Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to the topic of human happiness. Yet, although Aristotle's conception of happiness is central to his whole philosophical project, there is much controversy surrounding it. Hope May offers a new interpretation of Aristotle's account of happiness - one which incorporates Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings. May argues that the relationship amongst the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues, and happiness, is best understood through the lens of developmentalism. On this view, happiness emerges from the cultivation of a number of virtues that are developmentally related. May goes on to show how contemporary scholarship in psychology, ethical theory and legal philosophy signals a return to Aristotelian ethics. Specifically, May shows how a theory of motivation known as Self-Determination Theory and recent research on goal attainment have deep affinities to Aristotle's ethical theory. May argues that this recent work can ground a contemporary virtue theory that acknowledges the centrality of autonomy in a way that captures the fundamental tenets of Aristotle's ethics.

Aristotle, according to the author, depicts the way in which human acts of various sorts and in various combinations determine the logical structure of moral character. Some moral characters--or character types--manage to incorporate a high degree of practical consistency; others incorporate less, without forfeiting their basic orientation toward the good. Still others approach utter inconsistency or moral deprivation, although even these, insofar as they are responsible for their actions, retain a core element of rationality in their souls. According to Aristotle, moral character depends ultimately on the structure of individual acts and on how they fit together into a whole that is consistent--or not consistent--with justice and friendship.--From publisher's description.

This volume provides a systematic guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a key text of ancient philosophy, and Western philosophy in general.

Echeñique discusses Aristotle's views on moral agency and voluntariness and presents a theory of moral responsibility that is both original and compelling.

From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle discusses Aristotle's biological views about character and the importance of what he calls 'natural character traits' for the development of moral virtue as presented in his ethical treatises. The aim is to provide a new, comprehensive account of the physiological underpinnings of moral development and thereby to show, first, that Aristotle's ethical theories do not exhaust his views about character as has traditionally been assumed, and, second, that his treatment of natural character in the biological treatises provides the conceptual and ideological foundation for his views about habituation as developed in his ethics. Author Mariska Leunissen takes seriously Aristotle's--often ignored--claim that nature is one of the factors through which men become 'good and capable of fine deeds'. Part I ('The Physiology of Natural Character') analyzes, in three chapters, Aristotle's notion of natural character as it is developed in the biological treatises and its role in moral development, especially as it affects women and certain 'barbarians'-groups who are typically left out of accounts of Aristotle's ethics. Leunissen also discuss its relevance for our understanding of physiognomical ideas in Aristotle. Part II ('The Physiology of Moral Development) explores the psychophysical changes in body and soul one is required to undergo in the process of acquiring moral virtues. It includes a discussion of Aristotle's eugenic views, of his identification of habituation as a form of human perfection, and of his claims about the moral deficiencies of women that link them to his beliefs about their biological imperfections.

Presents a new translation with commentary exploring the final book of Aristotle's Ethics in a philosophically rigorous yet interpretatively open way.

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it's not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. It's not clear, for instance, what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it. Nor is it clear how we should understand the nature of its contributionwhat it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are "derived from" or "based on" what we perceive. Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate makes the case that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception's role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. Aristotle's Empiricism offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual meansand that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animalsbut also holds that our intellectual powers allow us to surpass these animals in certain ways and thereby develop distinctively human forms of understanding.

This book presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle's account of how shame instils virtue, and defends its philosophical import. Shame is shown to provide motivational continuity between the actions of the learners and the virtuous dispositions that they will eventually acquire.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.