Recently, students and scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of economics and have called for the reintroduction of historical perspectives into economic thinking. Supporting the idea that fruitful lessons can be drawn from the work of past economists, this volume brings together an international cross section of leading economists and historians of economic thought to reflect on the crucial role that money, crises and finance play in the economy. The book draws on the work of economists throughout history to consider afresh themes such as financial and real explanations of economic crises, the role of central banks, and the design of macroeconomic policies. These themes are all central to the work of Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, and the contributions both reflect on and further her research agenda. This book will be of interest to researchers in the history of economic thought, and those who wish to gain a deeper understanding of the variety and diversity in approaches to economic ideas throughout history.

An empirical investigation of financial crises during the last 800 years.

This volume chronicles the evolution of modern financial markets against the backdrop of some of the finance world's most infamous crises. Financial periods are intricately and historically examined, simplifying the financial instruments and techniques so that even the non-financial reader can identify the pattern that Morris uncovers in the lead up to a crisis.

WINNER OF THE LIONEL GELBER PRIZE A NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK OF 2018 ONE OF THE ECONOMIST'S BOOKS OF THE YEAR A NEW YORK TIMES CRITICS' TOP BOOK "An intelligent explanation of the mechanisms that produced the crisis and the response to it...One of the great strengths of Tooze's book is to demonstrate the deeply intertwined nature of the European and American financial systems."--The New York Times Book Review From the prizewinning economic historian and author of Shutdown and The Deluge, an eye-opening reinterpretation of the 2008 economic crisis (and its ten-year aftermath) as a global event that directly led to the shockwaves being felt around the world today. We live in a world where dramatic shifts in the domestic and global economy command the headlines, from rollbacks in US banking regulations to tariffs that may ignite international trade wars. But current events have deep roots, and the key to navigating today’s roiling policies lies in the events that started it all—the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath. Despite initial attempts to downplay the crisis as a local incident, what happened on Wall Street beginning in 2008 was, in fact, a dramatic caesura of global significance that spiraled around the world, from the financial markets of the UK and Europe to the factories and dockyards of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, forcing a rearrangement of global governance. With a historian’s eye for detail, connection, and consequence, Adam Tooze brings the story right up to today’s negotiations, actions, and threats—a much-needed perspective on a global catastrophe and its long-term consequences.

Collects the transcripts of a series of lectures given by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke about the 2008 financial crisis as part of a course at George Washington University on the role of the Federal Reserve in the economy.

The Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007-2008 reminds us with devastating force that financial instability and crises are endemic to capitalist economies. This Handbook describes the theoretical, institutional, and historical factors that can help us understand the forces that create financial crises.

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

This is the first history of finance - broadly defined to include money, banking, capital markets, public and private finance, international transfers etc. - that covers Western Europe (with an occasional glance at the western hemisphere) and half a millennium. Charles Kindleberger highlights the development of financial institutions to meet emerging needs, and the similarities and contrasts in the handling of financial problems such as transferring resources from one country to another, stimulating investment, or financing war and cleaning up the resulting monetary mess. The first half of the book covers money, banking and finance from 1450 to 1913; the second deals in considerably finer detail with the twentieth century. This major work casts current issues in historical perspective and throws light on the fascinating, and far from orderly, evolution of financial institutions and the management of financial problems. Comprehensive, critical and cosmopolitan, this book is both an outstanding work of reference and essential reading for all those involved in the study and practice of finance, be they economic historians, financial experts, scholarly bankers or students of money and banking. This groundbreaking work was first published in 1984.

The editors of this book have put together a compelling compendium of explanations and consequences of the global financial crisis. The essays are fairly homogeneous despite their apparent diversity, all providing a useful historical background. There is an obvious Institutionalist twist, with authors examining the changes in organizations and regulations that have accompanied the move towards financialization and money-manager capitalism. This analysis is often informed by the work of Hyman Minsky, pointing towards the inherent destabilizing forces of competition, as well as the dangers of deregulation, self-regulation, securitization, excess leverage, global imbalances, and the illusion of liquidity-enhancing and risk-reducing financial innovations. Marc Lavoie, University of Ottawa, Canada This valuable collection offers a stimulating range of heterodox views on the global financial crisis and proposals for reform of the financial system, nationally and internationally. The perspective of the authors is broadly Post Keynesian, sometimes with a radical or an institutionalist twist. Vigorously argued, clearly presented and largely non-technical, these essays provide a great deal of food for thought. John King, La Trobe University, Australia Though the worst of the financial crisis of 2008 has, with hope, ebbed, it has forever changed the economy in the United States and throughout the rest of the world. Using the financial and economic crisis as a catalyst, this volume examines how to better regulate the financial system and what to expect in the future if no steps are made toward reform. This book lays the foundation for those steps by providing concrete ideas that will push policy in the direction of jobs growth and widespread prosperity. Paired with a history of financial market problems, Heterodox Analysis of Financial Crisis and Reform analyzes complacency regarding the state of the economy, its lack of jobs, growing income disparity, poverty and the consequences of the false but widely shared belief that the economy is self-regulating. This book suggests ways to account for the inherent instability of financial markets and how to make asset values less precarious. Examining both the macro and micro sides of financial instability, the authors argue that existing rules and regulations are either not applied or that they are not effective enough to prevent market fluctuations of the magnitude experienced in 2008. This volume also sheds new light on just how inextricably linked success on Wall Street and welfare on Main Street have become. Students and scholars of heterodox economics, historians, political scientists, policymakers and all those with an interest in an economic renaissance will find this thought-provoking analysis of significant interest.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.