Everyone knows it is easy to lie with statistics. It is important then to be able to tell a statistical lie from a valid statistical inference. It is a relatively widely accepted commonplace that our scientific knowledge is not certain and incorrigible, but merely probable, subject to refinement, modifi cation, and even overthrow. The rankest beginner at a gambling table understands that his decisions must be based on mathematical ex pectations - that is, on utilities weighted by probabilities. It is widely held that the same principles apply almost all the time in the game of life. If we turn to philosophers, or to mathematical statisticians, or to probability theorists for criteria of validity in statistical inference, for the general principles that distinguish well grounded from ill grounded generalizations and laws, or for the interpretation of that probability we must, like the gambler, take as our guide in life, we find disagreement, confusion, and frustration. We might be prepared to find disagreements on a philosophical and theoretical level (although we do not find them in the case of deductive logic) but we do not expect, and we may be surprised to find, that these theoretical disagreements lead to differences in the conclusions that are regarded as 'acceptable' in the practice of science and public affairs, and in the conduct of business.

An introductory 2001 textbook on probability and induction written by a foremost philosopher of science.

Probability theory

Standard probability theory has been an enormously successful contribution to modern science. However, from many perspectives it is too narrow as a general theory of uncertainty, particularly for issues involving subjective uncertainty. This first-of-its-kind book is primarily based on qualitative approaches to probabilistic-like uncertainty, and includes qualitative theories for the standard theory as well as several of its generalizations.One of these generalizations produces a belief function composed of two functions: a probability function that measures the probabilistic strength of an uncertain event, and another function that measures the amount of ambiguity or vagueness of the event. Another unique approach of the book is to change the event space from a boolean algebra, which is closely linked to classical propositional logic, to a different event algebra that is closely linked to a well-studied generalization of classical propositional logic known as intuitionistic logic. Together, these new qualitative theories succeed where the standard probability theory fails by accounting for a number of puzzling empirical findings in the psychology of human probability judgments and decision making.

Discussing the relations between logic and probability, this book compares classical 17th- and 18th-century theories of probability with contemporary theories, explores recent logical theories of probability, and offers a new account of probability as a part of logic.

The present study is an extension of the topic introduced in Dr. Hailperin's Sentential Probability Logic, where the usual true-false semantics for logic is replaced with one based more on probability, and where values ranging from 0 to 1 are subject to probability axioms. Moreover, as the word "sentential" in the title of that work indicates, the language there under consideration was limited to sentences constructed from atomic (not inner logical components) sentences, by use of sentential connectives ("no," "and," "or," etc.) but not including quantifiers ("for all," "there is"). An initial introduction presents an overview of the book. In chapter one, Halperin presents a summary of results from his earlier book, some of which extends into this work. It also contains a novel treatment of the problem of combining evidence: how does one combine two items of interest for a conclusion-each of which separately impart a probability for the conclusion-so as to have a probability for the conclusion basedon taking both of the two items of interest as evidence? Chapter two enlarges the Probability Logic from the first chapter in two respects: the language now includes quantifiers ("for all," and "there is") whose variables range over atomic sentences, notentities as with standard quantifier logic. (Hence its designation: ontological neutral logic.) A set of axioms for this logic is presented. A new sentential notion-the suppositional-in essence due to Thomas Bayes, is adjoined to this logic that later becomes the basis for creating a conditional probability logic. Chapter three opens with a set of four postulates for probability on ontologically neutral quantifier language. Many properties are derived and a fundamental theorem is proved, namely, for anyprobability model (assignment of probability values to all atomic sentences of the language) there will be a unique extension of the probability values to all closed sentences of the language. The chapter concludes by showing the Borel's early denumerableprobability concept (1909) can be justified by its being, in essence, close to Hailperin's probability result applied to denumerable language. The final chapter introduces the notion of conditional-probability to a language having quantifiers of the kind

First published in 1982, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory starts with the uses we make of the concept in everyday life and then examines the rival theories that seek to account for these applications. It offers a critical exposition of the major philosophical theories of probability, with special attention given to the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and implications of each. The Classical Theory suggests probability is simply the ratio of favorable cases to all equi-possible cases: it is this theory that is relied on by gamblers and by most non-specialists. The A Priori Theory, on the other hand, describes probability as a logical relation between statements based on evidence. The Relative Frequency theories locate it not in logic but among empirical rates of occurrence in the real world, while the Subjectivist Theory identifies probability with the degree of a person’s belief in a proposition. Each of these types of theory is examined in turn, and the treatment is unified by the use of running examples and parallel analyses of each theory. The final chapter includes a summary and the author’s conclusions. This book is an essential read for scholars and researchers of Philosophy.

The first edition of this single volume on the theory of probability has become a highly-praised standard reference for many areas of probability theory. Chapters from the first edition have been revised and corrected, and this edition contains four new chapters. New material covered includes multivariate and ratio ergodic theorems, shift coupling, Palm distributions, Harris recurrence, invariant measures, and strong and weak ergodicity.