This third edition covers the basic analytical developments in naval search and detection theory over the last fifty years. Accessible to anyone with a mathematical background, it covers analytical decision-making, simulation techniques, and models used in determining the probability of detection.

This textbook for Naval Academy midshipmen focuses on search and detection theory as it was developed in World War II and evolved after the war. Accessible to anyone with a mathematical background, it covers analytical decision-making, simulation techniques, and models used in determining the probability of detection. This third edition is a comprehensive update that collects in one place the basic analytical developments in naval search theory over the last fifty years, while retaining the material on the models of search theory developed in the campaigns against the submarine threat in World War II. With recent improvements in stealth technology, the need to become more knowledgeable about search theory is increasing.

Brings the fundamental principles of the scientific method to bear on operational problems and addresses the elements of the two essential functions required of a commander -- making decisions and conducting naval operations.

This new volume provides a comprehensive analysis of both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. The book is unique in using diverse sources and examples to present a comprehensive topical description and analysis of the key components of operational warfare at sea today. It opens with a survey of the emergence of operational warfare at sea since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, going on describe and analyze the objectives of naval warfare at the operational level and methods of employment of naval forces for accomplishing these objectives. The book explains the specifics of operational functions in a maritime theatre, discusses the personality traits and professional education required for successful naval operational commanders, and explores naval operational command and control in both peacetime and war, closing with predictions for the future of operational warfare at sea. This book serves as a primer of how to plan, prepare and execute major naval operations and campaigns for naval commanders and their staffs, but will also be of interest to advanced students of naval history, strategic studies and military history in general.

Operations Research (OR) emerged in an effort to improve the effectiveness of newly inducted weapons and equipment during World War II. While rapid growth ofOR led to its becoming an important aid to decision making in all sectors including defense, its contribution in defense remained largely confined to classified reports. Very few books dealing with applications of quantitative decision making techniques in military have been published presumably due to limited availability ofrelevant information. The situation changed rapidly during the last few years. The recognition of the subject of Military Operations Research (MOR) gave tremendous boost to its development. Books and journals on MOR started appearing. The number of sessions on MOR at national and international conferences also registered an increase. The volume of teaching, training and research activities in the field of MOR at military schools and non-military schools enhanced considerably. Military executives and commanders started taking increasing interest in getting scientific answers to questions pertaining to weapon acquisition, threat perception and quantification, assessment of damage or casualties, evaluation of chance of winning a battle, force mix, deployment and targeting of weapons against enemy targets, war games and scenario evaluation. Most of these problems were being tackled on the basis of intuition, judgment and experience or analysis under very simple assumptions. In an increasingly sophisticated and complex defense scenario resulting in advances in equipment and communications, the need for supplementing these practices by scientific research in MOR became imperative.

“If you only read one book on the development of the Fleet Air Arm and Naval air warfare in the Mediterranean during World War 2 then this should be it.” —Military Historical Society After the Italian declaration of war in June 1940, the Royal Navy found itself facing a larger and better-equipped Italian surface fleet, large Italian and German air forces equipped with modern aircraft and both Italian and German submarines. Its own aircraft were a critical element of an unprecedented fight on, over and under the sea surface. The best-known action was the crippling of the Italian fleet at Taranto, which demonstrated how aircraft carriers and their aircraft had replaced the dominance of battleships, but every subsequent operation is covered from the perspective of naval aviation. Some of these, like Matapan or the defense of the “Pedestal” convoy to Malta, are famous but others in support of land campaigns and in the Aegean after the Italian surrender are less well recorded. In all these, the ingenuity and innovation of the Fleet Air Arm shines through—Taranto pointed the way to what the Japanese would achieve at Pearl Harbor, while air cover for the Salerno landings demonstrated the effectiveness of carrier-borne fighters in amphibious operations, a tactic adopted by the US Navy. The author’s years of archival research together with his experience as a carrier pilot allow him to describe and analyze the operations of naval aircraft in the Mediterranean with unprecedented authority. This provides the book with novel insights into many familiar facets of the Mediterranean war while for the first time doing full justice to the Fleet Air Arm’s lesser known achievements. “A full and fascinating story.” —Clash of Steel

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have been used in military operations for more than 60 years, with torpedoes, cruise missiles, satellites, and target drones being early examples.1 They have also been widely used in the civilian sector-for example, in the disposal of explosives, for work and measurement in radioactive environments, by various offshore industries for both creating and maintaining undersea facilities, for atmospheric and undersea research, and by industry in automated and robotic manufacturing. Recent military experiences with AVs have consistently demonstrated their value in a wide range of missions, and anticipated developments of AVs hold promise for increasingly significant roles in future naval operations. Advances in AV capabilities are enabled (and limited) by progress in the technologies of computing and robotics, navigation, communications and networking, power sources and propulsion, and materials. Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations is a forward-looking discussion of the naval operational environment and vision for the Navy and Marine Corps and of naval mission needs and potential applications and limitations of AVs. This report considers the potential of AVs for naval operations, operational needs and technology issues, and opportunities for improved operations.

Scholarly studies on the Battle of Midway are prolific, yet few have examined the pivotal role American and Japanese submarines played. Fewer still have challenged the prevailing wisdom held among historians that US airstrikes on vulnerable Japanese fleet carriers marked a turning point in the war, essentially prohibiting Japan from further major naval operations. Midway Submerged presents detailed arguments regarding the tactics employed in the US strategy for the Battle of Midway and effectively argues that submarine warfare played a greater role in the battles outcome than previously thought. Through meticulous research, military historian Mark W. Allen examines the tactics, performance records, American and Japanese naval doctrine, and each participating submarines actions. He concludes that the Japanese defeat should not be blamed on ineffective submarine tactics; instead, Allen advocates a closer inspection of the overall Japanese strategic plan. Furthermore, he creates a compelling and engaging new argument that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz made an appropriate decision to use submarines defensively. Allen shows that Nimitz correctly used his available assets to defend Midway against a Japanese amphibious assault, reigniting a need for more scholarly debate on this subject. For scholars of military history, this is a worthy and much-needed addition to the body of work on the Battle of Midway.