Osprey's study of NATO armies of the post-World War II period. The defeat of Hitler on 8 May 1945 left Western Europe militarily vulnerable and economically exhausted. The Soviet Union, however, had since 1940 annexed 180,000 square miles of Eastern Europe, occupied a further 390,000 square miles, and now seemed poised to advance still further westwards with its six-million strong forces. The increasing Soviet threat brought forth demands for a permanent Western Military alliance, and on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington DC. This book explores the history, organization and uniforms of NATO armies - excluding the United States and Great Britain - as they were in the late 1980s.

The book offers a detailed analysis on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A book needs to be written on this to make sense, from a theoretical perspective, why this invasion has occurred and what the main actors are pursuing. The originality rests on testing main international relations theories: realism, liberalism and constructivism to the war that emerges with the practices and approaches during the Cold War to date from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Soviet Union (and now Russia) and Ukraine. The monograph commences with a historical overview of NATO and how it has engaged in expansionism policy to further contain Russia in contemporary international affairs with the accession of additional former Soviet states. This helps to explain the current Russian invasion of Ukraine that would attract great readership. The main argument presented rests on the pursuance of realist interests by NATO, Ukraine and Russia for containment, national security interests and as a response to the security dilemma respectively. This has served as the main catalyst of this conflict that has made diplomacy, international law and collective security measures problematic to implement.

"My fellow Americans, I'm pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.†? – Ronald Reagan, 1984. With these words, spoken as a sound check to a radio broadcast, President Reagan came dangerously close to igniting the long-simmering Cold War. Although Soviet forces were placed on alert following reports of this comment, the full-scale conflict between the West and the Soviet Bloc did not break out. Cold War Gone Hot, the latest companion volume for Force on Force, looks at the 44-year history of the Cold War and asks: "what if?†? With the orders of battle, vehicle stats and missions included in this volume, Force on Force players can simulate the advance of Soviet tanks across Western Europe, a thrust into Alaska, or any number of other plausible scenarios where history took a slightly different path.

For many people who live in Europe, the presence of substantial US military forces is a matter of concern and debate, which has tended so far to centre around a few highly-visible bases, such as the cruise missile locations. Apart from these few bases, relatively little is known about the size and extent of the US military presence in Europe. This book aims to fill that gap by providing the raw data on what is where. The study also highlights the historical details behind the acquisition of bases in individual countries, and summarizes and analyses all of the basing agreements between the US and its host nations which are available to the public. The book a timely contribution to the debate: as discussions begin for possible post-INF cuts in superpower force levels in Europe, there is an urgent need for accurate and unbiased information on US forces in Western Europe and on the massive infrastructure that supports those forces.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.