The Makhnovist movement was an attempt by peasants in southeastern Ukraine to create an anarchist society in 1917–1921. This unique social experiment embraced a substantial territory with a population of millions but has been little studied by historians. In the years of revolution and civil war, the movement was protected from its numerous enemies by a remarkable military force—the Insurgent Army—and by an intelligence service—the Kontrrazvedka. It is the latter institution which is the subject of this study by Vyacheslav Azarov, a present-day Ukrainian anarchist.

This book extends principal-agent theory to the case of pro-Russian rebel militias in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates the much-discussed relations between the principal (Russia) and agent (rebel militias) in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 was a frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order, and since 2022 it has offered a challenge to the global order. Filling the gap in the literature on indirect warfare and insurgencies, this book offers systematic insights into structures and relations within the leaderless rebellion in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. It introduces the concept of the delegation of leaderless rebellion, based on the argument that it is a specific kind of rebellion when local elites do not actively participate as the leaders of the rebellion. Random people, without any fighting or political experience and with no social embeddedness, become rebel commanders, which means the principal – Russia – faces serious challenges but also benefits from opportunities to exercise complete control over the rebel forces and administration. This book will be of much interest to students of civil wars and insurgencies, political violence, Eastern European politics, and international relations in general.

In 1883, the Russian police established the Foreign Agentura in Paris. The bureau's brief: to forewarn Tsardom of terrorist plans and, if possible, to defuse acts of terrorism against high personages by revolutionaries operating under European sanctuary. As the revolutionary emigration expanded, the Foreign Agentura reacted by spreading its tentacles across Europe and England. With the help of their European colleagues, the Tsar's agents tackled and drove back this terrorist force, proving themselves invaluable in the evolution of political policing.

In the years following the Russian Revolution, a bitter civil war was waged between the Bolsheviks, with their Red Army of Workers and Peasants on the one side, and the various groups that constituted the anti-Bolshevik movement on the other. The major anti-Bolshevik force was the White Army, whose leadership consisted of former officers of the Russian imperial army. In the received—and simplified—version of this history, those Jews who were drawn into the political and military conflict were overwhelmingly affiliated with the Reds, while from the start, the Whites orchestrated campaigns of anti-Jewish violence, leading to the deaths of thousands of Jews in pogroms in the Ukraine and elsewhere. In Russian Jews Between the Reds and the Whites, 1917-1920, Oleg Budnitskii provides the first comprehensive historical account of the role of Jews in the Russian Civil War. According to Budnitskii, Jews were both victims and executioners, and while they were among the founders of the Soviet state, they also played an important role in the establishment of the anti-Bolshevik factions. He offers a far more nuanced picture of the policies of the White leadership toward the Jews than has been previously available, exploring such issues as the role of prominent Jewish politicians in the establishment of the White movement of southern Russia, the "Jewish Question" in the White ideology and its international aspects, and the attempts of the Russian Orthodox Church and White diplomacy to forestall the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The relationship between the Jews and the Reds was no less complicated. Nearly all of the Jewish political parties severely disapproved of the Bolshevik coup, and the Red Army was hardly without sin when it came to pogroms against the Jews. Budnitskii offers a fresh assessment of the part played by Jews in the establishment of the Soviet state, of the turn in the policies of Jewish socialist parties after the first wave of mass pogroms and their efforts to attract Jews to the Red Army, of Bolshevik policies concerning the Jewish population, and of how these stances changed radically over the course of the Civil War.

Nestor Makhno has been called a revolutionary anarchist, a peasant rebel, the Ukrainian Robin Hood, a mass-murderer, a pogromist, and a devil. These epithets had their origins in the Russian Civil War (1917–1921), where the military forces of the peasant-anarchist Nestor Makhno and Mennonite colonists in southern Ukraine came into conflict. In autumn 1919, Makhnovist troops and local peasant sympathizers murdered more than 800 Mennonites in a series of large-scale massacres. The history of that conflict has been fraught with folklore, ideological battles and radically divergent cultural memories, in which fact and fiction often seamlessly blend, conjuring a multitude of Makhnos, each one shouting its message over the other. Drawing on theories of collective memory and narrative analysis, Makhno and Memory brings a vast array of Makhnovist and Mennonite sources into dialogue, including memoirs, histories, diaries, newspapers, and archival material. A diversity of perspectives are brought into relief through the personal reminiscences of Makhno and his anarchist sympathizers alongside Mennonite pacifists and advocates for armed self-defense. Through a meticulous analysis of the Makhnovist-Mennonite conflict and a micro-study of the Eichenfeld massacre of November 1919, Sean Patterson attempts to make sense of the competing cultural memories and presents new ways of thinking about Makhno and his movement. Makhno and Memory offers a convincing reframing of the Mennonite / Makhno relationship that will force a scholarly reassessment of this period.

