The Committee calls for better and more accessible procedures for civil servants to raise concerns about the conduct of government. A route should to be established whereby evidence that a minister had misled Parliament or the public could be reported to Parliament following a complaint by a civil servant. Leaks damage trust within government and trust in government. The Committee concludes that leak investigations are often hamstrung by the fact that many leaks are politically motivated, including leaks from ministers and special advisers. The most effective way to prevent leaks by civil servants is to have accessible, effective and visible ways for individuals to raise concerns about the conduct of government, either internally or through an external oversight body, the Civil Service Commissioners. The report makes the following key recommendations: the Civil Service Commissioners should have the power to report to Parliament evidence indicating that the government was misleading Parliament or the public or the fact that the Civil Service has refused to act on a justified complaint; the Commissioners should also conduct independent investigation of breaches of confidentiality by special advisers; the leaking of information should only be a criminal matter where there is a breach of the Official Secrets Act or there is evidence of serious criminal misconduct; the Cabinet Office, Heads of Departments and the Civil Service Commissioners should do more to ensure that potential whistleblowers know how to raise concerns and have the confidence to come forward with them.

This book is the first of its kind to provide an in-depth treatment of the law of unauthorised disclosures in the United Kingdom. Drawing upon extensive data obtained using freedom of information as a methodology and examples from comparative jurisdictions, the book considers the position of civil servants, employees of the security and intelligence services and service personnel in the armed forces. It considers the protections available, the consequences of leaking and a full assessment of the authorised alternatives.

The book deals with the complicated relationships between national security and human rights, and between public health and human rights. Its premise is the fact that national security and public health are both included in human rights instruments as ‘exceptions’ to the human rights therein sanctioned, yet they can arguably be considered as human rights themselves and be equally valuable. The book therefore asks to what extent the protection of the individual could – or should – be overridden to enable the protection of the national security or public health of the general public. Both practice and case law have shown that human rights risk being set aside when they clash with the protection of national security or public health. Through theoretical analysis and practical examples, the book addresses the conflicts that arise when the concepts of national security and public health are used – and abused – and other rights, including freedom of speech, procedural freedoms, individual health, are violated as a consequence. It provides many interesting findings on the values that states are ready to protect – and forego – to ensure their safety, which can contribute to the ongoing debate on the protection of human rights. This book was originally published as a special issue of The International Journal of Human Rights.

On 27 November 2008 a senior Member of Parliament and Opposition spokesman, Mr Damian Green, was arrested by police and his home and offices searched in connection with an investigation into the leak and publication of a number of government documents. Press reports indicated that Mr Green was believed to have received government documents from a Home Office official, Mr Christopher Galley, who had been arrested eight days earlier and who had subsequently admitted to having leaked some documents. This series of events, and particularly the fact that Mr Green's office at the House of Commons was searched without the police producing a warrant, caused considerable disquiet. The Committee's remit was to review the internal processes of the House administration for granting permission for such action (as police searches of Members' offices and seizure of their papers), and to make recommendations for the future. As a starting point, the reasons why the police were requested to investigate the suspected disclosure of government information and how many disclosures, the type of information that had been leaked, in particular, whether any of it was relevant to national security or was otherwise classified, and the efforts that had been made to discover the source of the leaks before the police were called in. Also the Committee wished to disentangle the roles of the Home Office and the Cabinet Office in the investigation process. The Committee concluded the Home Office appears to have followed best practice for investigating leaks, as set out in the Cabinet Office's Memorandum to the Committees' sister Committee. But there are concerns that growing frustration in both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office may have led officials to give an exaggerated impression of the damage done by the leaks that could reasonably be presumed to have emanated from the Home Office. The Committee thought it was unhelpful to give the police the impression that the Home Office leaker(s) had already caused considerable damage to national security. The Cabinet Office's guidance to departments says that it is appropriate to involve the police in leak investigations when they involve "a serious and damaging impact on the functioning of a Department and suspicion of leaking sensitive information". However, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a leak of sensitive information could lead to a damaging impact on the functioning of a Department without falling within the categories laid down in statute. The Cabinet Office's guidance therefore seems to leave open the possibility of involving the police in an investigation without any suspicion let alone evidence that a criminal offence under the Act has taken place. The Committee recommend that the Cabinet Office revise its guidance to preclude this possibility.

This comparative study focuses on the changing relations between civil servants and politicians in the European Union in the last two decades. As well as national case studies this book also looks into politico-administrative relations in supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Incorporating HC 1040-i, ii and ii, session 2008-09. About the police search on 27 November 2009 of the Parliamentary offices of Damian Green MP, who had been leaked some restricted papers by a Home Office official

Seeks views on the content and administration of the MPs' expenses scheme. This title includes chapters that cover: scope of the consultation; principles of the scheme; working as an MP; expenses and allowances; administering the expenses scheme; working from two locations - accommodation for MPs; travel and subsistence; and, staff for MPs.

Greater transparency is increasingly seen as the answer to a wide range of social issues by governments, NGOs and businesses around the world. However, evidence of its impact is mixed. Using case studies from around the world including India, Tanzania, the UK and US, Transparency and the open society surveys the adoption of transparency globally, providing an essential framework for assessing its likely performance as a policy and the steps that can be taken to make it more effective. It addresses the role of transparency in the context of growing use by governments and businesses of surveillance and database driven decision making. The book is written for anyone involved in the use of transparency whether campaigning from outside or working inside government or business to develop policies.

The 2010 release of US embassy diplomatic cables put WikiLeaks into the international spotlight. Revelations by the leaks sparked intense debate within international diplomacy, journalism and society. This book reflects on the implications of WikiLeaks across politics and media, and on the results of leak journalism and transparency activism.

This book provides a definitive overview of the relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. The secrecy surrounding intelligence means that publication of intelligence is highly restricted, barring occasional whistle-blowing and sanitised official leaks. These characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicised, can be highly manipulated by intelligence elites, while civil society’s ability to assess and verify claims is compromised by absence of independent evidence. There are few studies on the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites, which makes it hard to form robust assessments or practical recommendations regarding public oversight of intelligence elites. Addressing that lacuna, this book analyses two case studies of global political significance. The intelligence practices they focus on (contemporary mass surveillance and Bush-era torture-intelligence policies) have been presented as vital in fighting the ‘Global War on Terror’, enmeshing governments of scores of nation-states, while challenging internationally established human rights to privacy and to freedom from torture and enforced disappearance. The book aims to synthesise what is known on relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. It moves away from disciplinary silos, to make original recommendations for how a variety of academic disciplines most likely to study the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites (international relations, history, journalism and media) could productively cross-fertilise. Finally, it aims to create a practical benchmark to enable civil society to better hold intelligence elites publicly accountable. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, surveillance, media, journalism, civil society, democracy and IR in general.