John Norris shows how logistics, though less glamorous than details of the fighting itself, played a decisive role in the outcome of every campaign and battle of World War Two. The author marshals some astounding facts and figures to convey the sheer scale of the task all belligerents faced to equip vast forces and supply them in the field. He also draws on first-hand accounts to illustrate what this meant for the men and women in the logistics chain and those depending on it at the sharp end. Many of the vehicles, from supply trucks to pack mules, and other relevant hardware are discussed and illustrated with numerous photographs. This first volume of two looks at the early years of the war, so we see, for example, how Hitlers panzer divisions were kept rolling in the Blitzkrieg (a German division in 1940 still had around 5000 horses, requiring hundreds of tonnes of fodder) and the British armys disastrous loss of equipment at Dunkirk. This is a fascinating and valuable study of a neglected aspect of World War Two.

A history of the Second World War with a focus on supply, transport, and other crucial operations—includes photos. Logistics, though less dramatic or glamorous than other aspects of war, nevertheless play a decisive role in the outcome of campaigns and battles. This book focuses on the role of logistics in World War II, marshaling some astounding facts and figures to convey the sheer scale of the task all belligerents faced to equip vast forces and supply them in the field. Military historian John Norris also draws on firsthand accounts to illustrate what this meant for the men and women in the logistics chain and those depending on it at the sharp end. Many of the vehicles, from supply trucks to pack mules, and other relevant hardware are discussed and illustrated with numerous photographs. Numerous topics are covered—for example, how Hitler’s panzer divisions were kept rolling in the Blitzkrieg (a German division in 1940 still had around five thousand horses, requiring hundreds of tons of fodder) and the British army’s disastrous loss of equipment at Dunkirk. This is a fascinating and valuable study of a neglected aspect of World War II.

Logistics in World War II: Final Report of the Army Service Forces is the after-action report of the vast logistics undertaking by the ASF headquarters both in the zone of interior and in distant theaters during World War II, considered to be a logistician's war. Long out of print, this facsimile edition covers what was done, how it was done, the problems and their solutions, and the successes and failures, ending with key lessons for future application. The report provides insights into methods and practices to achieve logistics readiness, and serves as an invaluable reference source for those researching the logistical dimension stretching from the factory floor to the foxhole. ARMY SERVICE FORCES, known as the Services of Supply until 12 March 1943, was responsible for administrative, supply (including procurement), and service activities for the War Department as a whole. With its creation, Army logistics was put on what promised to be a businesslike footing.

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

Throughout 1943, the German army, heirs to a military tradition that demanded and perfected relentless offensive operations, succumbed to the realities of its own overreach and the demands of twentieth-century industrialized warfare. In his new study, prizewinning author Robert Citino chronicles this weakening Wehrmacht, now fighting desperately on the defensive but still remarkably dangerous and lethal. Drawing on his impeccable command of German-language sources, Citino offers fresh, vivid, and detailed treatments of key campaigns during this fateful year: the Allied landings in North Africa, General von Manstein's great counterstroke in front of Kharkov, the German attack at Kasserine Pass, the titanic engagement of tanks and men at Kursk, the Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and Belgorod, and the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy. Through these events, he reveals how a military establishment historically configured for violent aggression reacted when the tables were turned; how German commanders viewed their newest enemy, the U.S. Army, after brutal fighting against the British and Soviets; and why, despite their superiority in materiel and manpower, the Allies were unable to turn 1943 into a much more decisive year. Applying the keen operational analysis for which he is so highly regarded, Citino contends that virtually every flawed German decision-to defend Tunis, to attack at Kursk and then call off the offensive, to abandon Sicily, to defend Italy high up the boot and then down much closer to the toe-had strong supporters among the army's officer corps. He looks at all of these engagements from the perspective of each combatant nation and also establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt the synergistic interplay between the fronts. Ultimately, Citino produces a grim portrait of the German officer corps, dispelling the longstanding tendency to blame every bad decision on Hitler. Filled with telling vignettes and sharp portraits and copiously documented, The Wehrmacht Retreats is a dramatic and fast-paced narrative that will engage military historians and general readers alike.

Contents: Mobilization activities before Pearl Harbor day; education for mobilization; interwar planning for industrial mobilization; mobilizing for war: 1939-1941; the war production board; the controlled materials plan; the office of war mobilization & reconversion; U.S. production in World War II; balancing military & civilian needs; overcoming raw material scarcities; maritime construction; people mobilization: Rosie the RiveterÓ; conclusions. Appendix: production of selected munitions items; the war agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.