad geo-political, economic and strategic factors behind the inter-war development of the Royal Navy and, to a great extent, that of its principal rival, the United States Navy. Roskill conceived the work as a peacetime equivalent of the official naval histories, filling the gap between the First World War volumes and his own study of the Navy in the Second. As such it is marked by the extensive use of British and American sources, from which Roskill extracted shrewd and balanced conclusions that have stood the test of time.

First published in 1968 and 1976, the two volumes of this work still constitute the only authoritative study of the broad geo-political, economic and strategic factors behind the inter-war development of the Royal Navy and, to a great extent, that of its principal rival, the United States Navy. Roskill conceived the work as a peacetime equivalent of the official naval histories, filling the gap between the First World War volumes and his own study of the Navy in the Second. As such it is marked by the extensive use of British and American sources, from which Roskill extracted shrewd and balanced conclusions that have stood the test of time. Picking up the story in 1930, this volume covers the rise of the European dictatorships on the one hand, alongside continuing attempts at controlling arms expenditure through diplomacy and treaties. Eventually, Italian, German and indeed Japanese aggression diminished the prospects for peace, to the point where Britain felt forced to rearm. How the Navy used the precious few years leading up to the outbreak of war is a crucial section of the book and forms a fitting conclusion to this important study of the inter-war years.

This revisionist study shows how the Royal Navy's ideas about the meaning and application of seapower shaped its policies during the years between the wars. It examines the navy's ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, the real meaning of the 'one power standard', naval strategies for war with the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy, the influence of Mahan, the role of the navy in peacetime, and the use of propaganda to influence the British public.

This volume brings together a set of scholarly, readable and up-to-date essays covering the most significant naval mutinies of the 20th century, including Russia (1905), Brazil (1910), Austria (1918), Germany (1918), France (1918-19), Great Britain (1931), Chile (1931), the United States (1944), India (1946), China (1949), Australia, and Canada (1949). Each chapter addresses the causes of the mutiny in question, its long- and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. More generally, authors consider the state of the literature on their mutiny and examine significant historiographical issues connected with it, taking advantage of new research and new methodologies to provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. The book provides fresh insights into issues such as what a mutiny is, what factors cause them, what navies are most susceptible to them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be.

Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of leading officers, the author examines the navy's operational experience and the evolution of its tactical doctrine during the interwar period. He argues that operational experience, combined with assumptions about the nature of a future naval war, were more important in keeping the battleship afloat than conservatism in Navy.

A number of major blockades, including the Continental System in the Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812, the American Civil War, and World Wars I and II, in addition to the increased use of peacetime blockades and sanctions with the hope of avoiding war, are examined in this book. The impact of new technology and organizational changes on the nature of blockades and their effectiveness as military measures are discussed. Legal, economic, and political questions are explored to understand the various constraints upon belligerent behavior. The analysis draw upon the extensive amount of quantitative material available from military publications.

Foreword by Admiral Sir John Woodward. When published in hardcover in 1997, this book was praised for providing an engrossing education not only in naval strategy and tactics but in Victorian social attitudes and the influence of character on history. In juxtaposing an operational with a cultural theme, the author comes closer than any historian yet to explaining what was behind the often described operations of this famous 1916 battle at Jutland. Although the British fleet was victorious over the Germans, the cost in ships and men was high, and debates have raged within British naval circles ever since about why the Royal Navy was unable to take advantage of the situation. In this book Andrew Gordon focuses on what he calls a fault-line between two incompatible styles of tactical leadership within the Royal Navy and different understandings of the rules of the games.

A new assessment of the British and Commonwealth contribution to the defeat of Japan in the Pacific. The monumental struggle fought against Imperial Japan in the Asia/Pacific theater during World War II is primarily viewed as an American affair. While the United States did play a dominant role, the British and Commonwealth forces also made major contributions—on land, at sea and in the air, eventually involving over a million men and vast armadas of ships and aircraft. It was a difficult and often desperate conflict fought against a skilled and ruthless enemy that initially saw the British suffer the worst series of defeats ever to befall their armed forces. Still, the British persevered and slowly turned the tables on their Japanese antagonists. Fighting over an immense area that stretched from India in the west to the Solomon Islands in the east and Australia in the south to the waters off Japan in the north, British and Commonwealth forces eventually scored a string of stirring victories that avenged their earlier defeats and helped facilitate the demise of the Japanese Empire. Often overlooked by history, this substantial war effort is fully explored in Forgotten War. Meticulously researched, the book provides a complete, balanced and detailed account of the role that British and Commonwealth forces played on land, sea and in the air during this crucial struggle. It also provides unique analysis regarding the effectiveness and relevance of this collective effort and the contributions it made to the overall Allied victory.