Comparative studies examine the constitutional design and actual operation of governments in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States. Contributors analyze the structures and workings of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in each sphere of government. They also explore how the federal nature of the polity affects those institutions and how the institutions in turn affect federalism. The book concludes with reflections on possible future trends.

Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

A careful evaluation of the nature and effects of the separation of the executive and legislative branches, Charles O. Jones treats specific developments in presidential-congressional relations by analyzing the experiences and styles of Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Bill Clinton.

The new series Stellenbosch Handbooks in African Constitutional Law will engage with contemporary issues of constitutionalism in Africa, filling a notable gap in African comparative constitutional law. Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism is the first in the series, examining one of the critical measures introduced by African constitutional designers in their attempts to entrench an ethos of constitutionalism on the continent. Taking a critical look at the different ways in which attempts have been made to separate the different branches of government, the Handbook examines the impact this is having on transparent and accountable governance. Beginning with an overview of constitutionalism in Africa and the different influences on modern African constitutional developments, it looks at the relationship between the legislature and the executive as well as the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches. Despite differences in approaches between the different constitutional cultures that have influenced developments in Africa, there remain common problems. One of these problems is the constant friction in the relationship between the three branches and the resurgent threats of authoritarianism which clearly suggest that there remain serious problems in both constitutional design and implementation. The book also studies the increasing role being played by independent constitutional institutions and how they complement the checks and balances associated with the traditional three branches of government.

Reveals how the U.S. Supreme Court's presidentialism threatens our democracy and what to do about it. Donald Trump's presidency made many Americans wonder whether our system of checks and balances would prove robust enough to withstand an onslaught from a despotic chief executive. In The Specter of Dictatorship, David Driesen analyzes the chief executive's role in the democratic decline of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey and argues that an insufficiently constrained presidency is one of the most important systemic threats to democracy. Driesen urges the U.S. to learn from the mistakes of these failing democracies. Their experiences suggest, Driesen shows, that the Court must eschew its reliance on and expansion of the "unitary executive theory" recently endorsed by the Court and apply a less deferential approach to presidential authority, invoked to protect national security and combat emergencies, than it has in recent years. Ultimately, Driesen argues that concern about loss of democracy should play a major role in the Court's jurisprudence, because loss of democracy can prove irreversible. As autocracy spreads throughout the world, maintaining our democracy has become an urgent matter.

Der Band enthält die Vorträge des 6. Seoul-Freiburg Law-Faculties Symposium, das im Juni 2016 in Freiburg i. Br. stattfand. Seit ihrem Beginn im Jahre 1996 hat die Partnerschaft zwischen der Law School der Seoul National University und der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs Universität vielfältige Früchte getragen, wesentlich zum gegenseitigen Verständnis des Rechtsdenkens und der Rechtsforschung in beiden Rechtskulturen und Rechtsordnungen beigetragen und damit zugleich die ebenso alte wie wertvolle Tradition der engen Verknüpfung zwischen koreanischem und deutschem Recht fortgeführt. Wie bereits die vorangehenden Symposien widmete sich das Symposium des Jahres 2016 mit dem Generalthema "Relationship between the Legislature and the Judiciary" einem grundsätzlichen Problem, dessen spezifische Ausprägungen im Verfassungsrecht, in der Rechtstheorie, im Privatrecht, im Strafrecht, im Handelsrechts und im Verwaltungsrechts Gegenstand der Vorträge und Diskussionen waren. Mit Beiträgen von: Un Jong Pak, Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher, Hong Sik Cho, Kye Joung Lee, Frank Schäfer, Jinsu Yune, Jan von Hein, Sank Won Lee, Ok-Rial Song, Boris Paal, Maximilian Haedicke, Seongwook Heo, Dongjin Lee