Lively, incendiary, and inspiring No Harmless Power follows the life of Nestor Makhno, who organized a seven million strong anarchist polity during the Russian civil war, and who developed Platform-anarchism during his exile in Paris as well as advising other anarchists like Durruti on tactics and propaganda. Both timely and timeless, this biography reveals Makhno’s rapidly changing world and his place in it. He moved swiftly from peasant youth to prisoner to revolutionary anarchist leader. Narrowly escaping Bolshevik Ukraine for Paris—this book also chronicles the friends and enemies he made along the way including: Lenin, Trotsky, Alexander Berkman, Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, Ida Mett, and others. No Harmless Power is the first text to fully delve into Makhno’s sympathy for the downtrodden, the trap of personal heroism, his improbable victories, unlikely friendships, and his alarming lack of gun-safety in meetings. Makhno and the movement he began are seldom mentioned in most mainstream histories—Western or Russian—mostly on the grounds that acknowledging anarchist polities calls into question the inevitability and desirability of the nation-state and unjust hierarchies. With illustrations by N.O. BONZO and Kevin Matthews, this is a fresh, humorous, and necessary look at an under-examined corner of history as well as a deep exploration of the meaning—and value, if any—of heroism as history.

Vasily Zarubin ranked as an important Soviet intelligence officer, but he has received little recognition in the history of intelligence in the United States. In Rezident, author Robert K. Baker, who worked with foreign counterintelligence matters for the FBI during a thirty-three-year career, presents the first English language biography of Zarubin, Stalins principal intelligence officer in this country during World War II. Rezident recounts the exploits of Zarubins work with Soviet intelligence during the twentieth century narrating how his odyssey extended from the Soviet Far East during the early years of Soviet Russia to deep cover assignments with his wife, Elizaveta, in France, Nazi Germany, and the United States. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin appointed Zarubin as his intelligence emissary to the United States to gather political, military, and technological information. Zarubin was successful in providing valuable information to the Soviet Union during the war years. This biography of Zarubins life and times provides a greater appreciation and understanding of the role of the security and intelligence services in the sphere of national security.

"An exploration of prewar and postwar power relations in Russia's Smolensk amid Stalinism and Nazism in Russia's Smolensk. The book investigates how lived experiences shaped people's fateful choices and how ordinary people sustained the twentieth century's two most murderous regimes"--

Near and Distant Neighbours is the first ever substantiated and complete history of Soviet intelligence. Based on a mass of newly declassified Russian secret intelligence documentation, it reveals the true story of Soviet intelligence from its very beginnings in 1917 right through to the end of the Cold War. Covering both main branches of Soviet espionage - civilian and military - Jonathan Haslam charts the full range of the Soviet intelligence effort and the story of its development: in cryptography, disinformation, special forces, and counter-intelligence. In a tragic irony, an organization that so casually disposed of others critically depended upon the human factor. Due to their lack of expertise and technological know-how, from early on the Soviets were forced to rely heavily on secret agents instead of the more sophisticated code-breaking techniques of other intelligence agencies. But in this they were highly successful, recruiting spy rings such as the infamous 'Cambridge Five' in the 1930s. Had it not been for Soviet espionage against Britain's code-breaking effort during the Second World War, Stalin might never have won the victory that later enabled him to dominate half of Europe. Similarly, espionage directed at his allies enabled the Soviets to build an atomic bomb earlier than expected and to take calculated risks in post-war diplomacy, such as his audacious blockade of Berlin which led to the Berlin Airlift. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 alienated many of the foreign 'friends' so valued by the Soviet intelligence services. It also made new recruitment of foreign agents much more difficult, as the USSR rapidly lost its glamour and ideological appeal to potential supporters in the West during the 1950s. However, the gap was finally bridged through exploiting greedy and disloyal Western intelligence officers, using blackmail and bribery - and with great success. In fact, it was the ultimate irony that the KGB and GRU had never been more effective than when the Soviet Union began to collapse from within.