The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

A milestone in Army doctrine

Addressing the range of nation-building experiences and concerns in the United States and its allies, Watson opens with a discussion of Somalia, Haiti, and Southeastern European experiences during the 1990s. She then shifts to a discussion of the more recent lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. An examination of the growing emphasis within the U.S. government focused on the education officers at the flag rank in combined, joint, and multinational aspects of military activities that form the basis of nation-building underscores the pace of changes taking place today. As nation-building and stability operations have expanded, so too should the discussion of such activities. With increasing pressure on the United States to engage in actions abroad in the long War on Terrorism, a greater understanding among the American public of what is involved in this area is absolutely crucial. The U.S. has been involved in numerous nation-building activities. Watson breaks down the operational and doctrinal shifts that have occurred in military and political circles during the last twenty years in this introductory overview of the topic. She supplements her narrative with brief biographical essays focused on individuals such as Marine General (Ret.) and U.S. commander in Somalia (1992-1994), Anthony Zinni and others who influenced the course of nation-building and stabilization processes now in place. Their impact is underscored in the documents Watson includes, which are taken from various studies, laws, and debates on the subject at hand, making this a useful work for both students and specialists.

What is nation-building and is it ever going to succeed? A critical view from 'old Europe'.

Five years into the ongoing and tragic conflict, the paper analyzes how Syria’s economy and its people have been affected and outlines the challenges in rebuilding the economy. With extreme limitations on information, the findings of the paper are subject to an extraordinary degree of uncertainty. The key messages are: (1) that the devastating civil war has set the country back decades in terms of economic, social and human development. Syria’s GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war started and it could take two decades or more for Syria to return to its pre-conflict GDP levels; and that (2) while reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure will be a monumental task, rebuilding Syria’s human and social capital will be an even greater and lasting challenge.

Why Nation-Building Matters establishes a framework for building security forces, economic development, and political consolidation that blends soft and hard power into a deployable and effective package.

This study provides a brief overview of the US military?s involvement in stability operations and draws out the salient patterns and recurring themes that can be derived from those experiences. It is hoped that a presentation and critical analysis of the historical record will assist today?s Army in its attempts, now well under way, to reassess its long-standing attitudes toward stability operations and the role it should play in them. The US military?s experience in the conduct of stability operations prior to the Global War on Terrorism can be divided chronologically into four periods: the country?s first century (1789-1898); the?Small Wars? experience (1898-1940)7; the Cold War (1945-1990); and the post-Cold War decade (1991-2001). Reference will be made to a group of 28 representative case studies. The list of these case studies can be found at appendix A; synopses of the cases, written by members of the Combat Studies Institute, are located in appendix B.

U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. To help craft a way ahead, the authors provide an overview of the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction operations and recommend ways to improve U.S. capacity to meet these needs.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush Administration. It rejects the ’rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

René Grotenhuis analyses policies intended to bring stability to fragile states and shows how they ignore the question of what gives people a sense of belonging to a nation-state.